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INTRODUCTION
The great bulk of private securities litigation in recent years has been
under the implied liability provisions of federal law.' With the United
States Supreme Court busy repressing that implied liability,2 it is time for
states to rethink the explicit civil liability provisions in their securities laws
and for private litigants to look more closely at the explicit liability provi-
sions in both federal and state law 3
In 1977 Texas enacted a major revision of its civil liability provi-
sions--those which create private rights to damages or rescission for fraud
or regulatory violations in securities transactions. This Article, which will
appear in two or more installments, if I ever finish it, concentrates on the
new civil liability § 33 and aims to provide (a) an unofficial legislative his-
tory4 of § 33 as it was hammered out in the State Bar Committee, since, as
1. See I BROMBERG § 2.5(6), at 45.
2. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (affirming
buyer-seller requirement for private suits under antifraud SEC Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (1977), and denouncing "vexatious" shareholder suits); Rondeau v. Mosinee
Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975) (requiring irreparable injury for the issuance of an injunc-
tion-in a private suit by a target of an alleged takeover through market purchases-for
violation of the 5% ownership disclosure requirements of SEA § 13(d)); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (requiring intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud for a
lob-5 suit); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (exchange offeror has no
implied cause of action for damages against a rival offeror under SEA § 14(e), the antifraud
statute for tender and exchange offers); Santa Fe Indus. Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977)
(no lOb-5 cause of action for full disclosure Delaware short form merger, regardless of the
unfairness of the terms of the merger or the absence of a corporate purpose).
3. I am not the first writer to observe that plaintiffs have apparently overlooked the
state securities laws. See Wolens, 'Hidden Gold" in the Blue Sky Laws, 20 Sw. L.J. 578
(1966).
4. Unofficial Legislative History. This history consists primarily of the changes in the
12 Drafts of the State Bar Committee proposal, and the reasons for them. They will be
given at relevant points in this Article. The Bar Committee has long been active in prepar-
ing and recommending securities legislation in Texas. In particular, it prepared the 1963
civil liability amendments and was disappointed in the changes made by the Legislature in
the Bar draft. It had better luck, or did a more thorough job, on the 1977 civil liability
amendments, which were passed without change in the Legislature.
The 1977 revision got its start in 1974 with the appointment of a study committee on civil
liabilities. Actual drafting began with the 1975 appointment of a Subcommittee on Civil
Liabilities, whose final membership was Sam Rosen (Chairman), Alan R. Bromberg, John
E. Dees, Jr., and Robert F. Watson. Others who served on the subcommittee at various
points were Raymond Britton, Fletcher L. Yarbrough, S. Tevis Grinstead, and David Short.
In time and by that process which seems to assume that law professors have more available
time than other persons, I came to be the chief draftsman for the project. For those inter-
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usual in Texas (and most other states), the official legislative history con-
sists of only a few dates, names, and votes,5 (b) an interpretation and anal-
ysis of the new provision in conjunction with other parts of TSA which it
cross references, 6 and against the background of prior law, (c) practical
advice on litigating the new law, and (d) some consideration of possible
implied actions and related claims.
7
ested in the time required for an undertaking of this sort, my records show 108.5 hours on
the committee's activities in 1976 and 41.2 in 1977, almost all spent on § 33.
Others who played a critical role in the work of the subcommittee, though not formally
members, were Roy Mouer, then Securities Commissioner, and Frank Arnold, then Staff
Legal Officer of the State Securities Board and now Deputy Commissioner. State Securities
Board members H. Grogan Lord, David D. Allen, and W. Gene Goodnight reviewed pro-
posals critically, and had significant influence on the final bill (especially Mr. Allen). While
the Board, the Commissioner, and the staff do not customarily support securities legislation
proposed by others, the political reality is that their opposition will kill it. So proponents
must negotiate to obtain their neutrality.
The full State Bar Committee (named in note ** supra) had a number of meetings on the
Drafts and made the final decisions. Draft 12 received the approval of the State Bar of
Texas board of directors and was submitted to the Legislature with the Bar's formal en-
dorsement. While it was a Bar bill, Draft 12 was written in close consultation with two other
interested groups, the Securities Industry Association and the Municipal Advisory Council
of Texas. Yet another important group was the informal steering committee that planned
and handled the liaison with the Legislature: John E. Dees, Jr., Roy Mouer, Sam Rosen,
Larry Schoenbrun, Wade Spilman, Mike Willatt, and Alan R. Bromberg.
5. Official Legislative History. The State Bar Committee's Draft 12 was introduced in
the 65th Legislature as S.B. 469 by Grant Jones of Taylor and referred to the Committee on
Economic Development (Tom Creighton, Chairman). After a hearing, the committee re-
ported favorably on March 10, 1977, with two amendments correcting typographical errors,
and attached a Fiscal Note of March 3, 1977, from the Legislative Budget Board, anticipat-
ing that there would be no fiscal implication or additional costs to the state from the bill if
enacted. On April 13, 1977, the bill was taken up by the Senate for consideration on second
readin& by a vote of 23 to 6; a proposed amendment to § 33A(2) was defeated 12 to 9 [see
discussion under § 33A(2) in a later installment]; the rules were suspended by a vote of 26 to
5 and the bill was passed on third reading with 7 nays. TEx. S.J., 65th Legis., Reg. Sess. 811-
12 (April 13, 1977). A companion bill was introduced as H.B. 881 by Pike Powers of Beau-
mont and referred to the Committee on Financial Institutions (Jerry (Nub) Donaldson,
Chairman), which held a hearing and then referred it to a subcommittee (Robert Maloney,
Chairman). The subcommittee, by a 3-0 vote, reported favorably to the committee on April
13, 1977. The committee, by a 9-0 vote, reported favorably on the same day. On April 20,
1977, the committee, by a 7-0 vote (with 2 absent), reported favorably on S.B. 469 which had
by then passed the Senate. The House Study Group Daily Floor Report (May 5, 1977)
included a pro and con analysis of the bill. On May 9, 1977, the bill was passed on second
reading with 3 recorded nays and 2 abstentions. TEx. H.R.J., 65th Legis., Reg. Sess. 2502
(May 9, 1977). The next day the bill was passed on third reading. Id. at 2578 (May 10,
1977). It was approved by the Governor on May 20, 1977, and became effective Aug. 2,
1977.
6. A chronic problem with TSA is the lack of coordination of its sections and phrases,
resulting from bad drafting and repeated piecemeal amendments. Large parts of the present
law originated in 1935 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 100, at 255, but there have been amendments or
formal (but only partially revised) reenactments by more than a dozen legislatures since
then, affecting at one time or another, most of the individual sections. The Texas Supreme
Court, in a nice understatement, observed that "[tihe Act, considered as a whole, is some-
thing less than a model of lucidity in legislative drafting." Flowers v. Dempsey-Tegeler &
Co., 472 S.W.2d 112, 114 (Tex. 1971). For a futile effort to get a coherent (and different)
statute, see Bromberg, The Proposed Texas Uniform Securities Act, 31 TEX. B.J. 1030 (1968).
7. Implied actions and related claims-under federal, Texas, or other state law-may
add to plaintiff's arsenal. Also they may illuminate the scope and interpretation of the ex-
plicit Texas claims.
Combining claims. Claims under TSA and other Texas statutory and common law can, of
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I may seem to speak with several voices in this Article, but I shall try to
distinguish them. When I present the State Bar Committee's official posi-
tion, I will so identify it. When I present my impression or recollection of
the committee's sense, I will so identify that. When I present my under-
standing of the Commissioner's or staff's position, I will so identify that.
In all other situations, I speak only for myself, although as one intimately
involved in the writing of § 33.
Civil liability has not been a significant feature of state securities law.8
The traditional state concern in this area has been with government regu-
lation-by licensing, permits, or registration-rather than with private
remedies. Kansas, generally regarded as the originator of blue sky law
with its 1911 act,9 did not prescribe civil liability until 1929.10 California,
which probably has the most comprehensive state securities law today, be-
gan its blue sky law in 1913,11 and added civil liability four years later in
the form of a declaration that securities sold without the required permit
were void. 12 Texas' first securities law, 13 adopted in 1913, had a rudimen-
tary civil liability provision in the form of a suit on a surety bond that a
seller of securities was required to file with the Secretary of State as a con-
dition to receiving a permit for the sale. ' 4 This civil liability provision was
course, be brought together in a Texas court. Federal 1933 Act claims can also be brought in
state courts. 1933 Act § 22(a). Claims under the securities laws of another state, such as the
Uniform Act, may also be brought in Texas courts in appropriate instances. However, fed-
eral 1934 Act claims (including those under the general antifraud provision, SEC 1934 Act
Rule 1Ob-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977)) can be brought only in federal courts, 1934 Act
§ 27, although they may be entertained as defenses in state courts. See, e.g., Southern Bro-
kerage Co. v. Cannarsa, 405 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1966, writ refd n.r.e.),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1004 (1967).
If plaintiff prefers federal court, because of 1934 Act claims, or broader discovery or class
action rules, or other reasons, he can bring his federal securities law claims there under
federal question jurisdiction, without regard to amount in controversy. And he can usually
combine his state claims growing out of the same conduct, by the doctrine of pendent juris-
diction. See, e.g., UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966); Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238
(1933).
8. As a rough indication, SOWARDS & HIRSCH, the only comprehensive treatise on
state securities law, devotes only 75 of its 1100-plus text pages to fraud litigation and 42
pages to other private litigation.
9. 1911 Kan. Sess. Laws, ch. 133. For historical sketches of blue sky law, see L. Loss
& E. CowETr, BLUE SKY LAW 1-17 (1958); SOWARDS & HIRSCH § 1.01.
10. 1929 Kan. Sess. Laws, ch. 140, § 17.
11. 1913 Cal. Stats., ch. 353.
12. 1917 Cal. Stats., ch. 352, § 26100. For the interpretation and application of this
language, see H. MARSH & R. VOLK, PRACTICE UNDER THE CALIFORNIA CORPORATE SE-
CURITIES LAW OF 1968, at 15-18 (1969).
13. More general histories of Texas securities law appear in Cox, The Securities Act, 2
TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. XIII (Vernon 1953), and Meer, The Texas Securities Act-1957
Model: Face/fit or Forward Look, 36 TEXAS L. REv. 429, 436 (1958).
14. 1913 Tex. Gen. Laws, 33d Legis., 1st Called Sess., ch. 32, § 6, at 68-69. The surety
bond was in the amount of 10% of the proposed sale, with a $1,000 minimum and $100,000
maximum. The suit authorized was only for misrepresentation of a material fact concerning
the stock. An example of a suit on this kind of bond is American Sur. Co. v. Thompson, 38
S.W.2d 576 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931, holding approved), rev'g 23 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1930). While there were provisions for replenishing the bond if it was
exhausted, they look unworkable.
The main investor-protection feature of the law, beside the required filing with the Texas
Secretary of State and his finding "that the sale of stock will be fairly and honestly con-
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dropped from the 1923 Act15 and the 1935 Act, 16 but the omission did not
prevent the courts from creating implied civil liabilities by holding that
contracts in violation of the acts were void and, therefore, as a matter of
public policy, unenforceable' 7 or rescindable.' 8
Texas' first general civil liability statute came in 1941, specifying that
sales in violation of TSA were voidable at the buyer's election.' 9 The 1941
law is quoted in Appendix 3 below. The state's next civil liability provi-
sion was enacted in 1963, and was broader in some respects, narrower in
others, and considerably more detailed.20 The 1963 statute is quoted in
Appendix 2 below. The more elaborate 1977 provision,2 '-§ 33-is
quoted in Appendix 1 below and is the central subject of this Article. Sec-
tion 33 is also the organizational framework of the Article, which is struc-
tured as analyses of the successive subsections of § 33.
The purposes of TSA civil liability have not been articulated by the
Texas legislature or courts. But it seems clear that the purposes are (a) to
indemnify investors victimized by violations of TSA, (b) correlatively, to
deprive violators of proceeds from transactions in violation of TSA, (c) to
encourage compliance with the regulatory and disclosure provisions or,
correlatively, to deter violations, and (d) to create incentives for private
ducted, both to the corporation and to the public" was that sales commissions and expenses
not exceed 15%. 1913 Tex. Gen. Laws, 33d Legis., Ist Called Sess., ch. 32, § 4, at 68. The
quoted language, as well as the expense limit, suggests that the law was aimed primarily at
rapacious salesmen rather than rapacious issuers. In any event, this is the first and last time
that fairness to the corporation has been a criterion for issuing a securities permit. The
expense limit evolved into § 9B, considered in Part 5.3 below.
15. 1923 Tex. Gen. Laws, 38th Legis., 2d Called Sess., ch. 52, at 114-20. A surety bond
was required, but for the limited purpose of assuring that the issuer received the proceeds of
securities sold. Id. ch. 52, § 6.
16. 1935 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 100, at 255.
17. Kadane v. Clark, 135 Tex. 496, 143 S.W.2d 197 (1940) (unregistered plaintiff not
entitled to commission for selling oil leases for defendant):
The statute is strictly penal in nature, and was enacted to protect the inter-
ests of the public. While the law does not specifically provide that a contract
made in violation of this Act shall be void, yet, when the Act as a whole is
read, and the purposes for which it was passed are considered, we think the
very letter and spirit of the law is to absolutely prohibit sales of securities not
made under the terms of this law . . . .The conclusion is inescapable that a
contract made in violation of its terms is not enforcible. Any other construc-
tion would nullify the very purpose for which it was enacted.
143 S.W.2d at 200. This principle is codified in § 33K.
18. Smith v. Fishback, 123 S.W.2d 771, 779-80 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1938, writ
ref'd)(transferors of royalty to trustee for royalty pool corporation to be formed, who were
to receive stock of the corporation in exchange, were entitled to have the transfers and con-
tracts cancelled and the cloud removed from their royalties; neither the stock nor the sellers
were registered).
19. 1941 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 363, § 1, at 593, apparently codifying and expanding Ka-
dane v. Clark, 135 Tex. 496, 143 S.W.2d 197 (1940), note 17 supra, and Smith v. Fishback,
123 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1938, writ ref'd), note 18 supra.
20. 1963 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 170, § 12, at 478. The changes made in the prior provi-
sion, and the reasons for them, are detailed in TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33, com-
ment (Vernon 1964). The 1963 provision is treated in Bordwine, Civil Remedies Under the
Texas Securities Laws, 8 Hous. L. REV. 657 (1971).





The full text of § 33 (1977) appears in Appendix 1 below. The text of
each subsection appears at the head of the discussion of that subsection in
this Article. The 1977 revision, compared to the prior or old (1963) law,
made-in a balanced way-a number of badly needed changes in civil
liabilities. The most important are these:
Investors are given.-
(a) The right to recover when they are defrauded sellers, e.g, in tender
offers or going private transactions. § 33B. Prior law gave rights only to
defrauded buyers.
(b) Relief from the difficult burden of proving that they could not have
known of the untruth or omission (required by prior (1963) § 33A).
(c) The right to recover from persons who control a violator, subject to
a defense of reasonable ignorance of the violation. § 33F(1). Prior law
imposed liability only on "any person who sells," although this phrase was
broadly construed.
(d) The right to recover from an issuer who files a false or omissive
prospectus with a registration statement for a sale of already outstanding
securities by a security holder. § 33C. Prior law apparently imposed no
liability.
(e) The right to recover from those who materially aid in a violation if
they act with intent to deceive or with reckless disregard. § 33F(2). Prior
law imposed liability only if these are "persons who sell."
(f) The right to recover attorneys' fees, if the court finds it equitable, as
well as traditional damages. § 33D(7).
Dealers and other defendants are given.-
(a) A due diligence defense that they could not have known of the un-
truth or omission. §§ 33A(2), 33B. The factors to be considered in decid-
ing whether the defense has been established will be discussed under§ 33A(2) in a later installment. Prior law was interpreted to deny such a
defense.
(b) The right to cut off potential liability for omission or misrepresen-
tation by making a rescission offer with full § disclosure. §§ 33H(2), 331.
Prior law limited cutoffs to technical violations (failure to register, etc.).
However, an investor who rejects in writing a rescission offer has a year in
which he can sue.
(c) A final statute of limitations on omission or misrepresentation lia-
bility. § 33H(2). Prior law apparently was completely open-ended: the
statute of limitations was three years from actual or constructive discovery
22. Purposes (a) and (d) are stated in TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33, comment
(Vernon 1964), and in House Study Group Report, note 5 supra. At least the latter carries
some expression of legislative intent.
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of the violation by the plaintiff. This created many problems of stale testi-
mony, lost records, and uncertainty about contingent liabilities. The pe-
riod for which an investor can speculate on the market at the expense of a
violator is reduced to a somewhat reasonable length.
(d) Greater clarity on measure of damages or rescission, and the re-
quirements of a rescission offer. §§ 33D, 331, 33J.
Overall, investors will have substantial net gains from the new law.
The table below compares the new and old versions of § 33 and
briefly indicates the nature of the changes and additions. The text that
follows gives more details.
Comparison of New and Old § 33 by Subsection
New (1977) Old (1963) Notes on New
§ 33A(l) § 33A(l) No substantive change
§ 33A(2) § 33A(2) Substantive changes
§ 33B New
§ 33C New
§ 33D § 33A Expands and clarifies
§ 33E New
§ 33F New
§ 33G § 33B No change
§ 33H § 33C Substantive changes
§§ 331-J § 33C Expands and clarifies
§ 33K § 33D No change
§ 33L § 33E No substantive change
§ 33M § 33F No substantive change
§ 33A(1)--LIABILITY OF SELLERS-REGISTRATION AND RELATED
VIOLATIONS
1. Text, Derivation, and Evolution. New § 33A(1) reads:
A. Liability of Sellers.
(1) Registration and Related Violations. A person who offers or
sells a security in violation of Section 7, 9 (or a requirement of the
Commissioner thereunder), 12, 23B, or an order under 23A of this Act
is liable to the person buying the security from him, who may sue
either at law or in equity for rescission or for damages if the buyer no
longer owns the security.
It is taken without substantive change from the 1963 § 33A(l). 23
Formal changes were made in § 33A(l) in 1977 when it was made an
independent sentence and separated from § 33A(2) to simplify the syntax
and highlight the substance. The relief available for both §§ 33A(l) and
33A(2) was moved to § 33D and modified in certain respects which will be
discussed under § 33D in a later installment. Apart from these modifica-
23. See note 20 supra for history, Appendix 2 below for text.
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tions in form, there was no change in § 33A(1) throughout the delibera-
tions of the Bar Committee, except to alter the caption from "technical
violations" to "registration and related violations" in order to allay con-
cerns that the former phrase might give defendants advantages by arguing
that the charge against them was "only a technical violation."
2 4
Both the 1977 and 1963 versions of § 33A(l) derived from Uniform Se-
curities Act § 410(a)(1), which drew from SA § 12(1). Since both those
acts are structured quite differently from TSA, the cross references in
§ 33A(1) have effects that are strikingly different in some respects from
those in other acts, as we shall see in the detailed treatment below.
2. Plaintifs.
2.1 Buyers. Only buyers of securities can sue under § 33A(l) [or
§ 33A(2)]. A plaintiff must plead and prove he belongs to that category.
"Buyer" is not a defined term in TSA, although a definition can be in-
ferred from the first sentence of the definition of "sale" in § 4E: a buyer is
one who acquires a security for value. 25 Who is a buyer will be obvious in
most situations, but in a few instances may have to be determined by look-
ing at the economic realities of the transaction, i e., who acquires the secur-
ity and gives the value. The person who is a buyer and seller in the same
transaction, giving up security X in exchange for security Y, can sue as a
buyer of security Y if there has been a violation as to that security.26 The
result should be the same if the exchange takes place in a merger, even
though the merger is exempt from registration by § 5G.2 7
2.2 Sellers? Sellers can sue for fraud under § 33B. But they can-
not sue for anything under § 33A(1); this section is explicitly limited to
buyer plaintiffs. Do sellers have implied rights to sue on the kinds of vio-
lations for which § 33A(1) gives rights to buyers? Part of the negative an-
swer is that most of the sections cross referenced in § 33A(l) regulate only
sellers (and therefore could give rights only to buyers), e.g., § 7 registration
of securities, § 9 escrow, expense limit, and prospectus requirements, and
§ 23A stop-sale orders. A possible exception 28 is § 12, which requires
24. This concern was expressed by then Commissioner-Designate Richard Latham
(now Commissioner), and the change was made in Draft 12 after "Technical Violation" was
used in Drafts 5-11.
25. Whether § 33B, where buyers are defendants, calls for a broader meaning of buyer,
aralleling the broader meaning of seller which can be derived from the later sentences of
4E (see Parts 3.1-3.2 below), will be discussed under § 33B.
26. Cf. Smith v. Fishback, 123 S.W.2d 711, 777 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1938, writ
refd) (oil royalty owners exchanging their royalties for unregistered corporate stock sold by
unregistered persons were buyers of stock, and could rescind under prior law which had no
explicit civil liability). § 4E, 2d sentence, specifies that a security issued in exchange for
value is sold.
27. See SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 464-69 (1969) (merger involves
purchase-sale for federal antifraud provisions).
28. Stop-Advertising Ordersfor Purchases. Another possible exception is a § 23B stop-
advertising order (see Part 5.7.1 below) for a tender offer or other offer to buy. However, it
seems quite clear from its historical context and its language, that § 22 (which is linked to
§ 23B in ways described below) was intended to control only sale advertising. Its original
form, 1938 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 100, § 23, at 269, clearly dealt only with sales. The 1955
changes, which produced the substance of the present provision, were intended to authorize
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dealer and salesman registration. An unregistered dealer or salesman pre-
sumably represents as much a threat to a seller as to a buyer. But it is
quite doubtful that a seller has an implied action against such an unregis-
tered buyer. 29 Inhibiting factors are the negative legislative intent mani-
fested by giving the right to buyers while saying nothing about sellers, the
serious questions whether buying activity is part of "dealing" or makes one
a "dealer," 30 and the long line of cases holding that TSA is intended to
additional sale advertising in the form of SEC preliminary prospectuses. 1955 Tex. Gen.
Laws, ch. 67, § 23, at 338; Tinsley, Texas Securities Act, 18 TEX. B.J. 273, 358-59 (1955).
Moreover, all this was years before tender offers became popular in the 1960's. Finally, the
language of present § 22 confirms that it applies only to sale advertising (e.g., § 22B applies
after registration, which is required only for sales; § 22C deals with underwriters (sellers);
§ 22D covers SEC 1933 Act filings (which are only for sales), the required legend is limited
to sales, and noncomplying use is "deemed a sale punishable"; § 23E invokes exemptions
(which apply only to sales). It follows that § 22 does not cover purchase advertising. And it
follows that § 23B-which has a common origin with § 22 in 1935 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 100,
§§ 23 (1st para.) and 24 (2d sent.), at 269 and 272, and is tied to § 22 by identical language
describing advertising and by the cross references from §§ 22B and 22D to § 23-does not
apply to purchase advertising. Indeed, that is plain on the face of § 23B, which prohibits the
use of banned advertising "in connection with any sale or offer of sale." Consequently, there
can be no valid § 23B stop-advertising order for purchases, and no implied liability based
thereon.
The Commissioner probably disagrees with this analysis. The Board's tender offer rules,
dealing wholly with purchase offers, threaten noncompliers with action under (in addition to
§§ 25, 29, and 32) § 23, which consists of § 23B just analyzed, § 23A which is even more
clearly limited to sale offers, and § 23C which is an information-gathering provision, also
clearly confined to sale offers. The Commissioner has issued § 23B stop-advertising orders
against persons who seemed to be buyers but in fact probably were sellers. Joe D. Russell
dba Trans-World Financial Corp., Tex. State Sec. Board Order No. CP-522 (Aug. 29, 1974),
summarized in TEX. STATE SEC. BOARD, TEX. MONTHLY SEC. BULL. 2 (Aug. 1974); Al Cor-
rea dba Trans-World Financial Corp., id. No. CP-523. The ads stated "Unlimited Funds
Available for qualified borrowers" and seemed to be offers to lend money and buy securities
(ie., borrowers' notes). However, the advertisers were probably loan brokers seeking ad-
vance payment placement fees from borrowers and thus selling some sort of security to the
borrowers.
29. The argument for the right would be based not only on the § 12 requirement but on
the parallel § 29A which prescribes criminal penalties for selling, offering or "deal[ing] in
any other manner" in a security without being registered. "Dealing" would have to include
buying for this argument to succeed, and it very likely does not. See note 30 infra.
30. Buying as Dealing. Parts of the definition of "dealer" in § 4C (which is discussed
generally in Part 5.5.3 below) might be construed to consist of buying activities: "soliciting
...orders for, or undertaking to. . .invite offers for,. . . or dealing in any other manner
in any security." More likely, these relate only to selling. Lewis v. Davis, 145 Tex. 468, 199
S.W.2d 146, 149-50 (1947) (discussed further in note 31 infra) gives the latter construction to
identical language in the 1935 Act:
[Tihe Securities Act in all of its many sections makes careful and detailed
provision for the registration of dealers in securities, that is, persons engaging
in the business of selling securities, and for permits for the issuance of securi-
ties, that is, securities issued to be sold,-all for the protection of buyers
against sellers.
See also Part 3.1.4 below.
Earlier, the Texas Supreme Court had firmly ruled that one engaged in buying (here a
buyer's agent) need not be registered: "Had the Legislature intended to require buyers of
securities to register, its intention would, or certainly in a penal Act should, have been mani-
fested more clearly than by the use of the word 'dealing' following particular and specific
words all relating to selling." Fowler v. Hults, 138 Tex. 636, 161 S.W.2d 478, 482 (1942),
discussed further in note 31 infra.
The conclusion that "dealer" refers only to selling activities is, then, strengthened by other
parts of the definition, which are unmistakably selling terms. Moreover, the point is aca-
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protect buyers, but not sellers. 31
demic here, since § 12 unambiguously compels only sellers to register. Thus, a buying
dealer is not in violation of the registration requirement. Ergo, his seller has no claim for
violation.
Whether "dealer" connotes buying may be significant in terms of the Commissioner's
authority to regulate purchases by tender offer. See Tex. State Sec. Board Rule XV, Tex.
Reg. Nos. 065.15.00.100-.700, reprinted in 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 46,615 (1978). That
point I will not debate in this Article.
31. Buyer Protection Purpose of TSA. The courts have consistently said that TSA is
intended to regulate sellers and protect buyers. Atwood v. State, 135 Tex. Crim. App. 543,
121 S.W.2d 353, 355 (1938); Kadane v. Clark, 135 Tex. 496, 143 S.W.2d 197, 199 (1940).
The courts soon added the corollary that TSA is not intended to regulate buyers and protect
sellers. Fowler v. Hults, 138 Tex. 636, 161 S.W.2d 478, 481-82 (1942) (buyer's agent need
not be registered to collect commission from buyer); see further discussions of Fowler in note
62 infra and note 30 supra; this cause of action arose before the 1941 addition of § 33b (now
§ 34), discussed below. The court wrote:
All the provisions of the Act above quoted and referred to [corresponding to
present §§ 4C, 7, 12, 13B, 23C, 29A, and 29B] relate to sales and sellers of
securities and not to purchasers or buyers. Nowhere in the Act is there any
language which might be construed as disclosing an intention to require pur-
chasers of securities to register or to prohibit one from buying securities with-
out registering ....
161 S.W.2d at 482. This language was quoted with approval in Herren v. Hollingsworth,
140 Tex. 263, 167 S.W.2d 735, 738-39 (1943), discussed in note 66 infra. The corollary was
repeated after the 1941 addition of § 33b (now § 34) to prohibit unregistered persons from
collecting commissions on purchases, thus affording a measure of protection to sellers.
Lewis v. Davis, 145 Tex. 468, 199 S.W.2d 146, 149 (1947). The case held that a plaintiff
alleging partnership with a defendant may maintain a suit to establish an interest in assets
acquired in defendant's name (including oil and gas leases) without alleging that either of
them is registered as a dealer under what are now §§ 12-15. [The relevance of the defendant
being a registered dealer is that some sales to a registered dealer are exempt by what is now §
5H and therefore do not require the seller to be registered. See, e.g., Dunnam v. Dilling-
ham, 345 S.W.2d 314, 318-19 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1961, no writ).] The rationale appears
to be that, even if the oil and gas interests were securities, there was no allegation that the
partnership was selling them, and thus no need for registration. With respect to the 1941
amendment, the court wrote:
We do not construe this added section to intend, on account of its use of the
words 'sale or purchase of securities' and 'securities so sold or purchased', to
work changes in the general purpose of the Act and so to amend it as to re-
quire the procuring of permits or licenses by those who buy securities and the
registration of securities for the protection of sellers against buyers.
199 S.W.2d at 149; accord, Fitz-Gerald v. Hull, 150 Tex. 39, 237 S.W.2d 256, 258 (1951)
(joint venture).
Later amendments to TSA have given sellers additional specific protections. The 1973
amendment to § 29C outlawed fraud by buyers. 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 97, § 2, at 217.
The 1977 amendment to § 33B gave civil remedies to defrauded sellers. A discussion of
§ 33B will appear in a later installment of this Article. § 32, an earlier provision dating from
1935, and authorizing injunction suits by the Commissioner and the Texas Attorney General
against violations, might be construed to protect buyers; it thrice uses the phrase "purchase
or sale" but in a welter of words aimed primarily at protecting buyers.
These protections of sellers are probably not enough to tip the balance in favor of giving
sellers an implied right to sue unregistered dealers and salesmen. Cf. Chesnut v. Coastal Oil
& Land Corp., 543 S.W.2d 154, 158 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.),
citing Lewis v. Davis, 145 Tex. 468, 199 S.W.2d 146 (1947), for the proposition that "the
1941 amendments. . . did not change the general purposes of the Act" and refusing to find
that Coastal's purchase of an oil and gas lease 1/4 for itself and 3/4 for plaintiffs was a sale
by Coastal to plaintiffs. Hence plaintiffs were not entitled to rescind. The transactions were
after the 1973 amendment to § 29C, although the court did not consider it.
It is still clear, as noted in Fowler and Herren, supra, that § 12 mandates registration only
for sellers. Moreover, the 1977 amendments to § 33, which for the first time gave express
rights to sellers for fraud (§ 33B) did not give them rights for dealer-salesman nonregistra-
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There are other possible § 33A(1) situations in which a seller might like
to sue. An issuer (seller) is injured if selling expenses are excessive and
might want to sue the underwriter or dealer for violation of the maximum
expense limits of § 9B, which are referenced in § 33A(l). However, it
seems that the limits are imposed only for the protection of buyers. The
caption of § 9 so states: "Protection to Purchasers of Securities." Hence, it
is doubtful that a legislative intent to protect issuers by the expense limits
could be found. Moreover, issuers can normally protect themselves by
contracting for limited expenses, although this will not always be true, es-
pecially when the issuer is controlled by the underwriter or dealer.
Other situations can be imagined in which one seller's violations could
injure another seller, who might therefore want to sue. In all these in-
stances, it seems unlikely that the courts will find implied rights for sell-
ers-other than for fraud-under an act they have consistently construed
to protect only buyers.32
Sellers who sell to buyers who violate the tender offer rules-assuming
the rules are valid33-may well be on a different footing. The rules were
presumably adopted for the specific protection of sellers (or recipients of
the offer to buy), and there are no express liabilities for tender offers from
which to draw negative inferences. However appropriate it may be to rec-
ognize implied actions to enforce compliance with the tender offer rules, or
express or implied actions for fraud, I remain dubious about damages or
rescission based solely on a regulatory violation.3 4
3. Defendants." Persons Who Sell. Only a "person who offers or sells"
can be sued under § 33A(l) [or § 33A(2)]. A plaintiff must plead and
prove that a defendant belongs to this category.35 Correspondingly, a de-
fendant is liable only to "the person buying from him." In many instances,
tion under (or parallel to) § 33A, even though § 33A was amended in other respects at the
same time. This generates a strong negative implication. I feel sure that no one in the State
Bar Committee intended to give sellers the right to sue for such nonregistration.
32. Note 31 supra.
33. See the end of note 30 supra.
34. There is another obstacle to suit for violation of the tender offer rules. In Simmons
v. Danco, Inc., 563 S.W.2d 376 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the court
held that the Securities Commissioner and the State Securities Board have primary jurisdic-
tion over the rules, and that a private plaintiff (here a competing offeror) cannot sue under
them without first "presenting" the matter to the Commissioner and the Board. Accord-
ingly, it was error for a district court to grant Danco (a proposed tender offeror for Contran's
shares) a temporary injunction restraining Contran and its controlling shareholder from
making a counteroffer for Contran's shares in alleged violation of the tender offer rules. Just
how a private plaintiff is to make such a presentation, and what rights he would have to
enforce the rules after action (or inaction) by the Commissioner or Board is not indicated.
35. Entities. Corporations are civilly liable to the same extent as natural persons. There
was once law to the contrary. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co. v. Flowers, 465 S.W.2d 208 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Beaumont 1971) (interpreting "person" in old § 33A to exclude "corporations"),
criticized in Lebowitz, Corporations, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 26 Sw. L.J. 86, 112-21
(1972). But it was reversed, 472 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. 1971), and disavowed by a clarifying
amendment of "person" in § 4B.. 1971 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 235, § 1, at 1085. The emer-
gency clause of that enactment referred to the first Dempsey case and "the resulting necessity
to confirm that the intent of the Legislature was, and is now, that Section 33 and certain
other sections of said [Securities] Act should apply to corporation and other entities as well
19781
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it will be obvious who the seller is, e.g., the owner, issuer, or promoter in a
face-to-face transaction, whether conducted directly or through agents. 36
But great strain is put on the concept by unusual fact patterns where sell-
ing activity is divided among several persons, especially if the primary
seller (the ex-owner or issuer) has disappeared across the border or into
insolvency so that the suit is against someone else. As the following parts
indicate, a very broad definition of "person who sells" (or "seller" for
short) prevailed in the pre-1977 law, but the changes made in that year call
for a narrower view.
3.1 Pre-1977 Law.
3.1.1 The Judicial Metaphorical Approach (Link in the Chain).
The broad interpretation of seller in pre-1977 law rests primarily on the
definition of sale in § 4E and on the decisions construing that language.
Section 4E devotes more than 200 words to defining offer and sale, itself an
as to natural persons." Id. § 2. However, corporations remain excluded from the criminal
provisions of the Act (§ 29) by the last sentence of § 4B.
Other entities such as partnerships, are presumably as liable as corporations. The legisla-
tive intent just quoted seems conclusive. To take full advantage of the joint and several
liability of general partners for partnership obligations, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
6132b, § 15 (Tex. UPA) (Vernon 1970), a plaintiff should normally name and serve as de-
fendants the partnership and each of the general partners. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 28; TEX.
REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 2033 (Vernon 1964); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2223
(Vernon 1971).
A "common law trust" is included in the definition of "person" but for some mysterious
reason, a "trust created or appointed under or by virtue of a last will and testament or by a
court of law or equity" is not. § 4B, 2d sentence. The latter kind of trust thus seems to be
exempt from any § 33 liability, unless the context can be found to indicate otherwise, in
accordance with the preamble to § 4. How that might happen is an open question, as is
whether the exclusion of the specified trust extends to its trustees and agents.
36. Agency; Vicarious Sales. See, e.g., Smith v. Fishback, 123 S.W.2d 771, 774-75, 777
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1938, writ ref'd). David McCutcheon was a seller of the stock
of a royalty pool corporation which he promoted and of which he was to receive 25%. The
remaining shares were to be issued to royalty owners like plaintiffs who signed pool con-
tracts transferring their royalties to Smith as trustee for the corporation, agreeing to take the
stock in exchange. David McCutcheon assisted in securing the signature of one of the roy-
alty owners and her husband to a pool contract. His agents (Cecil McCutcheon and Town-
send) approached every royalty owner in the pool, some as many as three times, to persuade
them to sign the pool contracts. The royalty owners took no initiative. "[Tihe conclusion is
inescapable that each of these pool contracts represents a sale by McCutcheon and his agents
of stock to" the royalty owners. Id. at 777. However, the court apparently concluded that
Smith (the trustee) was not a seller. The court refers to him as a "stake-holder" and does not
indicate that he engaged in sales activity.
The Comments to Drafts 8-12 (of which the last went to the Legislature) note that § 33F
(on liability of control persons and aiders) "does not supersede the common law liability of a
principal for an agent's acts within the scope of authority."
If an agent of a corporation or other entity sells within the scope of his authority, the
entity sells vicariously. But officers, directors, and shareholders of the entity do not sell
vicariously, since they are not the principals of the agent (the entity is). They may be liable
as aiders or control persons by § 33F, but they are sellers under § 33A(l) only if they have
engaged individually in acts which constitute selling. For an example of controlling share-
holders (who were probably also officers and directors) who were enjoined, along with their
corporations, from selling without securities and dealer registration, see Enntex Oil & Gas
Co. v. State, 560 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See
general, Annot., What amounts to participation by corporate officer or agent in illegal issu-
ance of security, in order to impose liability upon him under state securities regulations, 44
A.L.R.3d 588 (1972).
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indication of breadth. 37 The most general of the words are "every disposi-
tion or attempt to dispose of a security for value" and "any act by which a
sale is made."
Decisions on the pre-1977 law gave "sale" and "seller" astoundingly
broad meaning, best illustrated by examples. The Texas Supreme Court in
Brown v. Cole3 7A held that Brown sold securities-promissory notes and
stock in a Mexican mining venture owned by Fields-to Gould and Cole
by (a) presenting the venture to Gould (who in turn made the proposal
known to Cole), (b) furnishing Gould with a memo and prospectus from
Fields, including a description -of the properties, and a financial statement
(which Gould mailed to Cole at the latter's request), (c) obtaining addi-
tional information for Gould and Cole, (d) taking Cole's auditor to Mexico
for a firsthand investigation at Brown's expense, and (e) receiving checks
from Gould and Cole payable to "Brown, Agent," depositing the checks in
his account, and transmitting the funds to Fields. A group of about eight
investors, including Gould and Cole at $5,000 each, put in $35,000; Brown
himself invested on the same terms, and received no commission on any-
one else's purchases. For the court, Justice Culver wrote: "[T]he seller may
be any link in the chain of the selling process or in the words of the Act he
is one who performs 'any act by which a sale is made,' ",38 adding that
Brown's efforts "resulted in the participation by" Gould and Cole in the
investment. 39
In Smith v. Smith39A an even more startling decision, Howard Smith was
held to have sold a security-a promissory note of Sandblom or an interest
in Sandblom's group supposedly investing in contractors' retainage certifi-
cates--to his brother, Allen, by (a) writing Allen (and their three sisters) in
"rather persuasive" terms about investments Howard was making in the
group and inviting them to consider similar investments, (b) furnishing
Allen all the information that Allen got about the investment, although
Howard in turn got some of it from Sandblom, (c) receiving Allen's check
payable to Howard, depositing it in his account and transmitting the funds
to Sandblom, and (d) considering going into the business of selling these
investments for a commission. These factors were sufficient to make How-
ard a seller as a matter of law, even though the jury found that Howard did
not offer or sell securities and that Howard was acting solely as agent for
37. Unitization Agreements. An important exception to the definition of sale is found in
an out of the way place, § 5Q: "No oil, gas or mineral unitization or pooling agreement shall
be deemed a sale under this Act."
37A. 155 Tex. 624, 291 S.W.2d 704 (1956).
38. Id. at 708, discussed at length in Hill, Pifalls in the Texas Securities Act, 10 Sw. L.J.
265 (1956). Brown's liability to Gould and Cole was based on: (1) sale of an unregistered
security, Ze., without a permit (discussed below in Part 5.1) and possibly (2) sale by an
unregistered dealer (discussed below in Part 5.5, especially Part 5.5.3 at notes 260-67), and
was imposed pursuant to the 1941-1963 civil liability provision (Appendix 3 below) voiding
sales in violation of TSA. At the time there was no adequate small offering exemption like
today's § 51 which would probably shield Brown from both violations.
39. See further discussion of this causation factor in the text accompanying note 48
infra.
39A. 424 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1968, no writ).
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Allen when he received Allen's $25,000 and transmitted it to Sandblom.40
In Dean v. State41A Gary Dean was deemed a seller to the Henrys of an
override contract in the VibroSeat Company, although Ms. Lindsey (who
was a cousin to the Henrys and often consulted with them on investments)
initially suggested the investment to them, and although the Henrys de-
cided to buy before ever meeting Dean. Dean had no connection with the
company except that he owned an override contract himself and supplied
mechanical parts for the company. At the request of the company presi-
dent, Dean closed the deal with the Henrys at a meeting arranged by Ms.
Lindsey. At the meeting Dean "disclosed the particulars of' the company
to the Henrys, signed an override contract as representative of the com-
pany, received the Henrys' check (payable to the company) and handed it
to Ms. Lindsey, who delivered the check to the company president. The
Henrys testified that they had decided to buy before they met Dean, and
that his representations at the meeting were not a procuring cause of their
purchase. Nonetheless, Dean was held to be a seller.41
40. Id. at 249-50. Howard's liability to Allen was based on two violations: (1) sale of an
unregistered security (no exemption is discussed in the opinion; apparently Howard claimed
none, perhaps because it was clear that Howard's activities were part of Sandblom's, which
were far too public to satisfy the small offering exemption of § 5I, which may then have been
in effect, and no other exemption seemed applicable), and (2) sale by an unregistered dealer,
discussed in the next paragraph.
Dealer Question. Although the opinion mentions that Howard was not registered as a
dealer, 424 S.W.2d at 248, and this was an alternative basis of the suit, id. at 245, there is
absolutely no discussion of whether he was a dealer. Apparently this is because Howard did
not make an issue of the point, but defended primarily or solely on the grounds that he did
not sell at all, and that he was acting as agent for Allen (the buyer) and thus not required to
be registered. [On the latter principle, see Part 3.1.4 below]. The jury agreed with him on
both these assertions, but was overridden by the judgment n.o.v. for Allen, which was af-
firmed. The only facts noted by the court which could bear on the "dealer" issue are (1) "it
has not been established that [Howard] ever discussed the [Sandblom] investment opportu-
nity with prospective investors outside his family or that he ever received any sales commis-
sion," 424 S.W.2d at 247, (2) Howard considered "taking over" some of the Sandblom
investment accounts (from a Dr. Meadows who acted as intermediary between the investors
and Sandblom) receiving 1% higher interest from Sandblom than he (Howard) would pay
the investors, opened a bank account for this use and consulted his lawyer about the
problems involved, id., (3) Howard (like Allen) "had inherited a sizeable sum and was de-
voting a great deal of time to investing and reinvesting it," id. at 249, and (4) as the older
brother, Howard "frequently advised his brother and sisters as to his investment experiences
and opportunities," id. In the absence of any analysis or even discussion of the "dealer"
question, the decision cannot be regarded as a holding that these facts-family information-
sharing, personal investing, and consideration of going into Sandblom's financing busi-
ness-should suffice to make one a "dealer." Moreover, any authority the decision may
have on the "dealer" point is further weakened by its failure to specify whether it is based on
the 1941-1963 § 33 (Appendix 3 below) or the 1963-1977 § 33 (Appendix 2 below); the for-
mer, which declares all sales in violation of the TSA to be voidable may be a bit broader
than the latter which (like the 1977 version) specified damages or rescission for sales in
violation of § 12. The facts in the case span the Aug. 23, 1963, effective date of the 1963
amendment; the "solicitation" was before, the payment and acknowledgment after. The
court never indicates when it thought the sale was made, or which statute applied.
40A. 433 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
41. Id. at 175-77. The upper court rejected Dean's argument that the trial court erred in
refusing to submit to the jury his affirmative defense (raised by the evidence) that he did not
make a sale to the Henrys but that someone else did. Dean's conviction for sale without
being registered as a dealer (§ 29A) was reversed on other grounds (jury issue as to exemp-
tion). Why he was ever prosecuted on the facts is something of a mystery.
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In yet another example, a defendant, Mrs. Millar, was found to be a
seller even though she did not solicit a sale. As an executive of a dealer,
she confirmed sales to the plaintiff, and this was held to be a link in the
selling process.
42
More than one person may be a seller in the same transaction. X does
not establish that he was not a seller by proving that Y was a seller.
43
Where multiple sellers have each violated, it appears that their liability is
joint and several, and they have rights of contribution.44
Whether a person made a sale may be a jury question, in which case an
instruction using the § 4E statutory definition of sale is proper. 45 Since a
jury may well be confused, not to say bored, by the redundancies of § 4E,
a better instruction could be fashioned by choosing only those elements of
§ 4E most closely related to the evidence in the case.
More commonly, even in situations which seem doubtful, the courts
have used the broad interpretation to find that a defendant was a seller as a
matter of law.4
6
42. Christie v. Brewer, 374 S.W.2d 908, 917 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1964, writ ref'd
n.r.e.), sustaining the trial court's refusal to submit a jury issue on whether Mrs. Millar
solicited plaintiff. "Mrs. Millar as executive officer of the Christie Company and agent for it
confirmed the sales to appellee. This was certainly a link in the selling process. Accord-
ingly, it was immaterial that Mrs. Millar did not solicit the sale. Mrs. Millar participated in
a sale that was solicited." Id. Accordingly, she would be personally liable, under the 1941-
1963 version of civil liability provision (Appendix 3 below) as a seller because the security
was unregistered.
43. Brown v. Cole, 155 Tex. 624, 291 S.W.2d 704, 708 (1956); Dean v. State, 433 S.W.2d
173, 176 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
44. This is explicit in § 33F, added in 1977, for control persons and aiders. See the
discussion of § 33F in a later installment. A fortiori, the same principles apply to multiple
sellers.
Joint and several liability of multiple sellers was affirmed without discussion of this point
in Searsy v. Commercial Trading Corp., 560 S.W.2d 637 (Tex. 1977), rep'g 559 S.W.2d 663,
664 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977).
45. Christie v. Brewer, 374 S.W.2d 908, 915-16 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1964, writ refd
n.r.e.). The court overruled objections (1) to the special issue whether a defendant made
sale, through employees, to plaintiff, as being a question of law, (2) to the definition of sale
as being a general charge, duplicitous and multifarious (because of the numerous compo-
nents of the statutory definition) and (3) to the 9-month time period to which the special
issue related.
See Commercial Trading Corp. v. Searsy, 559 S.W.2d 663, 665 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texar-
kana 1977):
The appellees (plaintiffs) did not submit a special issue inquiring whether or
not the individual appellants [defendants] performed any act by which sales
were made or whether they in any way participated in the selling process. The
evidence does not establish as a matter of law that the individual appellants
formed any such link in the chain of the selling process or performed any acts
by which sales were made.
The court went on to assume the defendants were sellers, but held for them on the ground
that the commodity options they sold were not securities. The supreme court reversed on
the latter point, and affirmed the trial court judgment for plaintiffs without discussing
whether defendants were sellers. 560 S.W.2d 637 (rex. 1977), discussed further in note 46
infra.
46. See Christie v. Brewer, 374 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1964, writ ref'd
n.r.e.), note 42 supra, refusing to submit a jury issue on whether Mrs. Millar solicited plain-
tiff, and Smith v. Smith, 424 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1968, no writ), note 40
supra, holding Howard to be a seller as a matter of law, despite a jury finding to the con-
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Conspicuously missing from the broad metaphorical link-in-the-chain
test is a materiality-causation factor. Taken literally, the test would apply
to the secretary who types an offer or confirmation and to the postman who
delivers it. Obviously, the registration of such persons would do nothing to
further the purposes of the securities laws, and it would be folly to treat
them as sellers. When faced with such defendants, courts should insert a
materiality or causation factor that focuses on whether they are significant
elements in effecting the sale. 47 Indeed, this factor is suggested, if not re-
quired, by the supreme court's causation language in Brown v. Cole: "It is
clear that but for Brown's activities and repeated efforts, the respondents
[Gould and Cole] would not have participated in the transaction. 48
Stone v. Enstam49 is a good example of the needed materiality or causa-
tion factor. Another Dean (the president of Worldcom) was held not to be
a seller of Enstam's Worldcom stock to Stone who had become interested
in buying some of its stock after trying to sell computer services to the
company. Dean made various statements to Stone about Worldcom's
finances and prospects. Stone asked Dean how he could get some
Worldcom stock; Dean said neither he nor Worldcom would sell shares,
but Enstam might. Stone made up his mind to buy the stock before meet-
ing Enstam, and discussed only payment terms with him.
A more precise proximate cause test is used under the comparable fed-
eral provision for registration and related liability, SA § 12(1). "We hold
that the proper test is . . . did the injury to the plaintiff flow directly and
trary. See also Dean v. State, 433 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968), refusing a jury issue
in a criminal case.
Cf. Commercial Trading Corp. v. Searsy, 559 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana),
rev'd, 560 S.W.2d 637 (Tex. 1977), note 45 supra. The quotation there leaves considerable
question whether the individual defendants were sellers even under the broad test. (The
intermediate court describes the individual defendants as directors of the corporate seller
and assumes arguendo that they should be considered links in the selling chain "because
they knew that unregistered commodity options were being sold and their names were being
used in advertising literature to induce the sales." 559 S.W.2d at 665. But it held they were
not liable because the options were not securities. In reversing the civil appeals court and
affirming the trial court judgment (apparently against all defendants, including the individu-
als, now referred to as "stockholders," 560 S.W.2d at 639), the supreme court deals only with
the "security" issue and does not consider whether the individuals were sellers, or by what
standard they should be tested (or the effect of the 1963 amendment, see note 109 infra). It
concludes, however, that "defendants have sold unregistered securities for which plaintiffs
are entitled to rescission." 560 S.W.2d at 642.)
47. It seems doubtful that Mrs. Millar was a significant element in the Christie case,
although we do not have enough facts to be sure. Since solicitation is such an important part
of selling, the refusal of a jury submission on this point is dubious. A jury issue should have
been submitted on whether she was a seller, as it was on whether the dealer who employed
her was.
For the materiality element supplied by the 1977 amendment, see text accompanying note
83 infra.
48. 291 S.W.2d at 709. See also text accompanying note 39 supra.
49. 541 S.W.2d 473, 479-80, 475-76 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ). The court
distinguished Brown v. Cole, 155 Tex. 624, 291 S.W.2d 704 (1956), supra note 38, as involv-
ing an active negotiator whose efforts resulted in the sale, adding: "Dean was not acting as
an agent of either Stone or Enstam. He only volunteered without benefit to himself to find
someone who would sell Worldcom stock to Stone. It is apparent that ... Dean was not a
seller of securities under the Texas Securities Act." 541 S.W.2d at 480.
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proximately from the actions of this particular defendant?" 50
3.1.2 An Analytical, Functional Approach. A more system-
atic approach to the "seller" question is to examine the typical elements of
a sale, and use as tests those which have significance to the purpose of the
securities laws. Selling usually involves the following elements, whether
the transaction takes place in the organized securities market or outside it:
(1) Solicitation Th
(2) Information transmission J ese often overlap.
(3) Negotiation of terms
(4) Collection of purchase price
(5) Delivery of security
Of the five, only solicitation is specifically mentioned in § 4E, although
negotiation is hinted at by the "contracts and agreements whereby securi-
ties are sold" language in § 4E. Any one of the five may be embraced by
the judicial gloss--"any act by which a sale is made,"-which accompa-
nies the metaphorical link-in-the-chain test.."
The Texas decisions have not attempted to identify these functional ele-
ments, much less to give relative weights to them in deciding a "sale" ques-
tion, or to say which is or are indispensable. It may be impossible to do so
with any precision. But it is possible to make some general weightings.
Solicitation is normally the most important of the factors for several rea-
sons: it usually comes first, it is (by hypothesis) directed at producing a
purchase result, and it is (particularly as it overlaps information transmis-
sion) the phase in which investors are most likely to be injured. These
reasons make solicitation-alone, or coupled with information transmis-
sion and negotiation-an appropriate trigger for legal responsibility. The
Texas cases, as I read them, have implicitly stressed these first three ele-
ments: solicitation, information, and negotiation.5 2 In addition, solicita-
tion is the only one of the five elements specifically included in § 4E's
50. Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 693 (5th Cir.
1971). For further treatment of the federal law, see 2 BROMBERO §§ 8.5(310)-(319); 3 Loss
1712-20; 6 id. 3834-41.
51. Supra at note 38.,
52. Brown v. Cole, 155 Tex. 624, 291 S.W.2d 704 (1956), note 38 supra; Smith v. Smith,
424 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1968, no writ), note 40 supra; Stone v. Enstam,
541 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ) (no sale where no solicitation and
no negotiation), note 49 supra; Herren v. Hollingsworth, 140 Tex. 263, 167 S.W.2d 735
(1943), note 66 infra (no sale where no negotiation).
Nonsolicitation may be the sounder but unspoken basis for a holding that Coastal did not
sell to Chesnut a 3/4 interest in an oil and gas lease. Coastal assigned the 3/4 interest to
Chesnut for $8,765 immediately after acquiring the 4/4 interest (from the landowner) in
Coastal's name pursuant to a prior agreement with Chesnut that the lease was to be acquired
for their joint account (e., 3/4 for Chesnut and 1/4 for Coastal). The court's stated ration-
ale is, however, that Chesnut, by the prior agreement, had equitable title to the 3/4 when
Coastal procured the lease, so that the assignment from Coastal to Chesnut merely trans-
ferred the legal title to its equitable owner, and Chesnut's $8,765 payment was "only a re-
payment based on the agreement between the parties." Chesnut v. Coastal Oil & Land
Corp., 543 S.W.2d 154, 158 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). It was
immaterial that the assignment to Chesnut recited $10 and other good and valuable consid-
eration; this did not necessarily make the transaction a "sale" for TSA purposes. Chesnut
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definition of sale, and solicitation is important elsewhere in TSA. 3
Information transmission and negotiation, so far as they can be sepa-
rated from solicitation, should be judged by the materiality-causation fac-
tor suggested above.54 Thus, a stockbroker who, at a customer's request,
gives the customer a third party writeup on X Corp. is not a seller if the
customer later buys X securities from someone else. A seller's lawyer who
negotiates the details-as distinct, perhaps, from the basic transaction or
the agreement in principle--of a private placement or other sale agreement
is not a seller.
The other two elements, collection and delivery, are considerably less
important and perhaps wholly nonessential, although collection by the
"seller" occurred in several of the decided cases and was noted by the
courts in their review of the relevant facts." Similarly, delivery by the
"seller" took place and was mentioned in several cases.56 Nonetheless,
both of these are fairly mechanical or clerical functions. They commonly
take place after the buyer has made his investment decision, and often
occur after the buyer is contractually bound. For all these reasons, collec-
tion and delivery do not seem essential to make a person a seller.
5 7 If
collection and delivery coexist with the other elements, they reinforce the
"sale" or "seller" conclusion; but if they are all that a person has done,
they are not enough to make him a "seller."
Another element, though not necessarily part of the transactional se-
quence with the buyer, is almost invariably present in a sale. This is some
economic benefit to the "seller" by receipt of proceeds, commission, or
something else. While it seems clear from the cases that this is not an
indispensable element,58 it is one that should not be ignored. Absence of
sought to rescind the assignment from Coastal and to recover the $8,765 it paid for the 1/4
interest.
But see Christie v. Brewer, 374 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1964, writ ref'd
n.r.e.), note 42 supra, holding Mrs. Millar a seller although she did not solicit, inform, nego-
tiate, or do anything else very significant. I think this is wrong.
53. § 5P exempts from the registration requirements a dealer's execution of an unsolic-
ited purchase order. § 51 conditions the limited, nonpublic offering exemption on the ab-
sence of public solicitation. Semble § 5Q for oil and gas interests. § 5E exempts offers by an
issuer to its existing security holders if no commissions are paid for soliciting.54. Notes 47-50 supra and acmpanying text.
55. Brown v. Cole, 155 Tex. 624, 291 S.W.2d 704 (1956), note 38 supra; Smith v. Smith,
424 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston 1968, no writ), note 40 supra; Dean v. State, 433
S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968), note 41 supra.
56. Brown v. Cole, 155 Tex. 624, 291 S.W.2d 704 (1956), note 38 supra; Smith v. Smith,
424 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston 1968, no writ), note 40 supra; Dean v. State, 433
S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968), note 41 supra. In both Brown and Smith the "security"
that was delivered was not the traditional stock or bond certificate but whatever paper the
defendant happened to hand over.
57. "[T]he various activities which the legislature has defined as the making of a sale
[are not] dependent upon receipt by the dealer, salesman, or broker of the purchase funds."
Brown v. Cole, 276 S.W.2d 369, 379 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1955), aft'd without discussion
of thir point, 155 Tex. 624, 291 S.W.2d 704 (1956).
58. Brown v. Cole, 155 Tex. 624, 291 S.W.2d 704 (1956), note 38 supra, held uncompen-
sated persons liable. So did Smith v. Smith, 424 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1968, no writ), note 40 supra. And an uncompensated person was held to be a seller in a
criminal case. Dean v. State, 433 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968), note 41 supra.
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economic benefit to a person is an indication, and sometimes an important
one, that he is not a seller.59
3.1.3 Additional Requirements. A § 33A(l) defendant must
be not only a "person who offers or sells," but also a violator of one of the
provisions listed in § 33A(l). These provisions may have language limit-
ing the class of defendant-violators. Thus, § 7A(1) does not say "No per-
son shall sell" an unregistered security. It says "No dealer, agent or
salesman shall sell" such a security.60 Consequently, a § 33A(l) plaintiff
suing on account of an unregistered security must prove that the defendant
is a "dealer, agent or salesman" as well as a "person who offers or sells"
the security.6' Similarly, only a "dealer, agent or salesman" can violate a
§ 23B stop-advertising order or a § 23A stop-sale order, and thus be liable
under § 33A(l) for these kinds of misconduct.
3.1.4 Buyer's Agents or Brokers. There is authority in earlier
cases that an agent or broker for a buyer does not make a sale, is not a
seller, and therefore need not be registered. 62 In more recent cases the
result is contrary if the agent solicits his principal to buy. One decision
A possible explanation of these decisions is that the seller in each instance may have been
getting some indirect benefit through the receipt of funds by the organization in which he
was also an investor. But there was no reported evidence or court discussion on the point.
59. See Stone v. Enstam, 541 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ), note
49 supra and accompanying text.
60. The language goes back to 1935 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 100, § 5, at 261.
61. Stone v. Enstam, 541 S.W.2d 473, 479 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ).
62. The leading case is Fowler v. Hults, 138 Tex. 636, 161 S.W.2d 478 (1942), discussed
in note 31 supra for the proposition that TSA is not intended to regulate buyers or protect
sellers. The court squarely holds that an agent or representative of a buyer need not be
registered as a dealer in order to obtain his agreed commission from the buyer. The jury was
given the statutory definition of dealer and found that the agent was not a dealer. The high
court reasoned that the only part of the definition that might cover buying was the phrase
"or dealing in any other manner in ... securities"; this general phrase following particular
phrases that describe only selling must have the same character, by the doctrine ejusdem
generis. 161 S.W.2d at 482. While the court was focusing on the dealer definition of what is
now § 4C, it noted that essentially the same language appeared in the criminal fraud provi-
sion that has become § 29C. § 29C, since 1973, has contained explicit references to purchas-
ing as well as to selling, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 97, § 2, at 217, thus suggesting that
"dealing in any other manner" in § 29C includes buying as well as selling. But it seems
highly unlikely that a change in the fraud provision changed the meaning of the dealer
definition (§ 4C) or the dealer registration requirement (§ 12). Indeed, the very fact that the
latter two sections were not altered along with § 29C in 1973 argues strongly that the Legis-
lature intended them to retain their old meaning: sales only.
"The Act. . . does not apply to individuals acting as agents or employees for prospective
purchasers." Dunnam v. Dillingham, 345 S.W.2d 314, 318 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1961,
no writ) (dictum?).
Whether a person is a buyer's agent (and thus protected) or a seller's agent or acting for
himself as principal (and thus not protected) can be a difficult question, usually a question of
fact. See, e.g., Mecom v. Hamblen, 155 Tex. 494, 289 S.W.2d 553, 558 (1956) (Plaintiff
Hamblen was not defendant's agent in acquiring an oil and gas lease; plaintiff "fixed the
terms of the lease according to the requirements of the lessor, and. . . dictated the terms of
the assignment [to defendant], showing that he was not acting as [defendant's] agent. He
was a broker with this lease for sale.") (This was a "commission" case under what is now
§ 34, discussed in Part 5.5.5 below.) The burden of proof on agency in a § 33A(l) case
seems to be on the buyer-plaintiff, who must show that the defendant is a "person who
sells," L e., that the defendant is not his agent. However, agency for the buyer-plaintiff could
be regarded as an affirmative defense, with the burden on the defendant.
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holds that defendant's activities interesting his brother in an investment
made him a seller as a matter of law, despite jury findings that he did not
sell, and that he was acting solely as agent for his brother. 63 The State Bar
Committee, in its comments accompanying § 33 to the Legislature, wrote
that a "person who offers or sells" includes "a broker for the seller and, if
he solicits, a broker for the buyer.' '64 So there is some evidence of legisla-
tive intent to this effect. Absent solicitation, however, the old view remains
valid. Thus, "one who is simply buying or procuring an oil and gas lease
for another" is not a seller and "is not required to be registered. '65
3.1.5 Finders. There is some high authority that one who
brings parties together without having any power to negotiate terms for
either party is not a seller.66 Later intermediate court decisions have la-
63. Smith v. Smith, 424 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1968, no writ), note 40
supra. See also Brown v. Cole, 155 Tex. 624, 291 S.W.2d 704, 709 (1956): "Petitioner[Brown] could not, by designating himself as an agent [for Gould and Cole], escape his
responsibility for the negotiations with Gould and Cole leading up to their purchase. Brown
himself admitted ... that it was from his presentation of the proposal to [Gould and Cole]
that they became interested." The facts are discussed in the text accompanying note 38
supra.
64. Draft 12, Comments.
65. Chesnut v. Coastal Oil & Land Corp., 543 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Corpus Christi 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.), discussed in note 52 supra. The court correctly cites
Fowler v. Hults, 138 Tex. 636, 161 S.W.2d 478 (1942), note 31 supra, in support. But its
citation of Herren v. Hollingsworth, 140 Tex. 263, 167 S.W.2d 735 (1943), note 66 infra, is
dubious; that case rests on other grounds noted in note 66 infra.
66. Herren v. Hollingsworth, 140 Tex. 263, 167 S.W.2d 735, 738-39 (1943), although the
decision may rest as much on the view that there was no security (only an oil and gas drilling
contract to develop the defendant landowner's property). The specific holding is that plain-
tiff was not barred as a matter of public policy (see notes 17-18 supra) from suit merely
because he was unregistered as a dealer. But it is not clear whether he was regarded as a
nondealer for the reasons just suggested (no security, or no sale in this transaction) or be-
cause he had no prior activity in selling securities (a ground on which Kadane v. Clark, 135
Tex. 496, 143 S.W.2d 197 (1940), note 17 supra, was distinguished). Indeed, it is not entirely
clear that no security was involved. The terms of the drilling contract are not mentioned in
the opinions of the supreme court, cited above, or of the lower courts before and after, 161
S.W.2d 511 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1942) and 188 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Galveston 1945). From the date of the transaction (1936) and the fact that a defendant
landowner used a real estate broker (plaintiff) to obtain a drilling contract, and apparently
agreed to pay the broker an interest in other acreage for procuring the contract, it seems
likely that the driller was not to be paid cash. Rather, he was probably to receive an oil and
gas lease or other interest in the minerals, which might have been a security.
A later Texas Supreme Court opinion does not rule on TSA, but sheds some light on
Herren and confirms that non-sale was a critical part of its holding:
[Wle held. . . that the Securities Act being directed against sellers rather than
buyers, and the plaintiff being employed by the landowner to procure the
driller as a mere 'prospect' for an ultimate development contract, which did
not necessarily involve the 'prospect' acquiring an interest in the land, the
plaintiff was not selling anything to the driller and certainly not selling any-
thing to the defendant landowner, so was not required to have a license under
the Act. The decision may also be authority for the proposition that, if the
plaintiff could be considered as 'selling' something to the driller, all he could
have sold would have been the mere possibility that the defendant would
make a lease to the driller, such a possibility not being a 'security.'
Great W. Drilling Co. v. Simmons, 157 Tex. 268, 302 S.W.2d 400, 404 (1957) (emphasis in
original).
The idea that a "go-between" who brings others together is not a seller also appears in
Culver v. Cockburn, 127 S.W.2d 328, 330 (Tex. Civ. App.--Galveston 1939, writ dism'd
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beled such a person a "finder," defined as "an intermediary who contracts
to find and bring parties together, but [who] leaves the ultimate transaction
to the principals; he is the procuring cause and his function ceases when
negotiations between the principals begin."' 67 One court has held squarely
that a finder is not a seller, and therefore need not be registered under TSA
§ 12 in order to sue for commission or compensation under § 34.68 But
another court has rejected this view and applied § 34: "[W]e are not pre-
pared to say . . . that a party may circumvent the requirements . . .[of
TSA] merely by showing that his services were to be limited to the pro-
curement of the agreement of the principals." 69 To add to the confusion,
some earlier decisions applied § 34 to finders without considering whether
they were sellers.70 Finder is a convenient term, often used in business, but
it has no magic for TSA. Whether one who claims to be a finder is really a
seller will depend on the same kind of factual analysis used to determine
whether anyone is a seller.7'
3.1.6 Joint Owners or Venturers. When persons acquire se-
curities together, for example, as co-owners or as joint venturers, they may
be regarded as cobuyers rather than as sellers to each other,72 and several
decisions have so treated them.73 More commonly, the courts have given
judgmt cor.). However, the concept is so interwoven with the discussion of the exemption of
the seller that it may not be an independent ground.
67. Rogers v. Ellsworth, 501 S.W.2d 756, 757 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1973, writ ref d n.r.e.), citing Annot., Validity, Construction, and Enforcement of Business Op-
portunities or 'Tinder's Fee" Contract, 24 A.L.R.3d 1160 (1969); Stahl v. Preston, 541 S.W.2d
278, 278-79 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no writ).
68. Rogers v. Ellsworth, 501 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973,
writ refd n.r.e.), note 67 supra. For a fuller discussion of § 34, see Part 5.5.5 below.
69. Thywissen v. FTI Corp., 518 S.W.2d 947, 951 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.]
1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Semble, Fry v. Shaw, 508 S.W.2d 142, 146 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1974, writ ref d n.r.e.) (unregistered plaintiff cannot sue buyer for compensation in arranging
meeting between buyer and seller which resulted in the purchase).
70. Development Inv. Corp. v. Diversa, Inc., 393 S.W.2d 653, 658 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1965, no writ); Shriver v. Stoddard, 188 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1945, writ ref'd).
71. Thywissen v. FTI Corp., 518 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist] 1975,
writ ref'd n.r.e.), note 69 supra; Stahl v. Preston, 541 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1976, no writ). Note that § 34 bans suits for compensation or commission "for
services rendered in the sale or purchase of securities." It is slightly broader than "person
who ... sells" in § 33A(l); one may render services in a sale without being a seller. To this
extent, there is more basis for a finder not being liable under § 33A(1) than for him to forfeit
his right to compensation under § 34.
72. This may have been what the court had in mind when it wrote rather cryptically:
It is well settled that the Act does not apply to a joint adventurer and to
transactions between joint adventurers. Joint adventurers and partners are not
to be denied the right to recover their interest merely because of a failure to
comply with the Securities Act and we think it equally true that a dissatisfied
joint adventurer may not recover from other joint adventurers merely because
of the failure of the latter to comply with the Act.
Brown v. Cole, 155 Tex. 624, 291 S.W.2d 704, 709 (1956), citing for this well settled proposi-
tion a single case, Polk v. Chandler, 276 Mich. 527, 268 N.W. 732 (1936). Or the court may
have been thinking that a joint venture interest is not a security, as has been held in Mc-
Conathy v. Dal Mac Commercial Real Estate, Inc., 545 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1977, no writ).
73. Lewis v. Davis, 145 Tex. 468, 199 S.W.2d 146, 149-50 (1947) (alleged partners; cause
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lip service to this principle, but found that there was no joint venture be-
cause some requisite (e.g., joint control, or loss sharing) was lacking. 74
There is no more magic in "joint venture" than in "finder."' 75 A claimed
joint venture should not be taken at face value, but should be examined for
the elements of "security" and "sale." 76
3.2 Post-1977 Law. The "person who offers or sells" phrase of
§ 33A(1) [and § 33A(2)]-which defines the class of defendants-is the
same in the 1977 version as it was from 1963 to 1977, and the "sale" defini-
tion in § 4E is unaltered. Nonetheless, a narrower interpretation of this
phrase is required by the 1977 addition of specific provisions to cover, with
different standards, persons who might have been "any link in the chain of
the selling process,"' 77 and thus sellers under prior law. 78 Section 33C
makes issuers liable for untruths and omissions when they register out-
standing securities for secondary sale by the holders, 79 and § 33F makes
control persons and aiders liable in certain instances noted below. These
sections are more fully treated in a later installment of this Article.
The Bar Committee commented on the new context:
of action stated though plaintiff not registered; TSA is not for the protection of sellers or the
regulation of buyers, see text accompanying note 31 supra; Fitz-Gerald v. Hull, 150 Tex. 39,
237 S.W.2d 256, 258 (1951) (accord; joint venturers); Chesnut v. Coastal Oil & Land Corp.,
543 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, writ refd n.r.e.) (defendant who
bought for joint account of defendant and plaintiff, was not seller to plaintiff; see further
discussion at note 52 supra).
See MacKenzie v. Newton, 341 S.W.2d 498, 501 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1960, writ
refd n.r.e.) (defendant did not need dealer's license to enter joint venture with plaintiff to
acquire oil interests for their joint ownership).
74. E.g., Brown v. Cole, 155 Tex. 624, 291 S.W.2d 704 (1956), note 72 supra; Mummert
v. Stekoll Drilling Co., 352 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1961, writ retd n.r.e.); Fry
v. Shaw, 508 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ refd n.r.e.).
An agreement by defendant to give plaintiff an interest in property if plaintiff procures it
for defendant does not necessarily make them co-buyers or joint venturers. Allen v. Soren-
son, 388 S.W.2d 757, 759 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1965, writ refd n.r.e.) (decided under
the real estate license act; plaintiff not licensed under that act cannot sue for agreed interest
in property and cash commission).
The resistance of courts to the circumvention of TSA by joint venture allegation has prob-
ably led them to impose more stringent requirements for proving a joint venture than are
justified. Normally, an agreement to share losses is inferred from a partnership or joint
venture, rather than a prerequisite to its existence. See J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, LAW OF
PARTNERSHIP 72, 191-92 (1968). Instead of restricting the concept of joint ventures, the
courts would do better to abandon the implied exception of joint ventures from TSA and, as
suggested in the text, focus on whether the facts point to a "security" and "sale" from one
venturer to another.
75. See Part 3.1.5 above.
76. A good example with respect to "security" is McConathy v. Dal Mac Commercial
Real Estate, Inc., 545 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ), note 72 supra.
On the distinctions between joint venture for TSA and for other purposes, and the need for
analysis of "sale," see Hill, Pit/alls in the Texas Securities Act, 10 Sw. L.J. 265, 273-78 (1956).
On the elements of "sale," see Parts 3.1.1 above and 3.2 below.
77. Supra note 38.
78. The more important broad interpretations of seller were under pre-1963 law. The
1963 changes called for a somewhat narrower scope of liability. See note 109 infra.
79. § 33C, which is a fraud provision, has no application to § 33A(l) technical viola-
tions, although § 33C does cover violations that might otherwise be actionable under §
33A(2). Thus, § 33C is relevant to our argument on § 33A(1) only as part of the classifica-
tion of defendants accomplished in 1977.
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The phrase 'person who offers or sells'. . . is taken from U.S. law and
is intended to have the same meaning, e.g. including a broker for the
seller and, if he solicits, a broker for the buyer. A broad interpretation
of this sort implements the definitions of offer and sale in § 4E. Even
so construed, § 33A(1) [like §§ 33A(2) and 33B] is a privity provision,
allowing a buyer to recover from his offeror or seller [or a seller to
recover from his offeror or buyer]. However, some nonprivity defend-
ants may be reached under §§ 33C and 33F.80
The first two sentences of this comment were in the Bar Committee sub-
mission to the Legislature, 8' and thus may reflect official as well as unoffi-
cial legislative intent.82 The last two sentences were added to stress that
peripheral defendants are to be treated under §§ 33C and 33F, rather than
by stretching "person who offers or sells" to cover them. The difference
may be vital. By § 33F(l), a control person of a § 33A(1) defendant has a
reasonable care defense that he would not have under § 33A(l) if he were
a "person who offers or sells." By § 33F(2), an aider of a § 33A(l) defend-
ant must be a material aider and is liable only if he acts with the specified
intent (to deceive or defraud) or reckless disregard (for the truth or the
law). Materiality should be a requirement for a § 33A(l) "person who
offers or sells," but has not always been recognized as such.83 And intent
or recklessness is not required of § 33A(1) defendants. Thus, peripheral
defendants should be tested by the carefully prescribed standards of
§§ 33C and 33F rather than by a loose interpretation of the general phrase,
"person who offers or sells."
4. Other Preliminary Elements. To prevail under § 33A(1) [or
§ 33A(2)], a plaintiff must plead and prove two preliminary elements: "of-
fer or sale" and "security."
4.1 Offer or Sale. The first essential is an "offer" or "sale." 84
These terms ordinarily present little problem to the plaintiff since they are
amply defined in § 4E, which prescribes, inter alia, that offer and sale each
include "every disposition or attempt to dispose of a security for value"
and that "sell" "means any act by which a sale is made."85 There are few
reported cases in which a plaintiff has failed to prove "sale."8 6
80. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33, comment (Vernon Supp. 1978).
81. Draft 12. The comment first appeared in Draft 8.
82. The more recent Texas cases are in accord, treating a soliciting agent of a buyer as a
seller. Note 63 supra and accompanying text.
83. See text accompanying notes 47-50 supra.
84. There is no liability based on an offer which does not lead to a sale. See Part 5.1.2
below. But there are complex questions whether liability may be based on an improper offer
which leads to a proper sale. See Parts 5.1.2(A)-(D) and 5.4.1 below.
85. The leading cases on sale in pre-1977 law are cited and discussed in Part 3.1.1
above. The narrower interpretation indicated by the 1977 revision is discussed in Part 3.2
above.
86. See Stone v. Enstam, 541 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ), note
49 supra; Chesnut v. Coastal Oil & Land Corp., 543 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1976, writ ref d n.r.e.), note 52 supra. Other cases finding no sale, in a different con-
text (whether plaintiff, as a seller, was barred from suing for a commission or the like) are
treated in Parts 3.1.4-3.1.6 above.
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4.2 Security. The second essential is that the offer or sale was of a
"security." This term is broadly defined by § 4A to include stock, bond,
debenture, about a dozen other specific instruments, and several open-en-
ded categories, such as "investment contract," "evidence of indebtedness,"
"interest in any or all of the capital, property, assets, profits or earnings of
any company," and "any other instrument commonly known as a secur-
ity." Whether investments outside the traditional categories (stock, bond,
debenture, etc.) are "securities" because of the open-ended provisions is
often a difficult and hard-fought question.87 Moreover, this question may
be affected by statutes other than TSA.88 A full substantive interpretation
87. Compare Searsy v. Commercial Trading Corp., 560 S.W.2d 637 (Tex. 1977) (certain
"naked" options to buy and or sell commodity futures contracts are both "investment con-
tracts" and "evidences of indebtedness"), with State v. Monex Int'l, Ltd., [197 1-1978 Trans-
fer Binder] BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 71,233 (No. 74-3243-A, 14th Dist. Ct., Dallas
County, Texas, Judgment July 10, 1974, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law August 7,
1974) (commodities sold on margin are neither), aff'd on other grounds (federal preemption),
527 S.W.2d 804 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1975, writ refd). A fuller treatment of commod-
ity interests as securities in federal and state law is Bromberg, Commodities Law and Securi-
ties Law-Overlaps and Preemptions, 1 J. CORP. L. 217, 221-67 (1976), substantially the same
as 1 BROMBERG §§ 4.6(400)-(466).
Various franchise and distributorship arrangements have been held not to be securities.
See Bruner v. State, 463 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970); Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. v.
King, 452 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The authority of
these cases is undermined by the supreme court's reinterpretation of "investment contract"
in Searsy, supra. Similar arrangements have been held to be securities under federal law,
e.g., SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 821 (1973); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974).
An interest in a joint venture to buy and hold land for appreciation has been held not to
be a security. McConathy v. Dal Mac Commercial Real Estate, Inc., 545 S.W.2d 871 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ). See Part 3.1.6 above.
Most oil, gas, and mineral interests are embraced by one of the specific components of
"security" in § 4A: "certificate or any instrument representing any interest in or under an oil,
gas or mining lease, fee or title." See Kadane v. Clark, 135 Tex. 496, 143 S.W.2d 197 (1940)
(oil and gas lease); Cosner v. Hancock, 149 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1941, writ
dism'd judgmt cor.) (oil payment). But original oil and gas leases procured from the land-
owner have been held not to be securities. Culver v. Cockburn, 127 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Galveston 1939, writ dism'd judgmt cor.); Allen v. Sorenson, 388 S.W.2d 757 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Beaumont 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.), citing Herren v. Hollingsworth, 140 Tex. 263,
167 S.W.2d 735 (1943), note 66 supra, which was decided on other grounds discussed there.
Pension plans and other employee benefit programs raise difficult questions that have not
yet been considered in Texas. Controversy currently swirls around Daniel v. International
Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 434 U.S. 1061 (1978) (No.
77-753), which affirmed a holding that an employee, who had been denied a pension, stated
a federal securities fraud claim against his union, the union pension plan, and others. Par-
ticularly, the court held that the interest in the pension plan was an "investment contract,"
althouh the employee made no direct contribution to it and had no election whether or not
to participate in the plan. For some of the criticism, see Alef & Short, Problems created by
CA-7 decision that pension plan particpation is a security, 47 J. TAx. 282 (1977); 433 SEC.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-11, 1-1 (Dec. 21, 1977) (criticism of SEC's supporting position by
Sen. Harrison Williams, Jr.); Siegel, Pension Outlook, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 9, 1978, at 1, col. 1. The
most analytical treatment is Daniel v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, A Report to the
Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities From the Study Group of 1933,Act-General
Subcommittee on Daniel v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 32 Bus. LAW. 1925
(1977), directed to the district court decision which was affirmed.
88. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.72, § I (Vernon Supp. 1977) prescribes that a variable
annuity is not a security. On certain savings and loan accounts, see note 105, para. (C) infra.
[Vol. 32
1978] TEXAS SECURITIES ACT-CIVIL LIABILITY 893
of the open-ended categories will not be attempted here.89
The existence of a security is determined by the economic features of the
transaction, not by the pieces of paper delivered.90
The definition of a security in § 4A draws no distinction between differ-
ent parts of the Act, and thus would seem to be the same for registration
violations in § 33A(l) as for fraud violations in § 33A(2). Nonetheless,
there is reason, in borderline situations, to construe the term more nar-
rowly for § 33A(l) than for § 33A(2). The reason is that § 33A(l) is an
absolute liability provision which can produce crushing damages against a
seller who innocently guesses wrong on whether the interest being sold is a
security or who in all innocence never realizes there is a "security" ques-
tion.9' Conversely, when the plaintiff must show the defendant's fault as
in § 33A(2), there is less reason to give the defendant the benefit of the
doubt on whether he is selling a "security. '92 The statutory basis for mak-
ing such a distinction is the preamble to § 4, which prescribes definitions
"unless the context otherwise indicates." The no-fault context of § 33A(l)
may well indicate that a narrow interpretation of "security" is necessary
for this section.
5. Basis of Liability. Section 33A(l) creates liability for violation of
these provisions, which are analyzed in detail in the indicated Parts of this
Article:
(A) Section 7, which requires registration of securities offers and sales
89. "Investment contract" seems the broadest and is the one most frequently invoked.
It has generally been construed to require four elements: (1) an investment, (2) in a common
enterprise, (3) with the expectation of profits, (4) from the efforts of others. SEC v. W.J.
Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946); Searsy v. Commercial Trading Corp., 560 S.W.,d 637
(Tex. 1977), note 87 supra.
Cases on "investment contract" in state and federal securities law are collected in Annot.,
47 A.L.R.3d 1375 (1973); Annot., 3 A.L.R. Fed. 592 (1970). For more analytical treatment,
see I Loss 483-511; 4 id. 2487-88, 2500-56; SOWARDS & HIRSCH ch. 2; Coffey, The Economic
Realities f a "Security" Is There a More Meaningful Formula?, 18 W. RES. L. REV. 367
(1967); Hannan & Thomas, The Importance of Economic Reality and Risk in Defning Federal
Securities, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 219 (1974).
90. See Brown v. Cole, 155 Tex. 624, 291 S.W.2d 704, 710 (1956), discussed in the text
accompanying note 38 supra. Brown contended unsuccessfully (although a dissenting jus-
tice agreed with him) that the memorandum he sent Gould and Cole regarding the proposed
Mexican mining venture and the letters he wrote acknowledging receipt of their money for
transmittal to Fields were not "securities." The court pragmatically noted that these were
the only instruments issued to Gould and Cole, and these instruments recited the nature of
the transaction.
91. The point is argued further in 1 BROMBERG § 4.6(312). The SEC, in supporting a
broad interpretation of "security" to include interests in pension plans, has stressed that it is
speaking only of the antifraud provisions, not of the registration requirements (and the lia-
bilities related to them). Brief of the SEC, Amicus Curiae, at 4-5, 58-59, Daniel v. Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977), summarized in [1976-1977 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,846; Memorandum of SEC Office of General Counsel
(Dec. 7, 1977), 433 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1-1, at 1-2 (Dec. 21, 1977). In response, the
Seventh Circuit made it clear that it was deciding only the fraud question, not the registra-
tion question, e.g., at 561 F.2d at 1242, 1250.
92. The same is true of an enforcement proceeding, which seeks only future compliance
with the securities laws-if the holding does not foreclose the automatic liability issue.
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unless the security or the transaction is exempt by §§ 5 or 6. Part 5.1 be-
low.
(B) Section 9, which:
(a) Authorizes the Commissioner to require sale proceeds to be
escrowed until sales reach a specified level. Part 5.2 below.
(b) Limits marketing expenses to 20% of the public offering price,
or a lower level set by the Commissioner. Part 5.3 below.
(c) Requires that offers of registered securities be made by a full
disclosure prospectus. Part 5.4 below.
(C) Section 12, which requires dealers and salesmen who sell securities
to be registered except in exempt transactions. Parts 5.5 and 5.6 below.
(D) Section 23B, which bars a dealer or salesmen from using an adver-
tisement that the Commissioner has notified him is misleading. Part 5.7
below.
(E) A stop-sale order under § 23A, which authorizes such orders if the
Commissioner determines that a sale would violate TSA, tend to work a
fraud, or not be fair. Part 5.8 below.
The common and potent characteristic of these liabilities is their abso-
lute, strict, automatic, and no-fault character. They are absolute or auto-
matic in the sense that liability is imposed for the regulatory violation
without showing that the plaintiff was injured by the defendant's con-
duct.93 They are strict or no-fault in the sense that the plaintiff need not
show any misconduct of the defendant toward the plaintiff, or any intent
or other state of mind of the defendant. 94
93. Cf. Commercial Trading Corp. v. Searsy, 559 S.W.2d 663, 668 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana), rev'd on other grounds, 560 S.W.2d 637 (Tex. 1977), where the court
spoke of "the strict liability theory of... failure to register ... under the state and federal
securities laws."
But cf. Matrix Computing, Inc. v. Davis, 554 S.W.2d 288, 292 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1977, no writ): "IT]here being no evidence having probative force upon which the jury could
have made a finding of damages in favor of [plaintiff] Matrix, the trial court correctly
granted the motion for instructed verdict and rendered the take-nothing judgment." Plain-
tiff bought TCFC's commercial paper from a bank (and its trust officer), then sued the latter
(after TCFC went bankrupt) for misrepresentation and nonregistration. Plaintif's records
of the purchase were in disarray and those it tendered as evidence were not qualified for
admission under the business record statute, TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3737e (Vernon
Supp. 1978). It had never received signed notes and the unsigned notes it had for part of the
claimed investment were also excluded. So the case seems to hold that a plaintiff must be
able to show some loss in order to recover under § 33A(l) [or § 33A(2)], but not that the loss
was caused by defendant. On these unusual facts, the results would probably be the same if
plaintiff sued for rescission since plaintiff would have no admissible evidence that it bought.
But a rescission plaintiff should not have to prove damages under § 33A.
94. Comparison of Criminal and No-Fault Civil Liability. It is interesting to compare the
no-fault civil liability provisions of § 33A(l) with the criminal provisions of § 29. Both cre-
ate severe sanctions and cover approximately the same conduct. Their treatment is similar
in some respects. Offering or selling a security without security registration results in both
liabilities under §§ 33A(l) (via § 7) and 29B. Offering or selling a security without dealer or
salesman registration results in both liabilities under §§ 33A(l) (via § 12) and 29A. Fraud
results in both liabilities under §§ 33A(2) and 29C. Judging by the criminal penalties, these
are the gravest offenses ($5,000 fine, 10 years prison, or both).
Other parts of§ 29 carry criminal penalties only 1/5th as great: $1,000 fine, 2 years prison,
or both. But the corresponding civil liability is the same as for the more serious violations.
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5.1 Unregistered Security-§ 7.
5.1.1 § 33A(I) Civil Liability. The purpose of securities regis-
tration is to give the Commissioner and his staff "an opportunity for close
scrutiny [of the offering] for the buyers' protection." 95 The Commissioner
can generally refuse registration on a finding that the offering would not be
"fair, just and equitable" or would be fraudulent. 96
The earlier securities laws indicated bluntly that their purpose-to be
achieved largely through registration-was to prevent the sale of worthless
securities. 97 An additional purpose, which has always permeated the fed-
eral law and has gradually come to be recognized under the Texas act, is to
inform investors through a full-disclosure prospectus of the kind required
by § 9C and discussed in Part 5.4 below.
Violation of a § 23A stop order brings full civil liability under § 33A(1) and the smaller
criminal liability under § 29D. Violation of a § 23B stop-advertising order brings full civil
liability under § 33A(l) and the smaller criminal liability under § 29G but the two provi-
sions are not coextensive.
In an even more dramatic divergence, there are no criminal penalties for the violations of
§ 9, which create civil liability under § 33A(l). § 9C (the prospectus requirement) mutters
ominously that "[f]ailure to comply with this requirement shall be treated as a violation of
this Act, subjecting the parties responsible to the consequences thereof as provided herein."
But this is not enough to invoke the criminal provisions of § 29, which prescribe particular
violations and do not apply to "any violation of this Act," in contrast to most other state and
federal securities statutes, e.g., SA § 24, SEA § 32, UNIFORM ACT § 409. Thus, although the
prospectus is traditionally regarded (at least in federal law) as the most important protection
for investors, there is no Texas criminal penalty for failure to deliver it, unless that results in
material and misleading nondisclosures or other fraud violations covered by § 29C.
Finally, §§ 29E and 29F create criminal penalties for false statements in filings with the
Commissioner and false statements about registration, which have no correlate in § 33A(l),
although at least the latter might be actionable under § 33A(2).
95. Spence & Green Chem. Co. v. Mouer, 510 S.W.2d 620, 622 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
96. § 10A for § 7A qualification registrations; § 7C(2) for § 7C coordination registra-
tion. There is no explicit standard for denying a § 7B notification registration, but the Com-
missioner can stop the sale of any security, or revoke its registration, by a § 23A order
invoking similar standards. See Part 5.8.1 below. The Commissioner's (or staff's) expression
of disapproval is usually enough to cause withdrawal of a registration application. Formal
denials of registration are comparatively rare. For an example, see Southern State Land &
Cattle Co., Tex. State Sec. Board Order No. RD-553 (Sept. 3, 1976), denying registration of
5 breeding herds at $40,000 per herd (of 5 cows) plus $14,000 management contracts per
herd over 3 years, because not fair, just, and equitable: exorbitant price, excessive manage-
ment fees to sponsor, no tax opinion or IRS ruling, likelihood that IRS will successfully
challenge the tax basis as unrealistic, unfair termination provisions, no reasonable expecta-
tion of profit for the investor, etc.
The pros and cons of this kind of merit regulation have been vigorously debated. Among
the pros, see Jennings, The Role of the State in Corporate Regulation and Investor Protection,
23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 193, 207-39 (1958); Hueni, Application of Merit Requirements in
State Securities Regulation, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1417 (1969); Goodkind, Blue Sky Law: Is
There Merit in Merit Regulation?, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 79. Among the cons, see Manne &
Mofsky, What Price Blue-Sky--State Securities Laws Work Against Private and Public Inter-
est Alike, Barron's, Aug. 5, 1968, at 5; Bloomenthal, Blue Sky Regulation and the Theory of
Overkill, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1447 (1969); J. MOFSKY, BLUE SKY RESTRICTIONS ON NEW
BUSINESS PROMOTIONS (1971).
97. 1923 Tex. Gen. Laws, 38th Legis., 2d Called Sess., ch. 52, § 29, at 120; 1955 Tex.
Gen. Laws, ch. 67, § 42, at 346-47; see Kadane v. Clark, 135 Tex. 496, 143 S.W.2d 197, 199(1940).
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A dealer, agent, or salesman9 8 who sells an unregistered security or does
not have a permit for the security9 9 violates § 7 and is therefore liable by
§ 33A(1),1 0 unless there is a § 6 security exemption (which generally re-
quires the seller to be a registered dealer or a registered salesman) 1' or a
§ 5 transaction exemption. 102 Either type of exemption makes registration
98. For the meaning of these terms, see Parts 5.5.3 (dealer) and 5.6.3 (agent, salesman)
below. See also note 112 infra.
99. Registration Y. Permit. Registration and permit are used, with apparent equivalence,
by the Legislature, the Commissioner, and the courts. §§ 7B and 7C use registration; §§ 9C
and 10 use permit; §§ 7A, 22B and 29B (as well as the caption to § 7) use both. Finally,
§ 5.0(9) uses registration to refer to all three types. Although TSA specifies the granting of a
permit only for a § 7A (qualification) registration, it has long been the Commissioner's prac-
tice to issue permits for §§ 7B (notification) and 7C (coordination) registrations as well. For
the judicial recognition of the equivalence, see McQueen v. Belcher, note I I infra. For
instances in which the difference might be important, see notes 204-05 infra and accompany-
ing text.
This Article generally uses registration, registered and unregistered, rather than permit,
permitted and unpermitted, because of the ambiguity and awkwardness in the latter set of
words, because registration is more widely used in TSA, and because registration is the
phrase in federal and most other state securities laws.
100. Searsy v. Commercial Trading Corp., 560 S.W.2d 637 (Tex. 1977), rep'g 559 S.W.2d
663 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977); Bierschwale v. Oakes, 497 S.W.2d 506, 521-22 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1973), rei'd on other grounds sub nom. Meadows v.
Bierschwale, 516 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. 1974); Bateman v. Petro Atlas, Inc., Civ. No. 75-H-445
(S.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 1977), Findings 4-5, Conclusions 9-10; see Flowers v. Dempsey-
Tegeler & Co., 472 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. 1971) (offense proved for venue purposes).
For the same proposition under the 1941-1963 voidability provision, Appendix 3 below,
see Brown v. Cole, 155 Tex. 624, 291 S.W.2d 704 (1956), note 38 supra; Christie v. Brewer,
374 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1964, writ ref'd n.r.c.), note 42 supra; Prokop v.
Krenek, 374 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.); McQueen v.
Belcher, 366 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1963, no writ) (offense proved for venue
purposes); and possibly Smith v. Smith, 424 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1968, no
writ), note 40 supra.
For the same proposition under pre-1941 common law voidability for violation of TSA,
see Smith v. Fishback, 123 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1938, writ refd), note
18 supra.
101. The exception is § 5R which allows a § 6 security to be sold by its issuer or a subsid-
iary. § 5R creates a transaction exemption for this purpose. See note 102, para. (A)(7) infra.
Exempt Securities. The most important § 6 exemptions are for government and municipal
securities, §§ 6A, 6B; certain bank and savings association securities, §§ 6C, 6G (and see
note 105 infra); certain railroad and public utility securities, § 6D; commercial paper and
negotiable notes of less than 24-month maturity, § 6H; securities of certain nonprofit organi-
zations, §§ 6E, 6J; and securities listed on the major stock exchanges, § 6F. The stock ex-
change exemption is liberally construed, in an important respect, to include as "fully listed"
on an exchange (and thus exempt by § 6F) securities that have been "approved for listing
upon notice of issuance." Tex. State Sec. Board Rule VI.F, Tex. Reg. No. 065.06.00.006,
reprinted in 3 BLUE SKY L. REp. (CCH) 46,606 para. F (1978). Such approval is given by
the exchange in advance of issuance, so the exemption covers not only outstanding securities
that are listed, but also new securities that will be listed on issuance. The same rule contains
the exchanges the Commissioner has approved for the § 6F exemption in addition to those
named in the statute.
102. Exempt Transactions. The more important transaction exemptions-classified func-
tionally by who can use them, although they are not so grouped in TSA-are summarized
below. They are preceded by this highly significant and emphatic preamble:
Except as hereinafter in this Act specifically provided, the provisions of this
Act shall not apply to the sale of any security when made in any of the follow-
ing transactions and under any of the following conditions, and the company
or person engaged therein shall not be deemed a dealer within the meaning of
this Act; that is to say, the provisions of this Act shall not apply to any sale,
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[note 102 cont'd]:.
offer ... dealing in or delivery of any security under any of the following
transactions or conditions.
(A) Issuer Exemptions. The main exemptions for an issuer selling its own securities (and
for anyone acting for an issuer) are:
(1) Private, Limited Offerings: sales, without public solicitation or advertisement so long
as the total number of holders does not exceed 35 or (with prior notice to the Commissioner)
to no more than 15 buyers in 12 months, §§ 51(a) and (c), construed in Tex. State Sec. Board
Rule V.1, Tex. Reg. No. 065.05.00.009, reprinted in 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 46,605
para. I (1978). For general treatment of the § 51 exemption, see Bromberg, Texas Exemp-
tions for Small Offerings of Corporate Securities, 18 Sw. L.J. 537 (1964); Bromberg, Texas
Exemptionsfor Small Offerings of Corporate Securities-The Prohibition on Advertisements.
20 Sw. L.J. 239 (1966). Cases interpreting § 5I include Sibley v. Horn Advertising, Inc.,
505 S.W.2d 41.7 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ refd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929
(1975), discussed note 132 infra (no public solicitation or advertisement); Dean v. State, 433
S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968), discussed note 41 supra (jury issue on public solicita-
tion); Birchfield v. State, 401 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966) (public solicitation). A
case misconstruing § 51 (on advertisement) is Tumblewood Bowling Corp. v. Matise, 388
S.W.2d 479 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.), criticized in the second of
my articles cited above.
(2) Sales to Existing Securityholders. Existing security holders include holders of the
issuer's stock and debentures as well as convertibles and nontransferable warrants. No com-
mission (other than a standby commission, e.g., to an underwriter who will purchase the
securities not bought by the offerees) may be paid for soliciting holders in Texas. § 5E. The
securities need not be offered to all holders, or all holders of a particular class. Tex. State
Sec. Board Rule V.E. 1, Tex. Reg. No. 065.05.00.005 para. 1, reprinted in 3 BLUE SKY L.
REP. (CCH) § 46,605 para. 1 (1978). A court has, somewhat questionably, construed the
exemption to be inapplicable where the offering was to a large number of security holders
who became such in apparent violation of the registration requirements. Spence & Green
Chem. Co. v. Mouer, 510 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974, writ refed n.r.e.),
upholding a Commissioner's stop-sale order (apparently under § 23A). While the facts indi-
cated egregious past violations, it is improbable that the Legislature intended the § 5E ex-
emption to call in question the validity of all claimed prior exemptions. Certainly there is
nothing in § 5E that says an existing shareholder must have become such in an exempt or
registered transaction.
(3) Sales in the Course of Certain Reorganizations andAcquisitions. §§ 5F, 5G, construed
in Tex. State Sec. Board Rule V.G, Tex. Reg. No. 065.05.00.007, reprinted in 3 BLUE SKY L.
REP. (CCH) § 46,605 para. G (1978), and in Maddox v. Flato, 423 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1967, writ ref d n.r.e.).
(4) Sales to Certain Financial Institutions. § 5H, construed in Tex. State Sec. Board Rule
V.H, Tex. Reg. No. 065.05.00.008, reprinted in 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) § 46,605 para. H
(1978).
(5) Sales Pursuant to Certain Employee Stock Option and Employee Pension and Similar
Benefit Plans. §§ 51(a), 5H (last clause), construed in Tex. State Sec. Board Rule V.1.6-7,
Tex. Reg. No. 065.05.00.009 paras. 6-7, reprinted in 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) § 46.605
paras. 1.6-7 (1978).
(6) Sales to Security Dealers. The dealer must be registered and "actually engaged in
buying and selling securities." § 5H, construed in Dunnam v. Dilingham, 345 S.W.2d 314
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1961, no writ); Gerchsheimer v. American Heritage Bank & Trust
Co., 437 F.2d 1332 (10th Cir. 1971); misconstrued (as to "main course of business") in De-
velopment Inv. Corp. v. Diversa, Inc., 393 S.W.2d 653, 657 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1965, no writ). This exemption raises a number of tough and unanswered questions as to the
extent it covers sales to dealers for resale or as agents for other persons.
(7) Sales of Exempt Securities. § 6 exempts a variety of securities (e.g., those of banks,
savings associations, railroads and utilities and securities listed on the major stock ex-
changes; see note 101 supra) if sold by a registered dealer (or salesman). § 5R was added to
exempt the same securities (except those of nonprofit organizations named in § 6E, which
are partly covered already by § 5K) if sold directly by the issuer. 1963 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch.
170, § 6, at 476. By virtue of§ 5R, a § 6 issuer selling its own securities is not a dealer; § 4C
is contrary but must yield to the later and more specific § 5R so far as they are in conflict
(ie., as to issuers of § 6 securities).
(8) Sales of Securities of Nonprofit Issuers. § 5K considerably overlaps §§ 6E and 6J,
especially when the latter are combined with § 5R, discussed in the previous paragraph. §
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5K, among other conditions, prohibits the payment of commissions on the sales.(B) Nonissuer Exemptions. The main exemptions for a seller of securities who is not their
issuer are:
(1) Sales of Outstanding Securities By Owners. This provision, § 5C(I), so bristles with
restrictions that it defies paraphrase and needs to be quoted in full:
Sales of securities made by or in behalf of a vendor, whether by dealer or
other agent, in the ordinary course of bona fide personal investment of the
personal holdings of such vendor, or change in such investment, if such ven-
dor is not engaged in the business of selling securities and the sale or sales are
isolated transactions not made in the course of repeated and successive trans-
actions of a like character; provided, that in no event shall such sales, or offer-
ings be exempt from the provisions of this Act when made or intended by the
vendor or his agent, for the benefit, either directly or indirectly, of any com-
pany or corporation except the individual vendor (other than a usual commis-
sion to said agent), and provided further that any person acting as agent for
said vendor shall be registered pursuant to this Act.
The most troubling, and unresolved, questions are what is the "ordinary course of bona fide
personal investment. . . or change in such investment" and what are "isolated transactions
not made in the course of repeated and successive transactions of a like character."
See generally Comment, Exemptions to the Securities Act of 1957 and Their Importance to
Persons Dealing in Oil and Gas Interests, 12 Sw. L.J. 359, 361-64 (1958); Gilchrist & Hanna,
Secondary Distribution of Corporate Securities, 13 Sw. L.J. I, 41-42 (1959); Meer, A New
Look at the Texas Securities Act, 43 TEXAS L. REV. 680, 685, 697 (1965); Annot., Sales as
"Isolated" or "Successive," or the Like, Under State Securities Acts, I A.L.R.3d 614 (1965).
Cf Annot., Who is "Dealer" under state securities acts exempting sales by owners other than
issuers not made in course of successive transactions and the like, 6 A.L.R.3d 1425 (1966).
Decisions construing § 5C(1) are Bierschwale v. Oakes, 497 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [lst Dist.] 1973), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Meadows v. Bierschwale, 519
S.W.2d 125 (Tex. 1974) (no finding sales were isolated) and Prokop v. Krenek, 374 S.W.2d
265 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1964, writ refd n.r.e.) (benefit of another), note 100 supra.
Earlier decisions construing § 5C(1) or its predecessors must be read very closely because the
statute has been amended in important respects in its evolution from 1935 Tex. Gen. Laws,
ch. 100, § 3(c), at 259. 1955 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 67, § 3(c) added the references to dealer or
agent. 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 269, § 5C(l), at 579 added the isolated transaction require-
ment and the repeated transaction prohibition, as well as the requirement that an agent be
registered, and struck out some other language, to reach the present provision. See notes
295-97 infra and accompanying text on whether an unregistered agent destroys the exemp-
tion for the owner.
(2) Sales of Outstanding Securities by Dealers. § 5.0 is the critical exemption which per-
mits registered dealers (and, presumably, their registered salesmen) to make markets and
otherwise trade in outstanding securities. It has nine sets of requirements. Several of them
are not easily interpretable, e.g., when are "securities. . .outstanding in the hands of the
public," § 5.0(2), and what are "prices reasonably related to the current market price,"
§ 5.0(3)? The latter is partly construed in Tex. State Sec. Board Rule V.0.2, Tex. Reg. No.
065.05.00.015 para. 2, reprintedin 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) § 46,605 para. 0.2 (1978). For
other factors considered by the Commissioner in granting the exemption when it is not auto-
matically available, see Secondary Trading Exemption Notice, in State Securities Board,
Rules, Appendix V.B. (looseleaf, orig. pub. 1976). An important interpretation of § 5.0 by
the Commissioner appears to be moving toward publication as a rule: § 5.0 permits the sale
by a registered dealer acting either as principal or as agent.
(3) Sales of Outstanding Securities by Dealers Pursuant to Unsolicited Purchase Orders.
Several requirements are imposed by § 5P. But there is no specific requirement that the
dealer be registered, although it would be consistent with the statutory scheme of registering
professionals that he should be registered. Presumably the exemption extends to the dealer's
salesmen on the same basis.
(4) Private, Limited Offerings of Oil and Gas Interests. § 5Q is patterned after the § 51
issuer private, limited offering discussed in para. (A)(1) above. An agent acting for the own-
er must be registered (as a dealer or salesman).
(5) Sales to Certain Financial Institutions. This exemption, in § 5H, discussed in para.
(A)(4) above, is equally available to issuers and nonissuers.
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unnecessary 10 3 and therefore eliminates liability for nonregistration. 1°4 In
addition, some other statutes create exemptions from all or part of TSA.
105 By § 37, the burden of proof of an exemption is on the person claiming
[note 102 para. (B) cont'd]:
(6) Sales to Security Dealers. This exemption, in § 5H, discussed in para. (A)(6) above,
is equally available to issuers and nonissuers.
(7) Sales by Executors, Administrators, Receivers, etc. § 5A is discussed and partly
quoted in note 294 infra.
(8) Sales by Pledgees. § 5B.
(9) Sales of Securities of Nonprofit Issuers. This exemption, in § 5K, discussed in para.
(A)(8) above, is equally available to issuers and nonissuers.
(10) Sales by Banks and Savings Associations of Their Own Securities. This exemption,
in § 5L, partly overlaps §§ 6C and 6G as well as external exemptions. See paras. (A) and
(C) of note 105 infra.
(1I) Sales of Certain Options. § 5S is primarily for publicly traded options and has a
number of requirements including sale by or through a registered dealer, option perform-
ance guarantee by a dealer, underlying security listed on a stock exchange or quoted on
NASDAQ, and no benefit to the issuer of the underlying security.
103. § 7A(I) repeats that registration is not required when § 5 or § 6 exemptions are in
effect.
104. Sibley v. Horn Advertising, Inc., 505 S.W.2d 417, 419-20 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1975) (exempt by § 51 for certain nonpub-
lic offerings); Anderson v. Eliot, 333 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1960, writ refd)
(exempt by predecessor of § 5C(1) for certain resales by individual investors).
See Bierschwale v. Oakes, 497 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1973),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Meadows v. Bierschwale, 516 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. 1974), note
100 supra, recognizing that an exemption would preclude § 33A(l) liability, but finding that
the claimed § 5C(1) exemption was not proved. Semble, under the 1941-1963 voidability
provision, Appendix 3 below, Prokop v. Krenek, 374 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Riggs v. Riggs, 322 S.W.2d 571, 573-74 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1959,
no writ) (dictum since plaintiff failed to make the requisite tender).
There is no criminal liability under § 29B for sale of an unregistered security if one of the
exemptions applies. See Dean v. State, 433 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968), note 41
supra. The principle has been recognized in other cases where, however, the exemption was
not proved. E.g., Cox v. State, 523 S.W.2d 695 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975); cf. Bridges v. State,
360 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 821 (1962) (conviction affirmed;
indictment need not negate exemptions; it is not clear from the opinion whether this is a
§ 29B or § 29A violation).
105. (A) Banks. Texas Banking Code, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 342-41 Ia
(Vernon Supp. 1978) (added 1977): an officer, director or employee of a bank with fewer
than 500 shareholders is exempt "from the registration and licensing provisions" of TSA as
to participation in a sale of securities issued by the bank but "may not be compensated for
services provided under this article." §§ 6C and 6G exempt national and most state bank
securities, when sold by registered dealers or salesmen. § 5L exempts national and all state
bank securities when sold by the issuer and (like most other § 5 exemptions) makes it unnec-
essary for the issuer to register as a dealer. The implication of§ 5L is that the bank's officers
and employees (and perhaps its directors), through whom it sells securities when it does not
use registered dealers, need not register. The relationship between § 5L and art. 342-41 la is
obscure. Superficially, they overlap to a considerable degree. But presumably the Legisla-
ture intended something by adding art. 342-41 la which is much later and is specific about
officers, directors, and employees while § 5L is not. A reasonable reconciliation is that art.
342-41 la supersedes the exemption of bank officers, directors and employees implied by
§ 5L. Thus, such persons are exempt only when not compensated for selling and when in
banks with fewer than 500 shareholders. Such persons would not be exempt when compen-
sated, or when in banks with more than 500 or more shareholders. The prohibition on
compensation for services would literally prevent the payment of salary to an officer, etc.,
whose duties included selling securities. Since all officers and employees, and many direc-
tors, are compensated, it seems likely that the Legislature intended only to prevent extra or
special compensation, such as commissions per share, for selling securities. At the least,
there may be a fact question about what a person is being compensated for. Assuming the
correctness of my interpretation of art. 342-41 Ia vis-4-vis § 5L, the combined civil liability
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of the four sections are these. There are no § 33A(l) claims based on nonregistration of the
security (§ 7) of any bank covered by §§ 6C or 6G if the security is sold by a registered
dealer. There are no such § 33A(1) claims if the security is sold by an uncompensated of-
ficer, director, or employee of the bank and the bank has fewer than 500 shareholders.
There are no § 33A(l) claims based on § 9 violation in any of these instances since § 9 is
tied to securities registration, which is not required in these instances. There are no § 33A(1)
claims based on § 12 violation in any of these instances since the dealer is registered (by
hypothesis) or the officer, director or employee is exempt by art. 342-41 la. But there is § 12
violation, and hence § 33A(1) liability, if a compensated but unregistered officer, director, or
employee sells a security for any bank, or if a compensated or uncompensated officer, direc-
tor, or employee sells a security for a bank with 500 or more shareholders (unless some other
§ 5 exemption, such as §§ SE, 5H or 51, is applicable). A § 23A or § 23B order might be
made against a bank security in any instance and, if violated, would be actionable under
§ 33A(l). The registered dealer would not be barred from suing for commission or compen-
sation by § 34. The officer-director-employee exemption in art. 342-41 la would seem to
neutralize the § 34 bar against commission suits by unlicensed persons, but the art. 342-41 Ia
ban on compensation creates the same bar, or leaves § 34 in effect. There is no exemption
from the fraud provisions. Nor do any of the bank exemptions extend beyond securities
issued by the bank or, at least in the case of § 6G, securities guaranteed by the bank. Cf
Matrix Computing, Inc. v. Davis, 554 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ
dism'd), in which a bank not registered as a dealer was sued for selling third party commer-
cial paper to plaintiff; the bank won for other reasons (plaintiff failed to prove damages).
(B) Professional Corporations. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528e, § 19 (Vernon
Supp. 1978): the "sale, issuance or offering" of professional corporation stock to permitted
buyers is exempted "from all provisions of the laws of this state . . . which provide for
supervision, registration or regulation in connection with the sale, issuance or offering of
securities." (Professional corporations are those formed to render accounting, dental, legal,
and other professional services.) The quoted language appears to make inapplicable all the
parts of TSA on which §§ 33A(l) or 34 operate. Less clear is whether the fraud provisions
are part of "regulation"; arguably, they are not, and thus § 33A(2) liability remains in effect
for professional corporation securities. It seems somewhat clearer that TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE § 27.01 (Vernon 1968) is not the kind of law from which exemption is provided. And
it seems quite clear that there is no exemption provided from common law fraud.
(C) Savings Associations. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 852a, § 11.01 (Vernon Supp.
1978) (as amended 1975): "[slavings accounts, certificates, and other evidences of interests in
the savings liability" of associations subject to the Savings and Loan Act, and of federal
savings associations, "are not 'securities' for any purpose" of TSA. Since all of TSA de-
pends on "securities," no part of TSA is applicable to the described interests. Art. 852a,
§ 11.01 continues that other securities of such associations (Le., their common or capital
stock) are not subject to the TSA registration requirements, hence securities registration is
not required for these securities, and there is no civil liability under the parts of § 33A(l)
referring to §§ 7 or 9. §§ 34, 33A(2) and the other parts of § 33A(l) apparently remain
applicable except as indicated in the following sentences. Art. 852a, § 11.01 adds that asso-
ciation "officers" are exempt "from the registration and licensing provisions" of TSA for
transactions in securities of their associations. This eliminates civil liability for the part of
§ 33A(l) that refers to § 12, and probably eliminates (by implication) § 34 sanctions.
§ 33A(2) probably remains applicable to securities other than the specified accounts, certifi-
cates, and interests, while common law fraud remains applicable to all savings and loan
securities and § 27.01 remains applicable to all savings and loan "stock." As with the -bank
provisions discussed in (A) above, the outside exemption overlaps the inside ones, §§ 6G
(certain state savings associations) and 5L (federal and certain state savings associations).
But the conflicts are fewer here, since there is no ban on compensation of selling officers, and
no distinction based on the number of shareholders of the association. Thus, the outside
exemption can be read as an implementation of the implied exemption of officers in § 5L,
rather than as a supersession or limitation of it. But one limitation can be clearly inferred by
comparing art. 852a, § 11.01 with the banking provision and with its own predecessor (1963
Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 113, § 1101, at 269). The current savings and loan exemption is only for
officers. It does not cover directors or employees, although the bank provision covers both,
and the predecessor covered employees (as well as agents). Thus, it appears that there is
§ 33A(l) liability for violation of § 12 when an unregistered director or employee (who is
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it, Le., the § 33A(l) defendant. 0 6 The elements of the plaintiff's case are
that he bought 0 7 and the defendant sold10 8 to the plaintiff' 0 9 a security, " 0
the security was not registered under § 7 at the time of the sale," ' l and the
not also an officer) sells stock of a saving association, unless some other § 5 exemption ap-
plies.
(D) Other. No other exemptions can be located through the index to the annotated stat-
utes. However, the cross references at the beginning of title 19, Blue Sky Law, Securities,
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 58 1-1 to -39 (Vernon Supp. 1978), list other, less important,
statutes, some of which provide exemptions from TSA.
106. Accord, Brown v. Cole, 155 Tex. 624, 291 S.W.2d 704, 711 (1956). All elements of
the exemption must, of course, be proved. See Bierschwale v. Oakes, 497 S.W.2d 506 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1973), rep'd on other grounds sub nom. Meadows v.
Bierschwale, 516 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. 1974), note 100 supra, where defendant proved some but
not all of the § 5C(l) exemption, and therefore was liable. Semble, Prokop v. Krenek, 374
S.W.2d 265 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1964, writ refd n.r.e.), note 104 supra.
107. See Part 2.1 above.
108. See Parts 3 and 4.1 above. On offers as distinct from sales, see Part 5.1.2 below.
Territorial Aspects. Nothing in § 7 specifically limits the securities registration require-
ment to sales in Texas, although that was almost certainly the legislative intent, as well as a
general territorial principle of state law and a federal constitutional necessity. (By contrast,
the dealer registration mandate of § 12 applies "in this state."). In any event, most cross-
border transactions in either direction are covered. The authorities noted below are not § 33
or § 34 cases, but should be applicable to them.
Outside Sellers. Sales by out-of-state persons to Texas buyers are Texas sales, covered by
TSA. Thus an Arizona dealer sold, or at least offered, in Texas when he called a Texas
prospect from Arizona, offered municipal bonds over the telephone, and confirmed them by
mail from Arizona. Shappley v. State, 520 S.W.2d 766, 768-69 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). The
court affirmed the § 29A conviction for not being registered in Texas as a dealer or sales-
man. And it rejected defendant's argument that the sale took place in Arizona pursuant to
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE §§ 8.301(a), 8.313(a)(3) (Vernon 1978) (which state that a sale
takes place at delivery and that delivery of a security takes place on confirmation). How-
ever, the Code, in § 10.104(3), specifically yields to TSA. The court never quite indicates
whether defendant sold in Texas or only offered. The distinction would be unimportant in a
criminal case since § 29A applies equally to both offenses. The distinction could be impor-
tant in a § 33A(l) case; see Part 5.1.2 below.
Outside Buyers. Similarly, sales by Texas persons to outside buyers are Texas sales cov-
ered by TSA. Rio Grande Oil Co. v. State, 539 S.W.2d 917, 921-22 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (affirming § 32 injunction against defend-
ants in Texas selling oil and gas leases by telephone and mail to persons outside Texas; sales
were subject to acceptance in Texas and Texas bank accounts were used; defendants were
not registered in Texas, nor were the securities); Enntex Oil & Gas Co. v. State, 560 S.W.2d
494, 496-97 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (semble).
Dealers and Salesmen. Whether a person is acting as a dealer or salesman in Texas is
governed by the general principles stated above and by a specific rule defining a dealer
activity as occurring "within this state" if either the dealer "or his agent is present in this
state or the offeree/purchaser or his agent is present in this state at the time of the particular
activity." Tex. State Sec. Board Rule IV.B.28, Tex. Reg. No. 065.04.00.002 para. 28, re-
printed in 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) $ 46,604 para. B.28 (1977). There is an identical
definition for a salesman. Id.
109. § 33A(1) [like § 33A(2)] creates liability to "the person buying the security from
him" (the defendant). Semble § 33B creating fraud liability of a buyer "to the person selling
the security to him." This language, which has been in § 33A since 1963, is somewhat
tighter than the 1941-1963 language (Appendix 3 below): "the purchaser ... shall be enti-
tled to recover from the seller," not specifying the seller to the purchaser. The narrowing of
the language in 1963 is another reason for distinguishing the broad "seller" liability cases
(Part 3.1.1 above) under prior law. See Part 3.2 above. This aspect was not considered in
the Searsy cases, 559 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana), rev'd, 560 S.W.2d 637 (Tex.
1977), notes 46 and 45 supra.
110. See Part 4.2 above.
111. (A) Proof of Nonregistration and Related Matters. The plaintiff (or his attorney)
may ascertain the fact of the registration or nonregistration by examining the Commis-
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defendant was a "dealer, salesman or agent" at the time of the sale. 112 The
plaintiff loses if he is unable to prove, or the defendant is able to disprove,
any of the elements just listed. Registration of the security under federal
law, or the law of another state, is irrelevant if the security was not regis-
tered in Texas. However, registration of the security by any of the three
sioner's records, which are open to the public by virtue of § 11. (See also TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a (Vernon Supp. 1978) dealing generally with public access to infor-
mation in custody of state agencies). But there are quicker and more effective ways. A call
to the staff of the State Securities Board in Austin will usually produce an immediate answer
as to whether a security, dealer, or salesman was registered at a given time. A few days
more, and a few dollars for a fee, will bring from the Commissioner a certificate of noncom-
pliance (or compliance) which is prima facie evidence in court by authority of § 30. For an
application, see Dempsey-Tegeler & Co. v. Flowers, 465 S.W.2d 208, 216-17 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont), rev'd on other grounds, 472 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. 1971). Cf. McQueen v.
Belcher, 366 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1963, no writ) (Commissioner's certifi-
cate that no permit had been issued was evidence that no securities registration had been
accomplished; venue case). A stipulation or admission will usually be made, so that the
certificate becomes unnecessary at trial.
The Commissioner will certify other matters ascertainable from his records that may be
relevant to a § 33A(l) case, e.g., whether a notice was filed for a § 51(c) exemption, whether
a filing was made to clear an issue for exempt secondary trading under § 5.0, whether he
revoked a § 5.0 or § 5I(c) exemption, whether he issued a § 23A stop-sale order or a § 23B
stop-advertising order, and what notice he gave relevant persons of such orders. He will also
furnish a certified copy of a § 9A escrow order or a permit which may contain limitations on
marketing expense under § 9B. In general the registration material filed by persons seeking
to sell securities is open to inspection and copying.
Cf. Aiken v. State, 137 Tex. Crim. 211, 216, 128 S.W.2d 1190, 1193 (1939), in which,
without considering the predecessor of § 30, the court accepted the uncontroverted testi-
mony of a Securities Division employee that defendant was not registered for certain years.
For an unsuccessful effort to prove nonregistration by the buyer's testimony as a share-
holder of the issuer and as to statements made to him by the selling salesman, see LeNoble
v. Weber, Hall, Cobb & Caudle, Inc., 503 S.W.2d 321 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973, no writ).
The upper court did not rule on the admissibility of this evidence but sustained the directed
verdict for the seller on the ground that the testimony-which was excluded by the trial
court-was not properly tendered or included in a bill of exception.
(B) Duration. The time when securities registration becomes effective is discussed in
note 121 infra. A registration lasts one year, whether under § 7A (see § 10B), § 7B (see
§ 7B(2)b), or § 7C (see § 7C(3)). Renewals are permitted by each provision if the requisite
standards are met at the time of renewal. The Commissioner may revoke a registration,
after it has become effective, by § 23A. See Part 5.8.1 below.
112. § 7A(l) prohibits a "dealer, agent or salesman" from selling unregistered securities.
Other persons are not subject to the registration requirement or to consequent liability under
§ 33A(l) for nonregistration. The definition of dealer is broad enough to include many
persons who are active in securities transactions although not dealers in the business sense.
See Part 5.5.3 below. (The definition of salesman and agent is treated in Part 5.6.3 below.)
Nonetheless, plaintiff still has the burden of proving that defendant is in one of the specified
categories, and loses if he fails. Stone v. Enstam, 541 S.W.2d 473, 479 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1976, no writ), discussed note 273 infra.
The criminal provision, § 29B (see note 155 infra and accompanying text), sets penalties
for "any person" who sells or offers unregistered securities. At first glance, this appears
broader than the "dealer, salesman or agent" in § 7A(l). But § 29B seems to incorporate
§ 7A(I), and thereby its limiting language, by cross reference to it ("unless said security...
have been registered. . . as provided in Section 7"). In any event, § 33A(l) creates liability
not for violation of § 29B, but for violation of § 7. But cf. Ladd v. Knowles, 505 S.W.2d
662, 666, 668 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, writ refd n.r.e.), in which the trial court
permitted a rescission claim, based on § 29B-apparently because limitations had run on
33A(l)-to go to the jury. The jury found against plaintiffs and the intermediate court
affirmed (on pari delicto grounds, see notes 116, 364 infra) without discussing the validity of
an implied claim under § 29B.
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Texas procedures (qualification, notification, and coordination, §§ 7A, 7B,
and 7C respectively) will defeat the plaintiffs claim. But it is irrelevant
whether the seller was registered (as a dealer or salesman) under Texas or
any other law, except that Texas registration might permit him to claim a
§ 6 exemption that would otherwise be beyond his reach. Exemptions are
the main defenses to a § 33A(l) complaint." 13
5.1.2 Improper Offers. Section 33A(l) [like § 33A(2)] makes
liable "[a]ny person who offers or sells" in proscribed ways. The question
raised by this apparently disjunctive language is what liability arises from
an improper (proscribed) offer. No reported Texas case considers the
question, and plaintiffs have apparently overlooked its potential.
If an improper offer does not lead to a sale, it is clear from the statute
that there is no liability to the offeree since (1) he is not "the person buying
the security," (2) there is no transaction to rescind, and (3) except perhaps
in very unusual situations, there are no damages to the offeree. In broader
terms, the offeree has suffered no injury for which he should be compen-
sated. ' 14
By contrast, it is equally clear that an improper offer may result in sanc-
tions other than civil liability-such as a § 32 injunction, a § 29B prosecu-
tion, a § 23A stop order, or a § 14E registration revocation (dealer or
salesman)--whether or not the offer leads to a sale.
What is not so clear is whether an improper offer, followed by a proper
sale to the offeree, creates liability. The following paragraphs analyze sev-
eral variants of this problem. In view of the uncertainties in this area, one
who discovers in time that he has made improper offers would be wise
from a legal viewpoint (with which business considerations may, of course,
conflict) not to sell to those offerees but only to other persons.
(A) Offers Before Registration Filed (Gun Jumping). Unless
a particular exemption is applicable, an offer-written or oral-made
before the filing of a registration statement violates § 7A(1). The conse-
quence seems to be liability to the buyer under § 33A(1), even though re-
gistration is completed before the sale is made. This draconian result has
been reached in federal law, which is similarly structured." 15 This result,
while indicated by the phrasing of TSA, is not inevitable. It might be
avoided by doctrines such as ratification, cure (looking at the transaction
113. See the partial discussion of exemptions in notes 101, 102, 105 supra.
114. While § 33A(I) [like § 33A(2)J may not say explicitly that the violating offer must
be to the person who buys, that is the grammatical and logical implication, as well as the
intent so far as I am familiar with it. Thus, Z's illegal offer to X does not create any § 33
rights in Y, even though Y buys from Z. (If an illegal offer is made to Y too, that is a
different story.) The same is true for § 33B offers to buy. However, it is possible that the
offer to X destroys an exemption that would otherwise cover the sale to Y. See Part 5.1.2(E)
below.
115. Diskin v. Lomasney & Co., 452 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1971) (liability although security
later registered and full prospectus delivered; the "result here reached may appear to be
harsh," Judge Friendly concedes. Id. at 876). See 3 Loss 1695-98; 6 id. 3830-31 for a discus-
sion of federal and state law.
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as a whole), and pari delicto, 16 or on policy reasons suggested below. Any
of these might be implemented or complemented by a conjunctive reading
of "offers or sells" in the context of automatic liability created by
§ 33A(l).17
In policy terms, liability for an improper offer followed by a proper sale
can be justified-if at all--only by a rather punitive view that exalts deter-
rence of violations above other policy considerations. On the facts hypoth-
esized, whatever violation occurred has been cured; the registration system
has been vindicated by complying with it; the investor has received the
protection afforded by the Commissioner's clearing the registration; and
any loss the investor suffered can hardly have been from the failure to
register. The strongest case for liability can be made in the situation where
the investor was hard-sold before registration and before he received a
prospectus, so that he did not have-when he effectively made his invest-
ment decision-the benefits the registration system is supposed to give
him. If, in fact, he bought before registration, liability on that basis is per-
fectly appropriate.' 8 If there were material misrepresentations or omis-
sions in the offer, fraud liability under § 33A(2) is appropriate if they were
not corrected before purchase.
Liability for improper offers, followed by proper sales was not, so far as
I can recall, discussed by the State Bar Committee, which carried forward
prior and familiar statutory language on this point for the reasons de-
scribed in Part 9.2 below. Unless the courts find a way to eliminate this
liability, the statute should be amended by deleting "offers or" from
§ 33A(l), 119 or by adding an exception. 120
(B) Offers During Waiting Period. The waiting period is the
time after a registration is filed and before it becomes effective.' 2' One
116. See Ladd v. Knowles, 505 S.W.2d 662, 668 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, writ
ref'd n.r.e.): "Thus if the transactions were in fact illegal solely because the stock was not
registered, plaintiffs, by knowingly joining with defendants in the illegal scheme, were
equally culpable with defendants and, therefore, in pari delicto." In this case the shares
were never registered. The argument is much stronger in the situation considered in the text
where the shares are registered before sale. See further discussion in Part 6 below.
117. See TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 10 para. 6 (Vernon 1969): "In all interpretations
[of civil statutes] the court shall look diligently for the intention of the Legislature, keeping
in view at all times the old law, the evil and the remedy." The essence of my argument is
that the remedy of automatic civil liability for most of the improper offers described in the
text, if cured before sale, is wholly disproportionate to these slight evils, for which other
sanctions remain available.
118. "Sale" is very broadly defined in § 4E to include inter alia, "contracts and agree-
ments whereby securities are sold." "Buy" or "purchase" should have correspondingly
broad meaning. Thus, an investor who has agreed-in writing, orally, or by conduct-to
buy a security offered to him has been "sold" the security and should win under § 33A(l) on
this basis.
119. This is the technique of the proposal that would supersede the federal law. ALl
FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1702 (Proposed Official Draft 1978). See Comment (3) to id.
§ 1401, at 72 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973).
120. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25503 (West 1977), last sentence, expressly denies liability if the
security is qualified (registered) before any payment for the security even though there was
an improper offer.
121. Effective Time. A qualification registration under § 7A becomes effective on the
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looks in vain for any part of TSA that permits "offers" to be made during
the waiting period. 122 This is slightly incredible, since waiting period oral
offers are fully approved by federal 23 and most other state124 laws, and
are almost universally used in Texas, as elsewhere, to inform investors of
coming issues that will be sold when registration is complete and to give
investors time to consider relevant information about the issue.
A literal application of § 33A(l) would make rescindable virtually all
registered issues sold through traditional marketing practices. Such a dis-
astrous result might be avoided in the courts by applying concepts of ratifi-
cation or cure,' 25 by treating sales efforts during the waiting period as not
being "offers,"125A by treating such sales efforts as permitted "advertis-
ing,"126 or by treating "offers or sells" as conjunctive. Reinforcing all
these theories is the reality that Texas investors will be deprived of good
buying opportunities, and Texas dealers will be deprived of good selling
opportunities, if the nationwide practice is not permitted in Texas. 27 An
amendment specifically authorizing offers during the waiting period, per-
haps along the lines of Uniform Act § 402(b)(12), would be a much better
solution.
(C) Preliminary Prospectuses During Waiting Period. As just
Commissioner's issuance of a permit under § 10. A notification registration under § 7B gen-
erally becomes effective five days after it is received by the Commissioner. § 7B(2)b. A
coordination registration under § 7C generally becomes effective simultaneously with the
SEC registration to which it is coordinated. § 7C(2). Despite the statutory prescription of
effective dates for § 7B and § 7C registrations, and the limitation of§ 10 (governing permits)
to § 7A registrations--confirmed by the § 22B references to permits (for § 7A) and comple-
tion of registration for §§ 7B, 7C-the Commissioner traditionally issues the same kinds of
permits in all three types of registration. See note 99 supra. If the exact time of effectiveness
of a registration statement becomes critical, it seems clear that the statutory language should
take precedence over the administrative practice. For the duration of a registration, see note
111 para. (B) supra.
122. But see Part 5.1.2(C) below. A proposal is being developed which would, if enacted,
amend § 22 to permit oral offers during the waiting period.
123. 1 Loss 225-26; 4 id. 2321.
124. UNIFORM ACT § 402(b)(12) (if registration statement filed under U.S. law and in the
state).
125. See text accompanying notes 116-17 supra.
125A. All'§ 4 definitions are applicable "unless the context otherwise indicates." The
widespread industry practice-of which there is common knowledge, and which apparently
has been undisturbed by enforcement action-may well provide a context that indicates
otherwise. Common knowledge that most securities dealers are corporations was a factor in
the supreme court's holding that "person" included "corporation," even when § 4B did not
say so. Flowers v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., 472 S.W.2d 112, 115 (Tex. 1971), discussed in
note 35 supra.
126. See Part 5.1.2(C) below. This theory depends on characterizing the offer as "[tihe
whole, or any part, of' a "document" (e.g., a preliminary prospectus) filed with the SEC and
with the Commissioner before use. § 22D. It would probably be necessary that the offer be
limited to what is contained in the document and not include, for example, earnings projec-
tions that are rarely placed in such documents. There are obvious problems of proof of the
content of an oral communication. And it seems clear-from the § 22D requirement that all
advertising permitted by that section carry a printed legend--that only written advertising is
contemplated by that section. Still, the oral communication might be regarded as incidental
to the written.
127. It is the best securities that are most likely to be sold fastest, and thus no longer be
available for offers first made after registration becomes effective.
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noted, there is no express authorization for "offers" during the waiting pe-
riod. But there is an express authorization in § 22D for the use of "the
whole, or any part, of any written. . . documents theretofore filed" with
the SEC under the 1933 Act. These documents are primarily preliminary
prospectuses. 28 Their express permission by § 22D is, though not so
phrased, an exemption from § 7A(l)'s prohibition on offers before regis-
tration, and therefore an exemption from § 33A(1) liability for such offers.
(Why comparable treatment is not given to preliminary prospectuses filed
with the Commissioner under § 9C, but not with the SEC, is not evident.)
But § 22D contains three conditions or requirements which, if not met,
raise § 33A(1) questions: (1) The preliminary prospectus must be sent to
the Commission before it is used.129 (The advance filing allows the Com-
missioner to review the document and decide whether it is misleading so
that it should be informally withdrawn or formally banned by a § 23B
stop-advertising order.) (2) The material may not be broadcast on radio or
TV, or printed in newspapers. (3) The material must be overprinted or
stickered with a prescribed legend stating, inter alia, that it is for "informa-
tional advertising only" and that the securities have not been qualified in
Texas. Except for the local reference, the legend is similar to that required
on preliminary prospectuses by the SEC. 130 Multistate offerings, whose
prospectuses are printed elsewhere, do not normally contain the Texas lan-
guage, and Texas dealers often forget to append it.
The first two of the three provisions are written as conditions of the
§ 22D exemption, prefaced by "if." The third is written as a requirement.
This permits a distinction that would create § 33A(l) liability for violation
of the first two provisions, but not the third.' 3' Certainly, the third re-
quirement, which is silly if the SEC legend is present, serves no significant
investor protection purpose; this is a policy reason not to impose civil lia-
bility for failure to comply with it, especially if the investor later receives a
final prospectus. Even a violation of the first requirement, if it is cured by
filing before the sale is made, provides little justification for imposing lia-
bility.
(D) Unfiled Advertising After Registration. Once a registra-
128. Tex. State See. Board Rule XIV.B.2, Tex. Reg. No. 065.14.00.002 para. 2, reprinted
in 3 BLUE SKY L. REP.(CCH) 46,614 para. B.2 (1978), confirms that preliminary prospec-
tuses may be used under § 22D.
129. § 22D so states. There is a rule requiring § 22B(3) advertising to be filed with the
Commissioner five days before use. Tex. State Sec. Board Rule XIV.B.1, Tex. Reg. No.
065.14.00.002 para. 1, reprinted in 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 46,614 para. B.I (1978). See
Part 5.1.2(D) below. But it applies only to post-registration advertising, not to a preliminary
prospectus used during the waiting period. However, § 22D does not specify that the pre-
liminary prospectus be filed with the Commissioner before the registration application is
filed. The rules allow the prospectus to be filed after (which in practice means with) the
application or if an application "is in the process of being filed" and will be filed before the
effective date at the SEC. Tex. State Sec. Board Rule XIV.B.2, Tex. Reg. No. 065.14.00.002
para. 2, reprinted in 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 46,614 para. B.2 (1978).
130. SEC Sec. Act Rule 134(b)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 230.134(b)(1) (1977).
131. However, the last sentence of § 22D treats violations of all three as equally unlawful
and subject to the same criminal penalties.
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tion statement has become effective, no restraints on offers are imposed by
§ 7. But-in one of those abrupt shifts of vocabulary that make TSA so
maddening-offers in the form of "advertising" are restricted by § 22B,132
which imposes three requirements in the absence of an exemption: 33 (1)
dealer or salesman registration of the person using the advertising, (2) re-
gistration of the security, and (3) filing of the advertising with the Commis-
sioner. 134 Violation of either of the first two requirements is likely to result
in direct liability under § 33A(1), which incorporates similar requirements
by reference to §§ 12 and 7. What about violation of the third require-
ment, which has no parallel in § 33A(1)? Such a violation does not auto-
matically create civil liability to a buyer who received the noncomplying
advertisement, because § 33A(1) contains no reference to § 22.135 The
connection is not supplied by the last clause of § 22A which says of illegal
advertising: "[Iln addition, the state and purchasers shall have all other
remedies provided for where the unlawful [sic] sales are made under this
Act." Purchasers no longer have remedies for "unlawful sales." They pre-
sumably did have "voidability" rights for such sales under a provision sim-
ilar to Appendix 3 below, when the predecessor of § 22A came into the
law.' 36 The more precise civil liability amendments of 1963 and 1977
should be read to nullify any automatic civil liability for advertising that
contravenes § 22, unless it also contravenes § 7, § 12, or one of the other
sections specifically referenced in § 33A(1).
(E) Offers to Nonbuyers. We have already noted at the be-
ginning of Part 5.1.2 above that an improper offer to X does not create any
civil liability to X if X does not buy. But it is possible that an improper
offer to X may destroy an exemption for a sale to Y, allowing Y to sue. An
example is an attempted nonpublic, limited offering under § 51 [or § 5Q].
If the offer to X amounts to "public solicitation or advertisements," it may
destroy the exemption for sales to all buyers about the same time, so that
132. Advertising is implicitly defined by § 22A as "any circular, advertisement, pam-
phlet, prospectus, program or other matter." For a critical discussion of what is advertising,
with emphasis on distribution and use, see Bromberg, Texas Exemptions for Small Offerings
of Corporate Securities-The Prohibition on Advertisements, 20 Sw. L.J. 239, 250-54 (1966).
Generally following those ideas are Sibley v. Horn Advertising, Inc., 505 S.W.2d 417,419-20
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ reed n.r.e.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1975); Tex. State
Sec. Board Rule V.1.1-2, Tex. Reg. No. 065.05.00.009 paras. 1-2, reprinted in 3 BLUE SKY L.
REP. (CCH) 46,605 paras. 1.1-2 (1978).
133. By § 22E, § 22 does not apply to § 5 exempt transactions or to § 6 exempt securities,
unless the advertising violates a § 23B stop-advertising order or, presumably, a § 23A stop-
sale order. The "unless" clause looks redundant; what is the point of making a violation of
§ 23 also a violation of § 22? The purpose is apparently to invoke the criminal penalties of §
29G, which refers to § 22. § 29G overlaps § 29D so far as an ad violates § 23A. But only
§ 29G covers a violation of § 23B (via § 22E). In any event, the "unless" clause seems to
have no bearing on civil liability.
134. Advance filing is required. See note 129 supra.
135. An ad which violates § 22 is a criminal offense by §§ 22A and 29G, and is subject to
other sanctions, such as a § 32 injunction, a § 23A stop-sale order, a § 23B stop-advertising
order, and a § 14E revocation order.
136. 1955 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 67, § 23(a), at 338. The voidability provision was id. § 34.
For an effort to impose liability under it for an advertising violation, see Christie v. Brewer,
374 S.W.2d 908, 914-15 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1964, writ refd n.r.e.).
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buyer Y may sue under § 33A(1) even though he received no public solici-
tation or advertisement. This result depends on whether "such sale" in
§ 5I-which must be without public solicitation or advertisement-means
the specific sale to Y or all concurrent sales activity including the offer to
X. The latter interpretation has some support from the run-together lan-
guage of § 4E, which, as noted in Part 3.1 above, defines "sale" and "offer
for sale" identically to include "every attempt . . . to dispose of a security
for value." This language suggests that the Legislature may have been
looking at the whole offer-and-sale process as a single activity.1 37 Prece-
dent under the very differently worded federal private offering exemp-
tion 38 points the same way.139 On the other hand, there is a windfall
inequity in letting the legally solicited investor win because someone
-else-particularly someone who did not buy-was illegally solicited.
There is some precedent in SEC Rule 146 (which interprets the federal
private offering exemption) for disregarding the improper solicitation that
results in no sale."4° And the reference in § 51 to "such sale" rather than
to, say, "the offering," is a strong indication that, for § 33A(l) purposes, Y
cannot recover because of public solicitation of X. But the question is far
from decided, 41 and plaintiffs and defendants should argue for the inter-
137. It also suggests, more convincingly, that the definition was addressed to requiring
registration before offers were made, rather than to civil liability.' In fact, the irrational sale-
equals-offer definition was in the Act before civil liability was added in 1941. See, e.g., 1935
Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 100, § 2(e), at 257. For the advent of civil liability, see notes 19-21
supra and accompanying text.
138. 1933 Act § 4(2) exempts "transactions by an issuer not involving any public offer-
ing." In contrast, TSA § 51 exempts certain sales, provided "such sale" is made without
public solicitation or advertisement.
139. E.g., Henderson v. Hayden, Stone, Inc., 461 F.2d 1069, 1071-72 (5th Cir. 1972) (so-
phisticated, experienced buyer of $180,000 of $300,000 unregistered offering allowed to re-
cover under 1933 Act § 12(1) because other offerees not shown to be within private offering
exemption of 1933 Act § 4(2), although he alone would have been). See Donra v. Petroleum
Management Corp., 545 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1977) (sophisticated, experienced buyer of
$125,000; judgment for seller reversed and remanded to determine whether other seven of-
ferees (all of whom were sophisticated and four of whom bought) received sufficient infor-
mation for private offering exemption).
140. SEC Sec. Act Rules 146(d)(1), (2), 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.146(d)(1), (2) (1977), distinguish
between the qualification of offerees and those of buyers. As to offerees, the seller must have
reasonable grounds to believe that the offeree is sophisticated (able to evaluate the invest-
ment offered) or able to bear the risk of the investment. As to buyers, the seller must have
reasonable grounds, after reasonable investigation, to believe that the buyer is sophisticated
or both that the buyer and his representative together are sophisticated and that the buyer is
able to bear the risk. The implication is clear that an offeree who turns out to be unqualified
does not destroy the exemption so long as the seller had reasonable grounds to think he was
qualified before offering to him. Moreover, the Note following rule 146(e)(3) specifies infor-
mation, which must ordinarily be given to all offerees, need not be given to offerees who are
not going to buy. Thus, the rule 146 exemption survives despite a nonbuying offeree who is
unqualified and uninformed.
141. The only relevant decision seems to be Sibley v. Horn Advertising, Inc., 505 S.W.2d
417, 419-20 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1975).
Justice Guittard's opinion dealt with the question only by implication. In holding that there
was no public solicitation, it considered only the solicitation of the buyer in the suit (who
happened to be a defendant, urging unregistered security as a defense to a suit against him
on his contract to buy securities). In holding that an offering memorandum was not an
advertisement, because there was no public distribution of the memo, it considered that the
memo was shown to no more than 20 selected acquaintances of the promoters. The intima-
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pretations that aid them.
5.1.3 Meaning of Unregistered. At first glance, it appears
that a security is registered or it is not. Certainly any one of the three
modes of registration-§ 7A qualification, § 7B notification, or § 7C coor-
dination-produces the same result: a registered security. But there are
instances in which "registration" is murky.
Oversales are an example. Consider a multistate offering of which
100,000 shares are registered in Texas. Through miscalculation, or shifts
by the managing underwriter to places of strong demand, 102,000 shares
are sold in Texas. If the registration application is not amended in
time-and what is timely is not clear-are the last 2,000 shares (if they can
be identified, which they probably cannot since the typical closing is simul-
taneous for all shares) unregistered? Or 2/102 of each sale? Or all 102,000
shares? There are no firm answers.' 42
Other obscure questions relate to suitability or minimum purchase
standards imposed by rule' 43 or, occasionally, by permit.1'" Is a sale that
fails to meet these standards a violation of the § 7 registration requirement
precipitating civil liability under § 33A(1)? The answer should clearly be
no for the suitability standards which are usually too vaguely stated to be
the basis of automatic liability under § 33A(1). Even when more precisely
stated, in terms of the buyer's income or net worth, these involve defini-
tional and valuational problems, and the underlying information is exclu-
sively within the buyer's knowledge. The seller typically (and wisely) asks
for the buyer's written representation that the buyer meets the suitability
standards. If the buyer miscalculates or misstates, the seller should not be
liable. More technically, it seems to me that the securities have been regis-
tered, and thus there can be no liability under § 33A(l) for lack of registra-
tion, even if suitability standards are not met in all sales. 145 The minimum
purchase standards are sufficiently precise and compliance is largely
tions are that public solicitation is to be measured only by the buyer in court, but that adver-
tisement is to be measured by all recipients of the document.
142. See Blue Sky Osersales, 7 REV. SEC. REG. 831 (1974).
143. See, e.g., Tex. State Sec. Board Rule IX.C, Tex. Reg. No. 065.09.00.003, reprintedin
3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 46,609 para. C (1978) (real estate programs: $2,500 minimum
purchase ($10,000 for certain kinds of programs), prospectus to state suitability require-
ments); Tex. State Sec. Board Rule X.C. I & .4, Tex. Reg. No. 065.10.00.003 paras. I and 4,
reprinted in 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 46,610 paras. C. I and 4 (1976) (cattle feeding
programs: $5,000 minimum purchase, general remarks on suitability); Tex. State Sec. Board
Rule XI.C. I & .4, Tex. Reg. No. 065.11.00.003 paras. 1 and 4, reprinted in 3 BLUE SKY L.
REP. (CCH) 46,611 paras. C. 1 and .4 (1978) (oil and gas drilling programs: $5,000 mini-
mum purchase ($2,500 if income or production purchase program), dealer or sponsor shall
take all action reasonably required to assure sales only to purchasers for whom suitable).
144. See, e.g., TEX. STATE SEC. BOARD, TEX. MONTHLY SEC. BULL. 6 (Jan. 1971): permit
issued to Jade Oil & Gas Co. for sales of units (of convertible preferred and warrants) no
smaller than $10,000 to buyers with net worth no less than $500,000.
145. The contrary view would be that a registration, or at least a permit (see note 99
_rupra for the difference), is conditional on meeting the prescribed standards in sale, so that
failure to do so would make the permit or registration ineffective. Apart from questions
whether the Commissioner has authority to impose conditions of this kind-on which TSA
is silent-it seems that any such condition would have to be stated with great particularity in
the permit or registration document in order to form the basis for § 33A(l) liability. A
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within the seller's control, so it would not be inherently unreasonable to
hold the seller responsible for violating them. Nonetheless, there is still a
question whether violation renders the securities so sold "unregistered" for
§ 33A(l) liability.
Price variations raise similar questions. With rare exceptions (such as,
for open-end investment companies which sell shares at net asset value,
often plus a percentage sales load), securities are registered for sale at a
fixed price, e.g., 100,000 shares at $10 each. The price is more than a mat-
ter of tidiness or fee computation under § 35E. Price affects the maximum
marketing expense under § 9B, considered in Part 5.3 below. Even more
substantively, it affects the Commissioner's determination of fairness
under § 10A, which directs him to consider the difference between the
price paid for earlier securities (by "promoters") and the price being paid
by the public in the proposed offering.' 46 Thus, it may well be that a sale
below or, even worse, above the specified price is not a "registered" sale
and is therefore in violation of § 7 and actionable under § 33A(1).
Yet another question is for whom are securities registered. Section
7A(1) plainly contemplates that an application for a qualification registra-
tion will be filed by and a permit granted to the issuer of the securities or to
a registered dealer who is selling them. Sections 7B(2) and 7C(1) are in
accord, except there is no reference to a permit. Section 10A calls for the
Commissioner to "issue to the applicant a permit authorizing it to issue
and dispose of such securities." The form of permit used by the Commis-
sioner is addressed to the particular issuer or dealer. The implication of all
this is that registration is only for the applicant issuer or dealer, and that
the securities are "registered" for them but no one else. This is so far from
the reality of securities distribution that it cannot be accepted as correct.
In the usual offering there are multiple underwriters who (through the
managing underwriter) sell to other dealers at a discount from the public
offering price and possibly still other dealers who buy from the prior deal-
ers at a smaller discount. All these persons sell the securities to public
investors. This process (including the name and number of securities for
each underwriter) is carefully described in the prospectus which is a part of
the registration application. In this context, there can be no serious doubt
that the underwriters and the other selling dealers are all selling "regis-
tered" securities even though they are not named in the application or per-
mit.147 But there is a substantial question whether an investor who buys in
the registered offering and then resells at a later date is selling a "regis-
suitability standard in the prospectus, whether voluntary on the part of the issuer or "sug-
gested" by the Commissioner, does not meet this criterion.
146. Semble, § 7C(2). See also Tex. State Sec. Board Rule VII.D.3, Tex. Reg. No.
065.07.00.004 para. 3, reprinted in 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 46,607 para. D.3 (1976) on
how the prior price is computed in going concerns.
147. The usual dealer's exemption, § 5.0 (note 102, para. (B)(2) supra) is inapplicable for
a number of possible reasons: the securities are part of an unsold allotment in a distribution,
there may be no comparable securities in public hands, there may be no current market
price, the proceeds go to the issuer, etc. See §§ 5.0(l)-(4). A dealer who is not part of the
underwriting or selling group may use § 5.0 as soon as its conditions are satisfied, e.g.,
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tered" security. However, if he is not a "dealer, salesman or agent," he is
not a violator of § 7, and consequently not liable under § 33A(l).148 In
any event, he may have exemptions like § 5C(1) available to him. While
the practical problems may be small, there is an important theoretical dis-
tinction here. Texas registration is much more like federal registration of a
particular offering by particular persons than like Uniform Act registraiion
of all outstanding securities for nonissuer sales.149
5.1.4 § 34 Commission Ban. An unregistered security in-
vokes another sanction besides rescission or damages under § 33A(1). A
person who renders services in a sale' 50 of an unregistered security is
barred by § 34 from suing for a commission or compensation in the sale,
unless he shows that his transaction was exempt by § 5,151 or that the se-
curity was exempt by § 6.152 Additional exemptions outside TSA may ne-
gate § 34.153
The commission ban applies also to unregistered dealers, and has usu-
ally been litigated in that context, so detailed discussion is postponed to
Part 5.5.5 below.
5.1.5 Related and Implied Claims. An additional sanction
imposed upon the seller of an unregistered security (assuming no exemp-
tion) is that his violation precludes him from suing for any unpaid
purchase price, by the express language of § 33K (which will be discussed
in a later installment) and by the common law which preceded it. 154
Sale or offer of an unregistered security is a felony, punishable by a
$5,000 fine, 10 years in prison, or both, under § 29B.155 Only natural per-
sons can be convicted under § 29, ie., not corporations, partnerships, and
securities in public hands. The registration will satisfy the § 5.0 information requirement.
148. See note 112 supra and accompanying text.
149. See UNIFORM ACT § 305(i) and Official Comment to §§ 305(i), (j); L. Loss & E.
COWETr, BLUE SKY LAW 314-23 (1958).
150. Although § 34 starts off as though it applies to purchases as well as sales, the
purchase part pertains only to unregistered dealers. See Part 5.5.5 below. This is logical,
since securities have to beregistered only when sold, not when purchased. See § 7A(I). The
interpretation is confirmed by the middle portion of § 34, which refers to registration of "the
securities so sold."
15 1. The preamble to § 5 reinforces this result. The transaction exemptions are sketched
in note 102 supra.
152. The § 6 exemptions are summarized in note 101 supra. The preamble imposes as a
condition of each exemption that the security be sold by a registered dealer (or salesman).
Thus an unregistered person cannot use a § 6 exemption to avoid the commission bar of
§ 34 on a sale transaction. But he apparently can use a § 6 exemption to sue for a commis-
sion on a purchase. See note 289 infra.
153. See note 105 supra.
154. See, e.g., Anderson v. Eliot, 333 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1960, writ
refd), and Sibley v. Horn Advertising, Inc., 505 S.W.2d 417, 419-20 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1974, writ refd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1975), in which the courts recognized this
principle but found it inapplicable because there was an exemption.
155. See, e.g., Cox v. State, 523 S.W.2d 695 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975); Sharp v. State, 392
S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965); and, apparently, Bridges v. State, 172 Tex. Crim. 508,
360 S.W.2d 531, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 821 (1962). See also note 112 supra.
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other entities.' 56 The usual exemptions apply.1 57
The criminal penalties create the possibility of using leverage to obtain
satisfaction of a civil claim.'5 8 They also raise the possibility of an implied
civil action based on the criminal provisions. Such actions were enter-
tained by the courts before express civil liability was included in TSA, 159
and were expressly authorized by the 1941-1963 provision for voidability
of any transaction in violation of TSA, reproduced in Appendix 3 be-
low.' 60 Do such implied actions survive the particularization of civil lia-
bility for specific violations in the 1963 and 1977 versions of § 33A(l)?
Probably not, since the legislative intent to limit civil liability is conspicu-
ous. However 1977 § 33M (and its 1963 predecessor, § 33F) makes it clear
that the express liabilities of § 33 are in addition to any other remedies that
may exist. But these sections do not answer the question whether the
courts should imply a remedy under § 29B when an explicit remedy is
given by § 33A(l). The Texas courts have not addressed this question.' 6 '
In any event, it seems likely that plaintiffs will get no more from an im-
plied action based on § 29B than from an express action based on §
33A(l). 162 So the implied action is probably not worth pleading where
§ 33A(l) clearly applies. If pleaded, the defendant should attack its suffi-
ciency to state a claim, e.g., by special exception and motion for summary
judgment in state court, or by motion to dismiss in federal court.
The discussion above, also applies to a possible implied action based on
§ 29A (the criminal provision for sale without dealer or salesman registra-
tion) or § 29D (the criminal provision for sale in violation of a § 23A stop-
sale order). These situations are amply covered by the explicit liabilities of
§ 33A(l).
On the other hand, an implied action based on § 29C (the general anti-
fraud criminal provision, based on SEC Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-
5) may well be broader than the explicit antifraud liability of § 33A(2) and
should be seriously considered by plaintiffs with fraud claims. A further
156. § 4B, last sentence.
157. See notes 101, 102, 105 supra.
158. See Part 5.5.6 below.
159. See notes 17-18 supra and accompanying text.
160. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
161. An implied claim based on § 29B was asserted in Ladd v. Knowles, 505 S.W.2d 662,
666 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, writ ref d n.r.e.), but was disposed of on other grounds.
For some of the considerations in implying an action under the federal antifraud securi-
ties provisions, see I BROMBERG § 2.4 and Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 24-42
(1977), and under other federal statutes, Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The United States
Supreme Court's reluctance to imply remedies for acts that are covered by express remedies
troubles me in fraud cases that no legislature can completely foresee. But it seems appropri-
ate for technical violations that a legislature can obviously foresee since it is creating them.
If implied claims are accepted by the courts, they should include elements like causation
of loss that are required by basic tort principles but not by automatic § 33A(1).
162. On the probably insignificant difference between "any person" in § 29B and
"dealer, agent or salesman" in § 7A(l) referenced by § 33A(l), see note 112 supra.
§ 29B is probably narrower than § 33A(l) in applying only to natural persons. See note
156 supra and accompanying text. Whether this limitation would carry over to civil actions
based on § 29B is unclear.
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discussion in connection with § 33A(2) and § 33M will appear in a later
installment of this Article.
In the typical unregistered security case, the disclosure to the buyer will
have been sparse, without the benefit of a § 9C prospectus. So claims of
omission and fraud, under § 33A(2) or related provisions, are common in
§ 33A(1) suits.' 63 Fraud claims will be discussed under §§ 33A(2) and
33M in a later installment of this Article.
Parallel liabilities for securities unregistered under those statutes are cre-
ated by 1933 Act § 12(1) and Uniform Act § 410(a)(1).
5.2 Escrow Violaion- § 9Al.
5.2.1 § 33A4(1) Civil Liability. The Commissioner has discre-
tionary authority by § 9A to require the proceeds of an issuing company's
securities sales to be escrowed until they reach a specified monetary
amount which "in his opinion will reasonably assure protection of the
public." The main purpose is to safeguard investors from the total loss
that is likely to occur if a company needs some minimum amount to carry
out its plans and does not sell enough securities to obtain that amount.164
An escrow agreement is signed by the selling company, the escrow agent (a
bank or trust company), and perhaps the chief dealer or underwriter sell-
ing the securities. If the Commissioner finds, on a showing by the com-
pany and the escrow agent that the prescribed minimum has been
achieved, the funds are released to the company. If the minimum is not
achieved in two years (or a shorter period, which may be set in the agree-
ment), the funds are returned to the buyers. The statute does not require
that every penny of sale proceeds go into escrow; the Commissioner may
allow "expenses and commissions" to be excluded and presumably kept by
the company (in the case of expenses) or dealer (in the case of either).
However, the usual practice seems to be to require escrow of 100% of pro-
ceeds. 165 The securities may also be required to be escrowed, to assure
their delivery to buyers if the funds are released to the selling company.
This requirement is not customarily imposed.' 66
Escrow of proceeds is not commonly required of established companies,
of companies with alternate sources of financing, or for firm commitment
163. See, e.g., Bateman v. Petro-Atlas, Inc., Civ. No. 75-H-445 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 1977);
Stone v. Enstam, 541 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ); Ladd v. Knowles,
note 161 supra; Bierschwale v. Oakes, 497 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1973), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Meadows v. Bierschwale, 516 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. 1974).
164. Another purpose is to assure that expense limits are not exceeded. See Part 5.3.1
infra. Yet another is to assure reasonable diversification in certain risky operations, such as
those of oil and gas drilling. See Tex. State Sec. Board Rule No. 065.11.00.004 para. 4,
reprinted in 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 46,611 para. D.4 (1978): minimum amount of
funds to activate program shall be sufficient to accomplish its objectives, including spreading
the risk; minimum below $500,000 will be presumed inadequate to spread the risk; provision
must be made for return of payments to buyers if minimum not reached.
165. See Tex. State Sec. Board, Rules, Form VII.D. (Escrow Agreement) I (looseleaf,
orig. pub. 1976). This is the form commonly used.
166. The standard form of escrow agreement, note 165 supra, says nothing about escrow-
ing the securities.
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underwritings (in which the dealer-underwriter assures that the issuer will
have the proceeds of the full offering). Thus, escrow of proceeds is used
primarily for best efforts or all-or-none underwritings of small or new
companies. Escrow cannot be imposed if the securities or transactions are
exempt. 167
Section 33A(l) imposes civil liability on one who "offers or sells a secur-
ity in violation of Section . . . 9 (or a requirement of the Commissioner
thereunder)," although I have found no reported cases concerning the lia-
bility. Failure to deposit proceeds in escrow is the main violation at which
the liability is aimed. 68 But premature or improper release of proceeds is
also covered. 169
What § 9A violations, beside the two just mentioned, will generate
§ 33A(1) liability is obscure partly because the 300-word § 9A is redun-
dant, inconsistent, and, in some respects, pointless, like so much of TSA. It
is not clear, for example, whether buyer X (whose payment was properly
escrowed) has a claim under § 33A(1) because buyer Ys payment was not
escrowed. This might logically depend on whether X has been injured,
i e., on whether Y has a claim on the escrow fund. One clear requirement
of § 9A is that the issuing company, or its dealer, furnish buyers' names
and amounts to the escrow agent and the Commissioner. Violation of this
requirement indicates liability by § 33A(1), but the result would be absurd
if the required amount had been sold and the escrow properly closed by
delivery of proceeds to the issuer. 170 Not clear is whether errors in submit-
ting buyers' names and amounts, or submitting them to the bank and not
the Commissioner (or vice versa), are actionable by § 33A(l). Here, as
elsewhere, 17 the courts could call for a materiality or causation factor in
167. Preamble to §§ 5 and 6. See also notes 101, 102, 105 supra and accompanying text.
168. Arguably, the "offer or sale" is not in violation of § 9, only the disposition of pro-
ceeds after sale. But this must be rejected, for it would gut § 33A(l) so far as § 9A is con-
cerned.
SEC 1934 Act Rule 15c2-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-4 (1977) requires a broker or dealer
participating in an "all or none" underwriting to segregate or escrow proceeds in certain
instances. For examples of enforcement actions by the SEC for violation in such underwrit-
ings, see SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec. Inc., ['75-'76 Decisions] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 95,495 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), ['76-'77 Decisions] $ 95,741 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), mod/ifed and
af'd, [Current] 96,351 (2d Cir. Mar. 3, 1978); Lloyd D. Sahley, [1973 Decisions] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 79,562 (SEC Admin. Law Judge Nov. 1, 1973), arff'dsummarily sub nom. In
re Midwestern Sec. Corp., 5 SEC Docket 67 (1974); In re R. Basile & Co., 7 SEC Docket 71
(1975); United States v. Grant, 462 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers,
Inc., 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972); A.J. White & Co. v. SEC, 556 F.2d 619 (1st Cir. 1977);
Exchange Bank & Trust Co., SEC Sec. Exch. Act. Rel. No. 9708, ['72-'73 Decisions] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 78,974 (1972); SEC v. Rega, ['75-'76 Decisions] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 95,222 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
169. For a federal case against a bank escrow agent, see Exchange Bank & Trust Co.,
SEC Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 9708, ['72-'73 Decisions] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 78,974
(1972), note 168 supra.
170. Although most of § 9A is written in terms of "company," it suddenly shifts to "cor-
poration" when it deals with release of escrow funds to the issuer. "Company" includes
"corporation" by § 4B, but not conversely. A rationalist might argue that § 9A is thus im-
pliedly limited to corporate issuers. But it does not pay to be too rational about TSA.
Plainly, the intent is to cover all "companies."
171. See notes 47-50 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 32
1978] TEXAS SECURITIES ACT-CIVIL LIABILITY 915
liability.
If the escrow funds are returned to the buyers because the minimum has
not been sold, buyers are generally better off than they would be in a
§ 33A(1) suit; they are spared the trouble and expense of litigation, and
they do not have to worry about collecting a judgment. But they are worse
off in at least one respect: they do not get interest on their money, unless
the escrow agreement happens to provide otherwise. 172
The escrow agreement is ordinarily not signed by the Commissioner, but
he effectively dictates its terms. This may, or may not, make the terms of
the agreement 17 3 "requirements" pursuant to § 9A, which become actiona-
ble under § 33A(1). 174
A dealer selling for the issuer is a seller to the persons who buy from
him and probably violates § 9A (and is therefore liable by § 33A(l)) if he
does not turn the proceeds over to the escrow agent. It seems likely that
this is true whether or not the dealer is a signer of the escrow agreement,
since he will almost certainly be aware of the agreement. On the other
hand, it seems unlikely that a dealer would be liable because of an im-
proper release of the funds from escrow if he had nothing to do with the
release.
An issuer that sells through a dealer is a seller to the persons who buy
from the dealer and probably violates § 9A (and is therefore liable by
§ 33A(l)) if the dealer does not turn the proceeds over to the escrow agent.
Thus, it is to the issuer's advantage to have the dealer sign and be bound
by the escrow agreement.
The escrow bank would normally fall outside the broad definition of
sale, 175 and would not be a seller to the plaintiff, and thus would not be
liable under § 33A(l) for the company's failure (or a dealer's failure) to
put the funds in escrow. Conceivably, there might be situations in which
the bank could be reached as an aider under § 33F(2). A bank's improper
release of funds from escrow to the company is further removed in time
from the initial selling effort, but has so critical an economic connection
with the sale that the bank might be a seller in violation of § 9A. In any
172. The usual form of escrow agreement, note 165 supra, does not require investment of
the funds and therefore provides no interest.
173. The usual form of agreement, note 165 supra, prescribes such details as listing buy-
ers' addresses and numbers of securities (as well as names and dollar amounts, which are
specified in § 9A) on the deposit slips, furnishing the deposit slips biweekly to the Commis-
sioner, furnishing the Commissioner quarterly reports of the amount in escrow; and furnish-
ing disbursement reports from the bank to the Commissioner after he has authorized release
or return of the funds.
174. Violation of the Commissioner's requirements under § 9 creates the same civil lia-
bility as violation of § 9 itself, by virtue of the parenthetical clause in § 33A(l): "(or a re-
quirement of the Commissioner thereunder)." The Commissioner's determinations are
often made by the Deputy Commissioner pursuant to § 2C, which authorizes the Deputy to
perform the Commissioner's duties when the Commissioner "is absent or unable to act for
any reason." In practice, determinations are often made informally by staff members in
negotiation with registrants. Whether these are "requirements" for § 33A(1) liability is un-
clear and may raise fact questions. See also note 185 infra and accompanying text; note 199
infra.
175. See Part 3 above.
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event, there would be a strong case against a bank as an aider under
§ 33F(2), as well as possible claims for breach of the escrow agreement
(viewed as a third party beneficiary contract) or breach of trust.
Another form of escrow is sometimes required by the Commissioner:
escrow of outstanding shares held by promoters or other early investors.
The purpose of this escrow is to prevent resale of the outstanding shares to
the public until certain conditions are met. There is no authority for this
escrow in § 9 (or elsewhere in TSA), so violations of it do not lead to civil
liability under § 33A(l). 176
The elements of plaintiffs § 33A(l)-§ 9A case are that he bought 77 and
the defendant sold178 to the plaintifP 79 a security 180 for which a § 9A es-
crow requirement was in effect,' 8' and the defendant violated the escrow
requirement. 82
5.2.2 Related and Implied Claims. There seem to be no re-
lated or implied claims under TSA or federal law, unless the escrow viola-
tion can be classed as fraud.183 Uniform Act § 410(a)(1) is an express civil
liability for violation of § 305(g) escrow violations, closely corresponding
to the Texas provision.
5.3 Excessive Marketing Expense--§ 9B.
5.3.1 § 334(1) Civil Liability. Selling expense limitations
are the oldest substantive feature of Texas securities 84 law. The present
provision refers to the "total expenses for marketing securities, including
all commissions. . . and all other incidental selling expenses." The limit
is 20% of "the price at which the . . . securities . . . are to be sold, or
offered for sale, to the public of this State." Moreover, the limit may be
reduced by the Commissioner "to a less percentage which is in his opinion
fair, just and equitable under the facts of the particular case." The Com-
missioner often uses his power to reduce the limit, typically to 15%.' 85 Au-
176. For examples of authority to require escrow of outstanding shares, and of civil lia-
bility for violation, see Uniform Act §§ 305(g), 410(a)(1); CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25141,
251 3, 25503 (West 1977). The Texas securities escrow requirement is imposed by Tex.
State Sec. Board Rule VII.D.5, Tex. Reg. No. 065.07.00.004 para. 5, reprinted in 3-BLUE SKY
L. REP. (CCH) $ 46,607 para. E.5 (1976).
177. See Part 2.1 above.
178. See note 108 supra and cross references there.
179. See note 109 supra.
180. See Part 4.2 above.
181. See notes 111, 174 supra on proving the requirement.
182. Plaintiff should plead the way the requirement was violated, e.g., failure to escrow
proceeds or premature release.
183. For examples, see note 168 supra.
184. See note 14 supra.
185. See Tex. State Sec. Board Rule VII.E.7.2, Tex. Reg. No. 065.07.00.005 para. 7.2,
reprinted in 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 46,607 para. E.7.2 (1977): "The expenses for
marketing the securities paid by the Program shall not ordinarily exceed 15% of the gross
proceeds of the offering." "Program" is used elsewhere in the rules to designate a tax shelter
offering, usually of limited partnership interests. Nonetheless, the Commissioner commonly
applies the 15% limit to all equity offerings. However, his application rarely takes the form
of a condition of the permit or other formal determination by the Commissioner. Typically,
the limit is in the form of an undertaking by the registrant (issuer) that marketing expenses
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tomatic civil liability for violation of the § 9B expense limit (including the
Commissioner's requirement of a limit below 20%) is generated by
§ 33A(l).
Apart from policy questions about expense limits, 8 6 there are difficult
questions of measurement to determine whether there has been a violation,
and hence civil liability.
First, what expenses are included? The statute refers to "marketing"
and "selling" expenses.' 8 7 Plainly, these include commissions, discounts,
expense allowances, and other payments or benefits to underwriters and
dealers who sell the securities.' 88 The value of options to underwriters is
will not exceed 15%, or that sales in Texas will not be finally accepted unless they exceed a
specified dollar amount (of which the estimated expenses will be less than 15%). This latter
version is sometimes, but not offen, inserted in the permit. All this makes it hazy whether
the 15% limit in a given case is a "requirement" under § 9B whose violation leads to abso-
lute liability under § 33A(l). See note 174 supra; cf. note 199 infra. Defendants should be
prepared to challenge the "requirement" of less than 20%, and plaintiffs to prove it if chal-
lenged.
Lower limits are imposed for certain types of offerings. For publicly offered cattle feeding
programs, "[a]ll expenses of organizing the venture and selling interests therein to the public,
including underwriting discounts and commissions" must be paid by the sponsor if the spon-
sor is to receive the maximum first year 12.5% management fee allowed him; but if the
publicly owned venture "is to pay such expenses, the total of such expenses it shall pay,
together with the first year management fee, shall not exceed 12-1/2% of the gross receipts of
the public offering." Tex. State Sec. Board Rule X.B.3.a, Tex. Reg. No. 065.10.00.002 para.
3.a., reprinted in 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) $ 46, 610 para. B.3.a (1976).
186. They obviously protect investors against dissipation of their investment. But they
bear disproportionately heavily on small offerings (hence on small companies and those who
have invested in them). See SEC, COST OF FLOTATION OF REGISTERED ISSUES 1971-1972,
at 9 (1974): average compensation (e.g., commissions) and other expense of common stock
offerings to the public ranged from 13.24% and 10.35%, respectively (total 23.59%), for offer-
ings under $500,000 down to 3.03% and 0.15%, respectively (total 3.18%), for offerings over
$100,000,000. The figures reflect that some costs of an offering (legal, accounting, printing)
do not vary greatly with size, while others (commissions) are more nearly proportional to
size. This in itself tends to bar small offerings from the market, and the legal limits reinforce
that tendency by making some small offerings illegal as well as uneconomical. By the SEC's
figures, the average total compensation and other expense does not drop below 20% until the
offering exceeds $1,000,000, below 15% until the offering exceeds $2,000,000, below 10%
until the offering exceeds $5,000,000 and below 5% until the offering exceeds $50,000,000.
See generally Mofsky, Adverse Consequences of Blue Sky Regulation of Public Offering
Expendes, 1972 Wis. L. REv. 1010.
187. Tex. State Sec. Board Rule VII.E.7.1., Tex. Reg. No. 065.07.00.005 para. 7.1, re-
printed in 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) $ 46,607 para. E.7.1. (1977) makes it clear that all
"marketing" expenses are to be counted toward the 20% limit, "regardless by whom or what
entity they are paid." Juxtaposed with rule VII.E.7.2, note 185 supra, this means that the
issuer can pay up to 15% and other persons (controlling shareholders, general partners, sell-
ing shareholders, etc.) can pay an additional 5%.
188. For a transparent effort to circumvent the expense limit by selling to underwriters at
$100 for resale at $130 (the $30 difference to be retained by the underwriters), see Coleman
v. Miller, 19 S.W.2d 829, 835-37 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1929), aft'd, 29 S.W.2d 991 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1930, judgmt adopted). The main issue before both courts was the validity of
a claimed exemption from the TSA (1923 version, see note 15 supra) which had a 20%
expense limit. Neither court considered whether the limitation was exceeded if the exemp-
tion did not apply. Cf. Green v. Jackson, 113 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1938, writ
dism'd), in which excess marketing expenses figured tangentially. Plaintiff had received 200
shares of Faith Oil, allegedly as a 25% commission from Faith on the sale of other shares for
it. The court held that, even if this were true, it was no defense to plaintiffs suit against a
third person who had agreed to buy the shares from him. The court also held that Faith's
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included.18 9 And, although you would never guess it from anything in the
Rules, the Commissioner considers legal, accounting, and printing ex-
penses to be included. 190 Clarification by rule is badly needed for a provi-
sion that can lead to strict liability.' 9' Meanwhile, defendants should
argue that legal, accounting, and printing expenses are not included.
Second, what kind of allocation is permitted for a multistate offering?
The statute could be read to require that nationwide (or for that matter,
worldwide) marketing expenses not exceed the specified percent (20% or
less if required) of the Texas portion of the offering. This would be pa-
tently unreasonable and probably unconstitutional as a burden on inter-
state commerce. A much more reasonable reading is that total Texas
expenses (allocated geographically or pro rata, e.g., per share) not exceed
lack of a permit did not help defendant, since no permit was required for plaintiff's resale of
privately owned stock.
189. Tex. State Sec. Board Rule VILD.I l.c(7), Tex. Reg. No. 065.07.00.004 para. I .c(7),
reprinted in 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) T 46,607 para. D. 1l.c(7) (1977), adding that "[a]n
arbitrary value of twenty percent (20%) of the original exercise price of such options shall be
used in the computation of commissions unless evidence indicates that a contrary valuation
exists."
190. The staffs position is that marketing expenses are commissions or discounts plus
everything listed in SEC Form S-I, Item 23, 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 7124 (1978),
which is fied by the registrant. Item 23 calls for "expenses in connection with the issuance
and distribution of the securities," which may be broader than "marketing [expenses]...
including . . . all other incidental selling expenses" in § 9B. Item 23 refers specifically to
printing, legal, accounting, and engineering fees, among others.
Nonmarketing Legal and Accounting Fees. Customarily excluded from Item 23 are legal
expenses for the corporate cleanup (charter and bylaw amendments, restructuring of affili-
ates and of transactions between the company and its management, etc.), which often pre-
cede a first public offering. Accounting fees for a regular audit that is used in the
registration statement as well as for internal purposes may also be excluded from Item 23.
Even if included as "expenses in connection with the issuance and distribution of the securi-
ties," they seem rather clearly not to be "marketing" expenses subject to the § 9B limit.
Management Fees. Maximum fees for managing the issuer's business or properties are
specified for certain kinds of offerings, e.g., Tex. State Sec. Board Rule IX.D, Tex. Reg. No.
065.09.00.004, reprinted in 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) $ 46,609 para. D (1976) (real estate
programs: property acquisition fees, property sale commissions, program management fee,
etc.); Rule XI.B.4, Tex. Reg. No. 065.11.00.002 para. 4, reprinted in 3 BLUE SKY L. REP.
(CCH) $ 46,610 para. B.4 (1977) (oil and gas drilling programs: maximum 15% of the pro-
gram's cash receipts from public offering may be paid to sponsor for organizational and
offering expenses including any first year management fees; other limits specified); Rule
XII.B.3, Tex. Reg. No. 065.12.00.002 para. 3, reprinted in 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH)
46,612 para. B.3 (1977) (open end investment companies: maximum management fee 1.5%
of average net assets). See also note 185 supra concerning cattle feeding programs. While it
is usually a fact question what fees are being paid for, management fees of the kind de-
scribed here are rather clearly not for marketing the securities. Thus, management fees
would not be counted against the § 9B maximum and would not create § 33A(l) civil liabil-
ity for § 9B violation if they exceed the maximum. However, when specifically subjected to
a combined limit with marketing expenses (as for oil and gas, above, and cattle feeding, note
185 supra), management fees probably have the effect of reducing the § 9B limit on market-
ing expenses to the combined limit minus the management fee.
191. For a comprehensive list of selling expenses used by one state in applying its limit
(normally 15%), see CAL. ADMIN. CODE, tit. 10, ch. 3, rule 260.140.20 (1972), reprinted in 1
BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) $ 8591 (1978). For a comprehensive but different list of the com-
ponents used by the NASD in imposing its rather similar limits on underwriter compensa-
tion, see NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIEs DEALERS MANUAL 2151, at 2031-32
(1972); Merrifield, Underwriting Compensation, 26 Bus. LAW. 1235, 1244-47 (1971).
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the specified percent of the Texas portion of the offering. 192
Third, over what time interval is the limit measured? Front end ex-
penses in a slow offering may mean the limit is exceeded for the first three
or six months of the offering, but is not exceeded at the end of a year. It
seems reasonable to look at the entire span of the offering, but there is no
conclusive authority to this effect.
193
All these uncertainties offer untried opportunities to plaintiffs and un-
known perils to defendants.
The expense limits do not apply to exempt securities or transactions.
1 94
But they do apply to registered securities, whether registered by §§ 7A, 7B,
or 7C.
The elements of the plaintiff's § 33A(1)-§ 9B case ire that he bought' 95
and the defendant sold 96 to the plaintiff' 97 a security, 198 and the total ex-
penses for marketing the securities (including all commissions for the sale
of securities and all other incidental expenses) in the aggregate exceeded
20% of the price at which the securities were sold or offered to the public in
Texas, or a less percentage required by the Commissioner in accordance
with § 9B. 199
192. A related problem might arise if substantially more securities are offered in Texas
than are sold in the state. § 9B sets the limit at 20% of the price at which the securities "are
to be sold, or offered . . . to the public of this State." The danger is the possibility that
expenses of unsuccessful marketing efforts (travel, advertising, etc.) would be measured
against the smaller base of actual sales. Again, the reasonable solution is to prorate over the
entire offering.
193. To assure compliance with the limits, "an escrow of the proceeds of the offering may
be required." Tex. State Sec. Board Rule VII.E.7.3, Tex. Reg. No. 065.07.00.005 para. 7.3, 3
BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 46,607 para. E.7.3 (1977). (The escrow procedure is described in
Part 5.2.1 above.) This suggests strongly that the limit is to be measured at the end of the
escrow period, i e., at the end of the offering. In accord is the Commissioner's much more
common practice of accepting an undertaking that sales will not become final until they
reach a level which brings the estimated expenses below the designated percent. See note
185 supra.
194. Preamble to §§ 5 and 6. See also notes 101, 102, 105 supra and accompanying text.
Note, however, that § 5E (sales to existing security holders) bars the payment of any com-
mission other than a standby commission. And § 5.0, which is not really comparable since it
is only for dealer sales of outstanding securities (hence not for issuer sales) prohibits exces-
sive markups by requiring that the sales be at prices reasonably related to the current market
price. § 5.0(3).
195. See Part 2.1 above.
196. See note 108 upra and cross reference therein.
197. See note 109 supra.
198. See Part 4.2 above.
199. An expense limit below 20%, if imposed in the permit, can be proved from the
Commissioner's records in the manner described in note 111 supra. If imposed by rule (see
note 185 supra), it can be proved by authenticated copy of the rule. If not imposed by
permit (see note 185 supra) or by rule, the method of proof is not clear; possibly the Com-
missioner or a member of his staff can be called to testify that a lower limit was otherwise
"required" by the Commissioner.
Information on a company's actual selling expenses is not necessarily available from
filings with the Commissioner. It is normally reported by the company in its final SEC
Form S-I, Item 23, note 190 supra, which may be filed with the Commissioner by statutory
requirement for a § 7C coordination registration, or voluntarily in other cases. It.is avail-
able from the SEC if not from the Commissioner. However, in slow offerings, the Item 23
information will be only estimated. Another possible source of itemized information on ac-
tual selling expense is SEC Form SR, 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 7401 (1972), which
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5.3.2 Related and Implied Claims. There seem to be no re-
lated or implied claims under TSA, federal law, or the Uniform Act,200
unless there are nondisclosures or misrepresentations of the marketing ex-
penses that are material and thus fraudulent, or the expenses are so great
that they amount to fraud. Excessive expenses or markups may also vio-
late the rules of the National Association of Securities Dealers and permit
private suits based on those rules.201
5.4 Prospectus iolaion- 9C.
5.4.1 § 334(1) Civil Liability. A curiously drafted § 9C 20 2
mandates that the Commissioner require offers of securities "to be made
through and by a prospectus which fairly discloses the material facts about
the plan of finance and business" of the issuer. The prospectus must be
"filed with and approved by the Commissioner" or be an SEC prospectus
or offering circular. Noncompliance leads to civil liability under § 33A(l).
Section 9C does not apply if the securities or transactions are exempt.20 3
Civil liability for § 9C violations does not appear to have been litigated
in the reported cases. There are some difficult interpretive questions:
First, does § 9C apply to all types of registration? The statute is pref-
aced by "In connection with any permit to sell. . . ." We have seen that
permits are authorized by the statute only for § 7A (qualification) registra-
tions,2°4 but that they are commonly issued by the Commissioner for § 7B
(notification) and § 7C (coordination) registrations as well. A gratuitous
permit from the Commissioner may well be insufficient to invoke the pro-
spectus requirement of § 9C, and the corresponding civil liability for viola-
tion. 20 5 If so, only § 7A qualification registrations are subject to § 33A(1)
companies registering first-time offerings with the SEC are required to file with the SEC (in
Washington) three months after an offering and every six months thereafter while the offer-
ing continues. This too is available from the SEC. The Commissioner is considering a re-
quirement to report selling expenses. If the reported filings do not have the desired
information, or the plaintiff thinks the reports understate the expenses, he can use discovery
to obtain the information.
200. Some other states have civil liability for violation of maximum expense limits. See,
e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25141, 25503 (West 1977).
201. See, e.g., NASD Guide 2151.02 (Review of Corporate Financing) and 2154 (Fair
Prices and Commissions; Mark-up Policy); S. JAFFE, BROKER-DEALERS AND SECURITIES
MARKETS §§ 11.04, .10, .11 (1977); N. WOLFSON, R. PHILLIPS & T. Russo, REGULATION OF
BROKERS, DEALERS AND SECURITIES MARKETS 2.09 (1977); Lowenfels, Private Enforce-
ment in the Over-the- Counter Securities Markets. Implied Liabilities Based on NAISD Rules,
51 CORNELL L.Q. 633 (1966), reprinted in L. LOWENFELS, SELECTED ARTICLES UNDER THE
FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW (1978); Merrifield, Underwriting Compensation, 26 Bus. LAW.
1235 (1971).
202. The curious feature is that § 9C directs the Commissioner to require a prospectus
instead of§ 9C requiring a prospectus. It makes no difference for liability purposes; see note
174 supra. A similar locution appears in § 13D.
203. Preamble to §§ 5 and 6. See also notes 101, 102, 105 supra and accompanying text.
204. Note 99 supra.
205. The point is largely academic as to a § 7C coordination registration which is, by
hypothesis, registered with the SEC and subject to federal law so that 1933 Act § 12(1) gives
a cause of action for failure to comply with the prospectus delivery requirements of 1933 Act
§ 5(b). But there is no prospectus requirement for a § 7B notification requirement unless it
happens to be subject to federal law too. In fact there is a plain inference that prospectuses
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liability for a prospectus violation.
Second, is § 9C violated by oral or written offers in addition to a pro-
spectus? Literally, "all offers" must be "made through and by prospectus."
The language could be read to prohibit any offers except prospectuses.
The resulting world of mute salesmen handing out prospectuses to custom-
ers and refusing to furnish research reports or advice is too far from real-
ity, and too uninformative to investors, to be required by the statute. The
more reasonable meaning of the statute is that all sales include a prospec-
tus along with any other communication that is not otherwise barred. This
is confirmed by another part of TSA. 20 6
Third, is a late prospectus a violation? Plainly, failure to furnish a pro-
spectus is, and this is the main target of § 9C. I have already argued that
providing a prospectus after an oral offer is not a violation. But how late
may it be? The statement in § 9C that it is "in all respects . . . satisfied"
by an SEC prospectus or offering circular filed with the Commissioner
must mean that the use of such a document according to federal law does
not violate § 9C. Federal law, although encouraging the circulation of
preliminary prospectuses to offerees during the waiting period,20 7 does not
require that prospectuses reach offerees before their first written communi-
cation from the offeror (dealer), which is typically the written confirmation
of a sale pursuant to an oral buy order.20 8 Whether the adoption of the
federal practice carries over to offerings not registered with the SEC is an
open question, and the makers of such offers are well advised to get their
prospectuses out in time for the offerees to see them before deciding
whether to buy, because this is the purpose of a prospectus. A buyer. of a
non-SEC offering who first sees a prospectus with his confirmation should
not hesitate to allege a § 9C violation, and a defendant should not hesitate
to deny that this is a violation.
Fourth, does a defective prospectus-one which does not "fairly disclose
the material facts about the plan of finance and business"-violate § 9C?
A couple of decisions have said yes under the comparable federal prospec-
are optional in § 7B; § 7B(2)a.7 requires the filing with the Commissioner of "[a] copy of the
prospectus, if any, describing such securities." Even under § 7B, however, most sellers will
use a prospectus, if only to avoid the fraud liabilities for nondisclosure that are likely to be
incurred without a prospectus.
206. § 22 expressly permits certain kinds of advertising. See discussion in Parts 5.1.2(C)
and (D) above.
It is hard to wriggle around the specification of § 9C that "all offers"-not merely all
sales--be made by prospectus. This is wholly at odds with industry practice, which is to
solicit customers by telephone-thereby making offers-but to send prospectuses (which are
expensive in printing and mailing) later and only if they are interested. Each such offer is a
literal violation of § 9C, although fully consonant with federal law. Enforcement action has
never been taken, so far as I know, and probably never will be, against oral offers of this sort
so long as they are free of fraud. They produce no civil liability to nonbuyers who receive
no prospectuses. See the 2d para. of Part 5.1.2 above. For these reasons, little sleep is lost
over the technical, violations. But the statute should be amended to change "offers for sale"
to "sales."
207. See SEC Sec. Exch. Act Rule 15c2-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-8 (1977).
208. 1 Loss 246-47. This is the typical state rule too. UNIFORM ACT § 304(d).
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tus delivery requirement.20 9 These decisions have been sharply criticized
as short-circuiting the fraud provisions, i e., allowing recovery based on
allegation of fraud without really having to prove it, and without the de-
fenses that are available in a fraud case.210 They should not be followed in
Texas, and not only for the reason just stated. An additional reason is that
§ 9C does not authorize private parties to look behind the administrative
approval or clearance of the prospectus or to question the adequacy of its
disclosure. 211 This is stated slightly more emphatically for an SEC-filed
prospectus, by which, as already noted, "this subsection shall in all respects
be satisfied." The Legislature could hardly have intended to accord any
less deference to the Texas Commissioner when it required the prospectus
to be "filed with and approved by the Commissioner.'' 212 Thus, I think
administrative action allowing use of a prospectus is conclusive that it
complies with § 9C so far as § 33A(1) liability is concerned.
Fifth, is an issuer or other seller (in the common law sense of owner)
liable when an underwriter or dealer engaged to sell the stock fails to de-
liver a prospectus to a buyer? Since both the issuer or seller and the dealer
are sellers under TSA, 213 both have violated § 9C and are liable under§ 33A(l). 2 14
209. SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1098-1100 (2d Cir. 1972) (in-
junction); Jefferies & Co. v. Arkus-Duntov, 357 F. Supp 1206, 1214-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (civil
liability).
210. ALl FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE 560 Note (Proposed Official Draft 1978) (by Prof.
Loss, Reporter for the Code; § 1703(0 of the Code would reverse these decisions). See also 2
BROMBERG § 6.11(321), at 138.405(1977).
211. This argument relates, of course, only to a § 33A(1) automatic liability suit for vio-
lation of § 9C. Administrative approval does not preclude a fraud suit, based on the pro-
spectus, under § 33A(2) or other fraud provisions. Nor does it preclude a § 23A stop-sale
order or other administrative or criminal sanction.
212. Normally, of course, the Commissioner does not "approve" anything. Cf. § 10B:
the issuance of a permit "is permissive only, and does not constitute a recommendation or
endorsement of the securities." This language is repeated in bold face on the cover of the
Commissioner's Suggested Outline to Assist in Preparing Prospectus for Local Texas Offer-
ings Only (rev. ed. Sept. 10, 1975). But § 9C mandates that he approve a prospectus (if it is
not filed with the SEC) before its use. His grant of a permit, after reviewing the registration
application and accompanying prospectus, is thus approval of the prospectus for the limited
purpose of satisfying § 9C. The Commissioner's Suggested Outline, supra, is some further
evidence of his "approval" of prospectuses for this purpose. Page 2 of the Suggested Outline
confirms that it is "mandatory that an applicant... file such prospectus with the Securities
Commissioner and receive his approval thereof before its use." Earlier forms of permit
similarly echoed § 9C by specifying that "all offerings hereunder must be made by and
throu&h a prospectus, filed with the registration statement, which has been approved by the
Securities Commissioner." Beginning about 1970, however, the language was changed to
"through a prospectus which has been filed with this Agency," omitting all reference to
approval.
213. See Part 3 above. In view of the broad definition of sale in TSA, it probably makes
no difference whether the underwriting is firm (with the dealer buying from the issuer or
seller and reselling for his own account) or best efforts (with the dealer acting as agent for
the issuer or seller).
214. The usual underwriting agreement between issuer or seller and dealer or under-
writer requires the latter to deliver prospectuses in accordance with law. Such a provision is
a valuable encouragement to compliance, but probably does not shield the issuer or seller
from liability to the buyer if the underwriter or dealer fails to furnish the prospectus.
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The elements of a plaintiffs § 33A(l)-§ 9C case are that he bought 2 15
and the defendant sold 216 to the plaintiff2 17 a security2 18 for which a pro-
spectus was required by § 9C,219 and the defendant violated § 9C by not
making the offer to the plaintiff through and by a prospectus.
220
5.4.2 Related and Implied Claims. Failure to deliver a pro-
spectus violates and produces liability under 1933 Act §§ 5(b) and 12(1).
The same is true under Uniform Act § 4 10(a)(1) if the Commissioner exer-
cises his discretionary power in § 304(d) of that Act to require a prospec-
tus. Failure to provide a prospectus may well constitute fraudulent
omissions under any of the statutes, and a false or misleading prospectus
will also be fraudulent. These seem to be the only related or implied
claims under TSA, Uniform Act, or federal law.
5.5 Unregistered Dealer-§ 12.
5.5.1 § 33A(1) Civil Liability. The purposes of dealer (and
salesman) registration, as gleaned from the regulation imposed, are sev-
eral: to limit entry to honest 22 ' and knowledgeable 222 persons, to en-
courage compliance with TSA by making them liable to administrative
discipline223 and judicial receivership 224 for violations, and to require the
keeping of records which will facilitate enforcement and investor protec-
tion.225 A security seller who should be registered or licensed 226 as a
215. See Part 2.1 above.
216. See note 108 supra and cross references there.
217. See note 109 supra.
218. See Part 4.2 above.
219. It seems illogical to require plaintiff to prove that the Commission required a pro-
spectus when § 9C says that the Commissioner is to require it. See note 202 supra. It is
probably necessary for plaintiff to prove that a permit was issued; see notes 204-05 supra and
accompanying text. The typical permit has a prospectus requirement; see note 212 supra.
220. If plaintiff is alleging some other violations discussed above, such as a late or defec-
tive prospectus, he should so specify.
221. §§ 13B, 13C (application to include information enabling Commissioner to deter-
mine whether sales would be fraudulent, and establishing applicant's good reputation). For
the information actually required in dealer and salesman registration applications, see Tex.
State Sec. Board Rules, Appendix, Items VIII.A-D (looseleaf, orig. pub. 1976).
222. § 13D requires applicants to pass a written examination on their "qualifications and
competency to engage in the business . . . of securities." On examinations, and full and
partial waivers, see Tex. State Sec. Board Rule VIII.C, Tex. Reg. No. 065.08.00.003, reprinted
in 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 46,608 para. C (1977).
223. § 14.
224. § 25-1.
225. There appears to be no statutory provision dealing with record keeping. The Board
has published minimum requirements; applicants for dealer registration agree to comply
with them. Tex. State Sec. Board Rule VIII.E, Tex. Reg. No. 065.08.00.005, reprinted in 3
BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) $ 46.608 para. E (1977); Tex. State Sec. Board Rules, Appendix,
Items VIII.B.2-4 (looseleaf, orig. pub. 1976).
226. Registration v. License. §§ 12-21, 29A, 32, 5C(I), 5.0 and 5S consistently use "regis-
tered" (or its derivatives) to refer to the process by which dealers and salesmen are author-
ized by the Commissioner to engage in business. But §§ 34 and 5Q, most of the securities
industry, and many courts use "licensed" to refer to the same thing. The two terms are
identical in meaning. "Licensed" is the more logical term, since it immediately distinguishes
person registration from securities registration. Nonetheless, we will almost consistently fol-
low the almost consistent statute and use registration, with modifiers where necessary to
distinguish the two kinds.
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dealer (or salesman), but is not, violates § 12 and is therefore liable under
§ 33A(1) 227-whether or not the security is registered-unless a § 5 trans-
action exemption 228 or some external exemption 229 makes § 12 registration
inapplicable and thereby eliminates § 33A(1) liability for nonregistra-
tion.230 By § 37, the burden of proof of an exemption is on the person
claiming it, ie., the defendant in the § 33A(1) case.23'
The elements of a plaintiff's § 33A(l)-§ 12 case are that he bought 232
and the defendant sold,233 directly or through agents or salesmen, 234 to the
227. Bierschwale v. Oakes, 497 S.W.2d 506, 521-22 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.]
1973), rev'don other grounds sub nom. Meadows v. Bierschwale, 516 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. 1974);
Bateman v. Petro Atlas, Inc., Civ. No. 75-H-445 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 1977), Findings 1 4-5,
Conclusions 9-10; and possibly Smith v. Smith, 424 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston 1968, no writ), note 40 supra.
For the same proposition under the 1941-1963 voidability provision, Appendix 3 below,
see Brown v. Cole, 155 Tex. 624, 291 S.W.2d 704 (1956), note 38 supra; Riggs v. Riggs, 322
S.W.2d 571, 573-74 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1959, no writ) (dictum since plaintiff failed to
make the then requisite tender); and possibly Smith'v. Smith, 424 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston 1968, no writ), note 40 supra.
For the same proposition under pre-1941 common law voidability for violation of TSA,
see Smith v. Fishback, 123 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1938, writ ref'd), note
18 supra.
228. The preamble to § 5 not only makes the TSA inapplicable (unless otherwise specifi-
cally provided), it also states that a person engaged in a § 5 transaction "shall not be deemed
a dealer." The more important exemptions are summarized in note 102 supra, and the full
preamble is quoted there.
However, § 5.0 (certain sales of outstanding securities) can be used only by registered
dealers, and § 5S (certain options) is limited to sales "by or through" a registered dealer.
§ 5C(1) (certain sales of outstanding securities by owners) and § 5Q (private, limited offer-
ings of oil and gas interests) require that any person acting for a seller be registered. For the
background of this requirement, and the consequence for the owner if the person acting for
him is unregistered, see Part 5.5.6 below.
229. See note 105 supra.
230. The principle was recognized in Bierschwale v. Oakes, 497 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [I st Dist.] 1973), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Meadows v. Bierschwale,
516 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. 1974), note 227 supra, but the claimed § 5C(l) exemption was not
proved.
For the same proposition under the 1941-1963 voidability provision, Appendix 3 below,
see Anderson v. Eliot, 333 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1960, writ ref'd) (exempt
by predecessor of § 5C(l) for certain resales by investors); Riggs v. Riggs, 322 S.W.2d 571
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1959, no writ), note 227 supra.
23 1. All elements of the exemption must, of course, be proved. See Bierschwale v. Oakes,
497 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1973), rev'don other grounds sub nom.
Meadows v. Bierschwale, 516 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. 1974), note 227 supra, in which defendant
proved some but not all of the § 5C(1) exemption, and therefore was liable.
232. See Part 2.1 above.
233. See Parts 3 and 4.1 and note 108 above.
Improper Offers. While § 12 prohibits both offers and sales by unregistered persons, only
buyers can sue by § 33A(1). In effect, then, offers that do not lead to sales are not actionable.
See Part 5.1.2 for a fuller discussion. But there are at least two kinds of improper offers that
need to be considered. One is relatively rare: a person makes an offer before he is registered
and completes the sale after he is registered. The other is more common: an unregistered
person participates in an offer (and perhaps in the sale), but a registered person closes and
confirms the sale. I do not try to analyze these situations fully. For the kinds of arguments
which can be made, see the discussion of improper offers in the context of the securities
registration requirements in Part 5.1.2 above.
Offers by unregistered persons--absent exemption-may result in sanctions other than
civil liability-such as a § 32 injunction, a § 29A prosecution, or a § 23A stop or-
der-whether or not the offer leads to a sale.
234. § 12 so specifies.
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plaintiff2 35 a security236 in the state,237 and the defendant was a person,
firm, corporation, or dealer 238 not registered under § 12 at the time of the
sale.239 A plaintiff loses if he is unable to prove, or the defendant is able to
disprove, any of these elements. Registration of the defendant under fed-
eral law, or the law of another state, is irrelevant if he was not registered in
Texas. 240 Nor does membership in a self-regulatory organization, like the
New York Stock Exchange or National Association of Securities Dealers,
equate with Texas registration. The varieties of registration in Texas, and
their effect, are discussed in Part 5.5.4 below. Exemptions are the principal
defenses to a § 33A(l) nonregistration suit. 24 1 But there may also be a
substantial question whether defendant is a dealer, and, if he is not,
whether this relieves him from having to register. This is discussed in
Parts 5.5.2 and 5.5.3 below.
5.5.2 Significance of Dealer. Much ink has been spilled on
who is a dealer, and I will spill some more. But before doing so, it is
apropos to inquire why it matters. The significance was clear in the pre-
1961 law: civil liability derived-by common law or by the 1941-1963
voidability provision (Appendix 3 below)-from a violation of TSA. This
usually meant a criminal provision, and the pertinent criminal provision in
those days was for a "dealer, agent [or] salesman" who was unregistered
and sold securities. 242 Whether the defendant was a dealer thus became a
pivotal question in determining liability. In 1961, the present § 29A came
into effect with broader wording: "Any person who shall: A. Sell, offer...
or who shall deal in any other manner in any security. . . without being a
registered dealer or salesman as in this Act provided shall be deemed
guilty of a felony .... -243 Under that phrasing, the inquiry should have
shifted to whether the person was selling a security or (only if he was not)
whether he was dealing in a security (probably the same as whether he was
a dealer). Then the 1963 express civil liability (Appendix 2 below) moved
the basis of liability from the criminal provision to the § 12 registration
requirement which reads: "Except as provided in Section 5... no person,
235. See note 109 supra.
236. See Part 4.2 above.
237. § 12 so specifies. See note 108 supra on territorial aspects of sales subject to TSA.
238. The effect of this alternative language in § 12 is considered in Part 5.5.2 below.
239. See note 111 supra on proof of nonregistration.
Duration. All dealer and salesman registrations are annual and expire on December 31;
renewal requires application. § 19. Registrations may be revoked by the Commissioner for
insolvency, violations of TSA and other misconduct. § 14.
240. Cf. Shappley v. State, 520 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974), discussed note 108
supra. "[I]t would likewise be immaterial whether or not Arizona required dealers in securi-
ties to be licensed since the security laws of Texas govern this transaction." 520 S.W.2d at
768.
241. See, e.g., notes 101, 102, 105 supra.
242. 1935 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 100, § 30, at 276; 1955 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 67, § 30, at
342; 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 269, § 29, at 598.
243. 1961 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 466, § 1, at 1047. This was the provision that raised the
penalties for the major offenses--fraud and sales without securities or dealer-salesman regis-
tration-from $1,000 and/or 2 years imprisonment to $5,000 and/or 10 years imprisonment.
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firm, corporation or dealer shall, directly or through agents or salesmen,
offer for sale, sell ... any securities in this state without first being regis-
tered as in this Act provided. ... 244 Except perhaps for a trained chim-
panzee or a vending machine, every seller of a security will be a "person,
firm, corporation or dealer" and therefore apparently in violation of § 12,
hence liable by § 33A(l), unless there is an exemption. Thus, it would
seem that the only exceptions to a universal registration requirement are
those in the § 5 transaction exemptions, 245 which do not require a regis-
tered dealer, and that there is no need to decide whether someone is a
dealer.
There is another reason why the quest for the true nature of "dealer"
may be a waste of time. In most cases where a defendant is sued for being
an unregistered dealer, he is also sued for selling an unregistered security.
The same transaction exemptions 246 that will save him on the latter count
will usually save him on the former as well.247 If so, it seems irrelevent
whether-apart from the exemption-he is a dealer.
Nonetheless, there is some continuing tendency in civil liability cases to
focus first on whether the defendant is a dealer (or salesman). There are
several possible reasons for this, none of which have been articulated. One
is the habit of publishers, counsel, and courts to digest, annotate, compile,
and cite cases without regard for the statutes under which they were de-
cided, or for changes in those statutes. 248 Another reason, more under-
standable in policy terms, is because the § 5 exemptions are so
excruciatingly narrow in some areas. 249 A third reason, more substantive,
is that the sweeping language of § 12 ("person, firm, corporation or
dealer") may well be limited to "dealer" by the phrase which follows it
("registered as in this Act provided"). The Act provides only for registra-
tion of dealers (and salesmen). This is explicit in each of §§ 13-18. To
argue that "person, firm, corporation or dealer" means "dealer" is not very
good statutory construction, but TSA is not a very good statute. Perhaps
the more persuasive and analytical way to state the argument is that a
person is not required to register as a dealer unless he is one. 250
244. The language goes back to 1935 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 100, § 12, at 265.
245. Or the external exemptions, note 105 supra.
246. See notes 102 and 105 supra and accompanying text. Security exemptions, note 101
supra, do not help since they are contingent on the seller being a registered dealer.
247. Note, however, that some transaction exemptions are limited to registered dealers,
or require that persons acting for owners be registered as dealers (or salesmen). See note
228 supra.
248. This is part of the common law tradition that somehow values cases higher than
statutes. Cf. Pioneer Specialties, Inc. v. Nelson, 161 Tex. 244, 339 S.W.2d 199, 200 (1960):
"We have been cited to no Texas cases, and we have found none, which are determinative.
Our decision must rest, therefore, on the bylaws of the corporation and the Texas statutes
regulating corporations."
249. E.g., resales of outstanding securities, ostensibly covered by § 5C(l). See note 102,
para. (B)(1) supra.
250. A supporting argument is that TSA is full of surplusage and § 12 is a good example.
"Dealer" includes "person or company" by § 4C; "person" and "company" each include
"corporation" and "firm" by § 4B. So nothing is added to "dealer" in § 12 by ranging"per-
son, firm, corporation" beside it. All that the Legislature probably intended to do by the
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5.5.3 Meaning of Dealer. Assuming, for any of the reasons
just examined in Part 5.5.2, that dealer (or salesman) status is essential to §
33A(1) liability for violation of § 12,251 we turn then to the meaning of the
term. Section 4C defines dealer to include: "every person or company
other than a salesman, who engages in this state, either for all or part of his
or its time, directly or through an agent, in selling, offering for sale . . . or
dealing in any other manner in security . . . ." "Dealer" means much
more in TSA than it does in ordinary parlance. The statutory word in-
cludes (1) a securities professional selling for his own account, 252 often
called a principal and embracing a market-maker, (2) a securities profes-
sional buying or selling as agent for a customer, often called a broker, 2
53
(3) a securities professional who advises clients on buying and selling se-
curities, but who does not necessarily buy or sell them himself, often called
an investment adviser or counselor,25 4 (4) a company or other issuer selling
its own securities, unless it does so to or through a registered dealer or in a
transaction exempt by § 5,25 and (5) a nonprofessional who has sufficient
activity in the transaction in question, or otherwise, to fall into the statu-
tory net. Thus, it is erroneous to approach TSA with the idea that a dealer
is someone who holds himself out the public as being in the securities busi-
ness. A buyer plaintiff is missing a good bet if he fails to sue as unregis-
tered dealers every unregistered person who had anything significant to do
with his transaction.
The interpretive problems come mainly in the fifth category, i e., when
does a nonprofessional become a dealer? The breadth of the statutory
definition has been taken to mein that very slight selling activity will make
a person a dealer, especially if undertaken on behalf of another person and
for compensation. Attempts by a plaintiff to sell a defendant's oil payment
to two different persons made the plaintiff a dealer and barred him from
redundancy was to require registration of dealers whether they were individuals, partner-
ships, corporations, or otherwise organized.
251. "Dealer" is unmistakably critical to other liabilities, e.g., § 33A(1) for violation of
§ 7 (see note 112 supra).
252. This is the common meaning, and coincides with SEA § 3(a)(5). Whether buying
activity-makes one a dealer is considered in note 30 supra.
253. A broker is so defined in SEA § 3(a)(4).
254. Investment Advisers. § 4C explicitly includes "investment adviser" in the definition
of a "dealer." An investment adviser is thus a dealer whether or not he buys or sells securi-
ties. By my reading of § 12 (see note 30 supra), he is required to register only if he sells.
Since advice to buy could be construed as selling, an adviser is wise to register as a dealer.
Indeed he is instructed to register by the Board, which reads TSA more broadly. Tex. State
Sec. Board Rule VIII.A.I.c., Tex. Reg. No. 065.08.00.001 para. L.c, reprinted in 3 BLUE SKY
L. REP. (CCH) $ 46,608 para. A. I.c (1977): "The Securities Act requires the registration of
Investment Advisers and their agents actually involved in the rendering of investment ad-
vice."
Investment adviser is not defined in TSA, but is defined in Tex. State Sec. Board Rule
IV.B.12, Tex. Reg. No. 065.04.00.002 para. 12, reprinted in 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) $
46,604 para. B. 12 (1975). The definition resembles, but differs in some important particulars
from, the standard definition in UNIFORM AcT § 401(0 and Investment Advisers Act
§ 202(a)(1 1), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(l 1) (1976).
255. § 4C explicitly so states. If the issuer is not a dealer, its executives or employees
who do the selling are not salesmen, and need not be licensed as such. § 4D.
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recovering a commission since he was unregistered.256 Then came the log-
ical (or illogical) extension: one sale is enough, and it may be the sale on
which the lawsuit is based.257 None of these cases involved an express civil
liability for failure to have a dealer registration; no such provision existed
at the time. Rather, these cases involved what is now a § 34 defense to a
suit for commission by any unregistered "person or company," or its com-
mon law predecessor-the illegality defense based on violation of the then
criminal provisions for an unregistered dealer, agent, or salesman.258 The
cases may be distinguishable on the difference in statutory context and the
difference in economic sanction involved. It is far less radical to deny an
unregistered person a commission, which is a small percentage of the sale
price, than to hold him automatically liable for the full sale price under
§ 33A(l). More sales activity, e.g., in other transactions, seems necessary
to justify the latter sanction. 259
The leading case awarding damages or rescission-under the 1941-1963
voidability provision, as applied to the 1935-1961 penal provision for an
unregistered "dealer, agent or salesman" 260 -gives scant attention to the
"dealer" question. In Brown v. Cole261 the supreme court lists "unlicensed
'dealer'" as the first element of the plaintiffs' cause of action and affirms
the judgment for the plaintiffs against Brown without ever discussing the
issue whether Brown was a dealer, despite Justice Smith's vigorous dissent
that this was an essential and unproved element of the suit.262 The court
256. Cosner v. Hancock, 149 S.W.2d 239, 243 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1941, writ
dism'd judgmt cor.). A similar fate befell the plaintiff in Kadafie v. Clark, 135 Tex. 496, 143
S.W.2d 197, 199 (1940); all the court said on the "dealer" issue was that plaintiff was "active
in undertaking to sell various oil and gas leases."
257. Breeding v. Anderson, 152 Tex. 92, 254 S.W.2d 377 (1953), affirming the denial of a
commission recovery on a sale of oil properties. Citing Cosner v. Hancock, 149 S.W.2d 239
(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1941 writ dism d judgmt cor.), with approval, the court added: "It
is settled law that one engaging in a single or isolated transaction is not exempt from secur-
ing a license." 254 S.W.2d at 380.
258. Note 242 supra.
259. One would expect the same argument to apply to an even more serious criminal
sanction. But evidence of "four other attempts at solicitation of investments" plus very lim-
ited activity in the transaction before the court (described in the text accompanying note 41
supra) was sufficient for conviction for selling without a dealer registration. "The gist of
appellant's actions in these four instances was to make the initial contact with potential
investors to determine if they would be interested in participating in newly proposed ven-
tures." The conviction was, however, reversed on other grounds and remanded to determine
if the small offering exemption was applicable. Dean v. State, 433 S.W.2d 173, 176-77, 179
(Tex. Crim. App. 1968). There was no indication that Dean expected or received compensa-
tion in the other four efforts or in the one for which he was prosecuted. There was no
discussion of whether the prosecution had to prove Dean was a dealer; since the indictment
charged that he was, there was no reason for the court to question whether that was an
essential element of the case.
260. Note 242 supra.
261. 155 Tex. 624, 291 S.W.2d 704 (1956).
262. 291 S.W.2d at 711, 717:
The majority assumes that Brown was a dealer because it was admitted that
Brown had not registered as a dealer .... In order for the Act to have been
violated, it would have been necessary for the [plaintiffs] to plead and prove
that Brown was a dealer as that term is defined .... The [plaintiffs] plead
that Brown was a dealer in securities, and it is my contention that the estab-
lishment of the fact that Brown was a dealer was a condition precedent to
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may have glossed over this point since it was plain that Brown was in the
securities business, 263 he probably had sufficient activity in this transaction
to make him a dealer,264 and the court's attention was directed to the
"sale" issue by the defense.265 Consequently, the decision cannot be re-
garded as a holding on "dealer" at all, only on "sale," "security," and re-
lated exemption questions.266 In particular, the decision rests primarily, if
not wholly, on Brown's sale of an unregistered security without exemption,
rather than on his sale as an unregistered dealer.267
The most recent holding on "dealer" is the most dubious, at least in civil
liability terms. In Enntex Oil & Gas Co. v. State 268 Spindletop, on the
liquidation of its wholly owned subsidiary (Enntex), became the manager
and co-owner of oil and gas leases in which buyers from Enntex were also
co-owners. "By managing the wells drilled by Enntex . . .which were
owned jointly .. .Spindletop . . .became a 'dealer' under [TSA] .. .
irrespective of the fact that it did not attempt to sell any securities. It was
dealing with securities which should have been licensed and regulated
under the Act. ' 26sA Accordingly, the court affirmed a § 32 injunction
against Spindletop acting as a dealer without being registered. As a non-
seller, Spindletop would have no § 33A(1) liability, except perhaps vicari-
ously as a control person, aider, or transferee of Enntex. I have grave
doubts whether "dealing" was intended to cover co-ownership, even with a
degree of management. Fortunately, § 5Q (exempting sales of interests in
a single oil or gas lease to 35 or fewer persons in 12 months if there is no
public solicitation) will prevent most of the automatic liability that would
attach to an occasional sale of a lease interest by a manager under a joint
operating agreement, unitization agreement, or similar arrangement, if the
recovery under the pleadings as well as the law. The question .. .was a
question of fact to be determined by the jury.
263. He was a registered salesman of a dealer. 276 S.W.2d at 371.
264. He brought at least four investors and perhaps nine into the Mexican mining ven-
ture. Besides Gould and Cole, there was Bloch (Cole's auditor, whom Brown took to Mex-
ico for the investigation) and Ivey-Brown Co. (Brown's partnership with Frank Ivey) who
were "sold" by Brown. Five other investors, who may or may not have been "sold" by
Brown, are listed at id at 369, 373.
Whether a registered salesman who moonlights like this must also be registered as a
dealer to avoid liability under § 33A(l) is considered in Part 5.6.4 below.
265. True, one of Brown's points of error in the court of civil appeals was that the trial
court was wrong, "(6) in holding that defendant Brown was a 'dealer,' within the terms of
the Securities Act, the undisputed proof showing he was not, in the transactions with plain-
tiffs, dealing in securities under said Act." 276 S.W.2d at 375. But this seems aimed at the
question whether the interests involved were "securities" (which all courts held they were)
rather than whether Brown was a "dealer." The intermediate court paid as little attention to
the "dealer" question as the high court did, merely saying, after noting that "sell" includes a
solicitation, "the word 'dealer' having a like comprehensive meaning." Id at 378.
266. See, e.g., the court's designation of the issues and defenses at 291 S.W.2d at 707,
which begins: "the question here presented for determination is [whether] or not petitioner
Brown made a sale of 'securities' to the respondents."
267. See also the discussion of Smith v. Smith, 424 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston 1968, no writ), on the dealer question, note 40 supra.
268. 560 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. Civ.App.-Texarkana 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
268A. Id. at 498.
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holding is extended to civil liabilities. 269 The holding is questionable in its
own legal context and special facts; 270 it should not be expanded to others.
It is hard to believe that the Legislature intended everyone who sells a
security to register as a dealer unless the transaction is exempt by § 5.27 1
The patent purpose of dealer-salesman registration is to regulate an indus-
try or business. Indeed, the § 4C definition rather clearly contemplates
some continuity of activity to become a dealer. A line of decisions, both
early272 and late,273 construe "dealer" to be someone who is in the business
of selling securities. I think this is sound, especially in the civil liability
area, and connotes not only continuity of activity274 but activity with the
269. Note, however, that an "oil, gas or mineral unitization or pooling agreement" is not
deemed a sale. § 5Q.
270. The court indicated that it was motivated by the unusual circumstance of the disso-
lution: "The securities were at the time of disposition [by Enntex], and are now, subject to
regulation. Regulation cannot be avoided simply by a wrongdoer. . . transferring its as-
sets." 560 S.W.2d at 498.
271. The counterargument is the obvious one that the Legislature created the exemptions
it wanted in § 5, and that they apply to dealer registration as well as to securities registration
in most instances.
272. Culver v. Cockburn, 127 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1939, writ dism'd
judgmt cor.), affirming a $1,500 judgment for plaintiff, as an agreed commission for finding
a buyer for defendant's oil and gas lease. The main defense was that plaintiff was not regis-
tered under TSA. (The court said he had no permit, a term usually associated with securities
registration, but referred to statutes dealing with person registration.) The court held that
plaintiff was not a dealer, noting that he had made only two other sales, and that decisions in
other states held isolated transactions to be outside the securities act. (These decisions prob-
ably interpreted specific exemptions for isolated transactions.) The supreme court rejected
the isolated transaction concept in Breeding v. Anderson, 152 Tex. 92, 254 S.W.2d 377
(1953), note 257 supra and accompanying text.
See also Cosner v. Hancock, 149 S.W.2d 239, 243 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1941, writ
dism'd judgmt car.), and Anderson v. Eliot, 333 S.W.2d 654, 658 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1960, writ ref'd), both construing the predecessor of the § 5C(l) exemption to apply to the
"owner of the security; [so] that he is not a dealer if he sells for the purposes named...
provided, of course, he is not in that . . . business." 333 S.W.2d at 658. The earlier court
restated the point more emphatically: "If one attempts to sell, as a business, securities for
himself or others, he comes within the definition of a dealer within the meaning of the Act."
149 S.W.2d at 243. The same statement is made in Flournoy v. Gallagher, 189 S.W.2d 108,
111 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1945, no writ).
Cf. Aiken v. State, 128 S.W.2d 1190, 1192 (Tex. Crim. App. 1938): Indictment sufficiently
charged appellant was a dealer when it "affirmatively stated that appellant was engaged in
the business of a dealer 'by soliciting, offering for sale and selling' securities. The acts
charged against appellant clearly define him as a dealer in securities."
273. Stone v. Enstam, 541 S.W.2d 473, 479 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ): "A
dealer is one who attempts to sell securities for himself or others as a business, and a sales-
man is one employed by a dealer to sell, offer to sell, solicit subscriptions, or deal in any
other manner in securities." Using this interpretation, the court held it was not against the
weight of the evidence for the trial court to find that Dean (the president of Worldcom) was
not a dealer or salesman in Stone's purchase of Worldcom stock from Enstam (vice presi-
dent of Worldcom). Dean made various statements to Stone about Worldcom's finances
and prospects. Stone asked Dean how he could get some Worldcom stock; Dean said
neither he nor Worldcom would sell shares but Enstam might. Stone made up his mind to
buy the stock before meeting Enstam, and discussed only payment terms with him. Appar-
ently there was no evidence of any prior sales activity by Dean.
The finding that the president was not an agent was also upheld, although the court did
not supply a definition of agent. Id. at 479. The agency point was touched on again, id. at
480.
274. Evidence. There should be no difficulty about the admissibility of evidence of sales
or offers to other persons for purposes of showing the defendant was a dealer. Such evi-
dence was admitted in Cosner v. Hancock, 149 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1941,
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investing public for the purpose of making profit from the services (as dis-
tinguished from profit from the ownership of the securities).275 Thus, to
take the easy cases, an investor who trades his own account, even though
quite actively, solely by transactions through or with a registered dealer is
not in the securities business, does not deal with the public, profits only
from the ownership of his securities, and should not be regarded as a
dealer. On the other hand, a person who actively sells securities to other
investors and, for compensation, aids investors in selling to third per-
sons-all without the intervention of a registered dealer-is in the securi-
ties business, deals with the investing public, profits from his activities, and
should be regarded as a dealer.
Finally, the Legislature, with the emphasis of repetition,276 has decreed
that a person engaged in a § 5 exempt transaction is not a dealer, even
though he may be a dealer in other transactions.
277
5.5.4 Meaning of Unregistered. Just as there are different
ways to register securities (discussed in Part 5.1.3 above), there are differ-
ent ways to register persons. Moreover, the latter lead to different results
in terms of the kinds of securities which can be sold by the registered per-
son.278 Registration may be general (for all kinds of securities) or re-
stricted to one or more of the present categories: (1) oil and gas interests,
(2) municipal and government bonds, (3) real estate syndication interests
or condominium securities, (4) sales to the dealer's own employees, (5)
open end investment company securities, and (6) securities issued by the
writ dism'd judgmt cor.); Kadane v. Clark, 135 Tex. 496, 143 S.W.2d 197 (1940), note 256
supra; Dean v. State, 433 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968), note 259 supra; Culver v.
Cockburn, 127 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1939, writ dism'd judgmt cor.), note
272 supra. Other criminal cases in which sales to other persons were admissible, over objec-
tions that they related to extraneous offenses, include Morgan v. State, 557 S.W.2d 512, 513-
14 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (a fraud prosecution under § 29C); Shappley v. State, 520 S.W.2d
766, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (prosecution for lack of dealer registration, § 29A). But see
Christie v. Brewer, 374 S.W.2d 908, 916-17 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.),
in which such evidence was inadmissible to impeach a defendant's testimony that he never
offered the stock to anyone other than plaintiff, because this was a collateral issue. "We
would. . . exclude this testimony unless it is admissible for some other reason." Id at 917.
The court gives as an example of a good reason, the determination of the scope of the de-
fendant's authority as an agent for his employer. Establishing that defendant was a
dealer-if that were relevant to liability-would be a similar reason for admitting the evi-
dence.
275. As a matter of policy, it should be a rare situation in which one who assists gratui-
tously in a transaction is regarded as a dealer. Indirect or nonmonetary compensation is, of
course, compensation and keeps the transaction from being gratuitous. Compensation, it
will be recalled, is not absolutely essential for a person to be a seller; see notes 58-59 supra
and accompanying text.
276. § 5 preamble, quoted in note 102 supra. See also the last clause of § 4C.
277. The § 5 exemptions are summarized in note 102 supra. Especially important for the
investor trading his own account is § 5C(l). Cf. Annot., Who is "'dealer" under state securi-
ties acts exempting sales by owners other than issuers not made in course o/successive transac-
tions, and the like, 6 A.L.R.3d 1425 (1966).
278. There is no explicit statutory authority for different kinds of dealer registration. But
the necessary authority is probably implicit in § 13D (Board may waive examination of
"any applicant or class of applicants"), § 17 (Commissioner to determine the form of regis-
tration certificate given to dealers), and § 28-lB (Board may classify persons and prescribe
different requirements).
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dealer. 279
While not spelled out anywhere in TSA, it seems clear that a dealer (or
salesman) with a restricted registration is registered only when dealing in
his specified area. Thus, an oil-and-gas-only dealer is unregistered if he
sells a corporate share or a municipal bond, and is correspondingly in vio-
lation of § 12 and liable by § 33A(l). An applicant for registration is ap-
parently not registered until his certificate is issued by the
Commissioner.280
Dealer registration also registers one or more officers or partners of the
dealer.281 I have already remarked 282 that registration with the SEC or in
another state, or membership in a self-regulatory organization, does not
amount to Texas registration.
5.5.5 § 34 Commission Ban. An unregistered dealer (or
salesman 283) is subject to another private sanction beside rescission or
damages under § 33A(1). He is barred by § 34 (Appendix 4 below) from
suing for a commission or compensation from either the seller or the buyer
in either the sale or the purchase of securities.2 84 Thus, a buyer from or
279. Tex. State Sec. Board Rule VIII.A.2.a, Tex. Reg. No. 065.08.00.001 para. 2.a, re-
printedin 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 46,608 para. A.2.a (1975). Temporary registrations
are also authorized by § 15.
280. This is the implication of § 15 for dealers and § 18 for salesmen.
For the duration of registrations, see note 239 supra and § 19. The latter provision con-
templates automatic renewal if timely application is made.
281. Note 304 infra.
282. Note 240 supra and accompanying text.
283. § 34 bars suits by any "person or company .. without alleging and proving that
such person or company was duly licensed under the provisions hereof." It is not explicitly
limited to dealers (and salesmen). But only dealers (and salesmen) are, in our view, required
to register. See Part 5.5.2 above. Hence only dealers (and salesmen) are subject to § 34.
284. Breeding v. Anderson, 152 Tex. 92, 254 S.W.2d 377 (1953), discussed in note 257
supra; Sibley v. Coffield, 193 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1946, writ refd n.r.e.)
(suit against seller); Tumblewood Bowling Corp. v. Matise, 388 S.W.2d 479 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1965, writ refd n.r.c.) (suit against seller); Development Inv. Corp. v.
Diversa, Inc., 393 S.W.2d 653 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1965, no writ) (suit against
buyer); Maddox v. Flato, 423 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1967, writ ref d
n.r.e.) (suit against buyer; history repeats itself; securities of same company as in Sibley v.
Coffield, 193 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1946, writ ref'd n.r.e.), two decades ear-
lier); Fry v. Shaw, 508 S.W.2d 142, 146 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ ref d n.r.e.) (suit
against buyer); Thywissen v. FTI Corp., 518 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist
Dist.] 1975, writ refd n.r.e.) (suit against buyer); Remley v. Street, 523 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1975, writ ref d n.r.e.) (suit against seller); Stahl v. Preston, 541 S.W.2d
278 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no writ) (suit against buyer and seller).
See Flournoy v. Gallagher, 189 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1945, no writ)
(unlicensed plaintiff barred by predecessor of § 34 from suing defendant for share of pro-
ceeds of oil and gas leases plaintiff aided defendant in acquiring for resale).
See also Hall v. Hard, 160 Tex. 565, 335 S.W.2d 584, 590-91 (1960) (fact issue whether
sale of properties sued on included securities; if it did, plaintiff is barred).
§ 34 codifies early decisions that an unlicensed dealer is barred from suing for commis-
sions on transactions because he is acting illegally and his contracts with customers are un-
enforceable by him. See, e.g., Kadane v. Clark, 135 Tex. 496, 143 S.W.2d 197 (1940);
Cosner v. Hancock, 149 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1941, writ dism'd judgmt
cor.). For the history and interpretation of § 34 and the criticism which led to its present
form in 1975, see Bromberg, Collectibilift of Commissions on Exempt Transactions in
Securities, 11 BULL. SEC. ON CORP., BANK. & Bus. LAW, STATE BAR OF TExAs, No. 1, Oct.
1973, at 3.
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through an unregistered dealer or salesman, if the buyer wants to keep the
security [instead of rescinding or suing for damages under § 33A(1)], can
refuse, with impunity, to pay the commission. 285 Similarly, a seller to or
through an unregistered dealer or salesman can refuse to pay a commis-
sion.286 Section 34, in effect, gives a person using an unregistered dealer or
salesman a right to withhold commissions, but it says nothing about recov-
ering commissions if they have already been paid. Whether a right of re-
covery would be inferred, in the face of the explicit limits of § 34 and the
specific right of a buyer to rescission or defined damages under § 33A(l), is
an open question, but seems doubtful.
The commission barred by § 34 may include the markup charged by an
unregistered broker or dealer who acquires a security in his own name and
then resells to a buyer.287
§ 34 has an analogue in TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § 20(a) (Vernon Supp.
1978) that bars suits for real estate commissions by persons who are not licensed real estate
brokers or salesman under that act. When the transactions involve oil and gas or other
interests that are real estate as well as securities, both provisions come into play. See, e.g.,
Breeding v. Anderson, 152 Tex. 92, 254 S.W.2d 377 (1953); Hall v. Hard, 160 Tex. 565, 335
S.W.2d 584 (1960); Thywissen v. FTI Corp., 518 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist
Dist.] 1975, writ refd n.r.e.).
285. See Development Inv. Corp. v. Diversa, Inc., 393 S.W.2d 653 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Texarkana 1965, no writ); Maddox v. Flato, 423 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. Civ. App.- Corpus
Christi 1967, writ refd n.r.e.); Thywissen v. FTI Corp., 518 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Stahl v. Preston, 541 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. Civ.
App.- San Antonio 1976, no writ); Fry v. Shaw, 508 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. Civ. App.- Dallas
1974, writ ref d n.r.e.); Remley v. Street, 523 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. Civ. App.- Beaumont 1975,
writ refd n.r.e.).
Note the paradox that a person aiding a buyer is not considered a seller unless he solicits
the buyer (Part. 3.1.4 above) and only a seller is required to register by § 12. But such a
person-if otherwise a dealer or salesman (see note 283 supra)--is deprived of his right to
compensation by § 34 unless he is registered. However, a mere finder may be considered
outside § 34; see Part 3.1.5 above.
286. See Sibley v. Coffield, 193 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1946, writ refd
n.r.e.); Tumblewood Bowling Corp. v. Matise, 388 S.W.2d 479 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1965, writ ref d n.r.e.); Stahl v. Preston, 541 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976,
no writ).
287. Mecom v. Hamblen, 155 Tex. 494, 289 S.W.2d 553, 556-58 (1956) (alternative hold-
ing). Plaintiff took an oil and gas lease in his own name from the landowner for 25¢ an acre,
and instantly assigned it to defendant for 50¢ an acre and an alleged agreement to pay an
additional $1 an acre for acreage retained and selected. The court held that the additional
$1 an acre never became due but, even if it had, it was barred by § 34 as "commission on the
sale of a lease." 289 S.W.2d at 556. This conclusion rested on the prior negotiation of the
resale, simultaneous taking and resale of the lease, and the use of the same practice by
plaintiff in five to seven prior leases of the same property. Justice Culver, for a unanimous
court, wrote:
This was patently just a method of selling a lease and earning a commission.
[Plaintiff] admits that the lessor had told him that he could have for himself all
over and above a certain price. We think the law is not to be circumvented in
such manner. If so, then all that one must do to avoid the penalties of the Act
is to take the security in his own name when he has found a purchaser and
then convey the same, adding to the price the amount of his commission.
Id at 557.
The court emphasizes that this was a riskless transaction for plaintiff, who therefore was
never a true owner. The holding would therefore be inapplicable to someone who assumed
real risk by acquiring ownership with his own funds and retaining it for some reasonable
time.
Cf. Thywissen v. FTI Corp., 518 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975,
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The § 34 sanction, by its own terms, does not operate-and commissions
may be recovered-on sale transactions exempted by § 5288 or on the
purchase or sale of securities exempted by § 6.289 Exemptions outside
TSA may also provide relief from § 34 .289A
5.5.6 Related and Implied Claims. An additional sanction
imposed upon the unregistered dealer who sells a security is that (assuming
no exemption) his violation precludes him from suing for any unpaid
purchase price, both by the express language of § 33K (which will be dis-
cussed in a later installment) and by the common law which preceded it.290
An unregistered person who sells or deals in securities commits a felony
and may receive a $5,000 fine, 10 years in prison, or both, under § 29A.291
While prosecutors are not collection agents for private citizens, a plain-
tiff may find that a complaint to the prosecutors, 292 or even the threat of a
writ refd n.r.e.), in which plaintiff sued-unsuccessfully, in part because of § 34-a buyer
for the difference between the initial price plaintiff quoted defendant and the lower price
that seller had originally quoted plaintiff, i.e., the markup. Plaintiff never bought; rather,
defendant negotiated directly with, and bought from, seller.
288. Hedley v. duPont, 558 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, no
writ) (§ 5Q, 35 or fewer sales of oil-gas interests in 12 months); Dunnam v. Dillingham, 345
S.W.2d 314, 318-19 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1961, no writ) (present § 5H, sale to registered
dealer); Gerscheimer v. American Heritage Bank & Trust Co., 437 F.2d 1332 (10th Cir.
1971) (semble).
One court held that the plaintiff had to be registered even if the transaction was exempt.
Rowland Corp. v. Integrated Sys. Technology, Inc., 488 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1972, writ refd n.r.e.). This was a misreading of the statute. Bromberg, Collectibility of Com-
missions on Exempt Transactions in Securities, 11 BULL. SEC. ON CORP., BANK. & Bus. LAW,
STATE BAR OF TEXAS, No. 1, Oct. 1973, at 3; Lebowitz, Recent Developments in Texas Corpo-
ration Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 823, 864-67 (1974). The section was amended to overrule the case
and restore the original meaning. 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 78, § 3, at 206. Bateman &
Dawson, The 1975 Amendments to the Texas Business Corporation Act and the Texas Securi-
tiesAct, 6 TEX. TECH L. REV. 951, 1010-13 (1975).
Note that some of the § 5 exemptions can be used only by registered dealers, or require
that any person acting for a seller be registered. See note 228 supra.
289. However, § 6 exempts the specified securities when sold or dealt in by registered
dealers or salesmen. Thus an unregistered dealer (or salesman) cannot use the courts to
collect a commission on the sale of a § 6 security. Apparently he can sue for a commission
on the purchase of a § 6 security; otherwise the reference to "purchase" in the last clause of§ 34 would be meaningless.
289A. Note 105 supra.
290. See, e.g., Anderson v. Eliot, 333 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1960, writ
retd), in which the court recognized this principle but found it inapplicable because there
was an exemption.
291. See, e.g., Muse v. State, 137 Tex. Crim. 622, 132 S.W.2d 596 (1939); Atwood v.
State, 135 Tex. Crim. 543, 121 S.W.2d 353 (1938); Aiken v. State, 137 Tex. Crim. 211, 128
S.W.2d 1190 (1939); Springfield v. State, 172 Tex. Crim. 341, 356 S.W.2d 940 (1962); Sharp
v. State, 392 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965); Wilson v. State, 386 S.W.2d 282 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1965); Dean v. State, 433 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968); Shappley v. State,
520 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
Only natural persons may be convicted. See note 156 supra and accompanying text.
If the transaction is exempt by § 5, registration is not required by § 12, and there is no
violation of § 29A. See Dean v. State, 433 S.W.2d at 177-79.
292. TSA § 3 envisions prosecution by district and county attorneys on advice from the
Securities Commissioner, and by the Attorney General if the local officials do not respond.
Nothing here prevents a citizen from complaining directly to the local district or county
attorney. However, a complaint to the Securities Commissioner may add force, or invoke
other sanctions, such as an injunction suit under § 32.
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complaint, hastens a favorable settlement of his claim for damages or re-
scission. However, an attorney may not participate in such a threat if it is
solely to gain a civil advantage. 293
The possibility of an implied civil action based on the criminal provision
has already been discussed for sellers in Part 2.2 above and, more gener-
ally-under the parallel criminal provision for selling unregistered securi-
ties-in Part 5.1.5 above.
Despite a lack of decisional authority, it should be clear that the partici-
pation of an unregistered dealer or salesman in a transaction does not de-
stroy a § 5 exemption for a transaction if the exemption would otherwise
be available. 294
293. State Bar of Texas Rule DR 7-105, IA TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. 353 (Vernon
1973). "A lawyer shall not present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present criminal
charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter." See In re Thompson, 416 F. Supp.
991 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
294. Dealer and Salesman Coverage by § 5. The supreme court has interpreted § 5A
("judicial, executor's, administrator's, guardian's or conservator's sale, or any sale by a re-
ceiver or trustee in insolvency or bankruptcy") as applicable only to the executor, adminis-
trator, etc. and not to an unregistered person acting for him in the sale. The unregistered
person was barred by § 34 from suing for compensation in the transaction. Breeding v.
Anderson, 154 Tex. 92, 254 S.W.2d 377, 379 (1953): "Subsection (a) ... excludes sales made
by executors, administrators, etc., but it does not exempt dealers or salesmen who make sales
or offer securities for any of those named exempt persons." No rationale beyond this literal
reading of the statute is given. How far it extends to other parts of § 5 has not been decided.
Dealers are rarely mentioned in § 5 except when they are required to be registered, explic-
itly (as in §§ 5.0, 5S) or implicitly (as in §§ 5C(l) ("any person acting as agent for said
vendor shall be registered"), SQ ("if such sale or sales are made by an agent for such owner
such agent shall be licensed")). Only § 5P (unsolicited purchase order handled as agent
for the buyer) speaks of a dealer without a registration requirement. The reference to an
unsolicited order obviously contemplates someone in the securities business and therefore
required to be registered. This legislative intent may be clear enough to interpolate the word
"registered" and limit § 5P to registered dealers. See note 102, para. (B)(3) supra.
Salesmen are not mentioned at all in § 5 except in § SN, which makes the exemption
inapplicable to salesmen (or agents) of farmers' cooperatives if they sell to nonmembers or
receive commissions. The effect is to require them to be registered in these two instances.
The structure of § 5N makes it clearer than in §§ 5C(1) or SQ that an unregistered agent
does not destroy the exemption for his principal (the owner or issuer of the security). See
notes 295-97 infra and accompanying text. Nor are agents-which are the same as salesmen
in the context of the person registration requirements, see Part 5.6.3 below-mentioned ex-
cept in the sections just cited.
There are at least three good arguments against reading unregistered dealers (or salesmen)
out of the exemptions that do not mention them, as Breeding read them out of § 5A. First,
Breeding's narrow interpretation is not very consistent with the emphatic and sweeping pre-
amble to § 5, quoted in note 102 supra. This broad language was not even considered in
Breeding, and may not have been called to the court's attention. Second, the 1957 Legisla-
ture codified the parallel holding of Breeding that a person acting as an agent for the seller in
a personal investment resale under § 5C(l) must be registered. 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch.
269, § 5C(l), at 579. It imposed the same requirement in the similar exemption for sales of
oil and gas interests. Id § SQ. But it did not make similar changes elsewhere in § 5, e.g., in
§§ 5A, 5B, 5F, 5G, 5H, 51, thus encouraging an inference that it rejected Breeding except for
§§ 5C(l) and SQ transactions (and for § 5N, the farmer's cooperative exemption discussed
above, which had required licensing of salesmen and agents in certain transactions since its
origin in 1935 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 99, § 3(q), at 261). Third, the 1975 Legislature clarified
that a person need not be registered to collect a commission on a § 5 transaction (unless
otherwise specifically required by § 5). 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 78, § 3, at 206. (The occa-
sion for this amendment is described in note 288 infra and the sources cited there). The
Legislature would hardly have emphasized in § 34 that unregistered persons could collect
19781
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Closely related, and equally lacking in authority, is whether the pres-
ence of an unregistered person aiding a seller in a § 5C(1) or § 5Q transac-
tion (both of which require agents for sellers to be registered) destroys the
exemption for the seller. The answer should be no, for several reasons.
First, the history of the requirement shows that it was intended to keep
unregistered persons from claiming commissions under the shelter of the
seller's exemption,295 not to constrict the exemption for the seller. Second,
the requirement is, by its syntax, a proviso at the end of each exemption,
rather than a condition written into the exemption.296 Third, it would be
unreasonable to impose on an individual investor (the seller) the burden of
another person's compliance with an industry registration requirement ap-
plicable only to the other person. So perverse a result should be rejected
unless required by unmistakable legislative language. On the other hand,
it seems clear that the unregistered person aiding the seller in a § 5C(1) or
§ 5Q transaction does not have the benefit of the exemption, and is there-
fore in violation of § 12 and liable under § 33A(1), 297 even though the
seller is not.
A person's lack of a dealer's (or salesman's) registration generally does
not excuse him from performing his contracts. 298
Federal law requires dealers to register, 299 but does not specify any civil
liability for failure to do so. However, such liability has been implied.300
Uniform Act § 201 requires broker-dealer and agent (salesman) registra-
tion, and § 410(a)(1) creates civil liability for violation.
5.6 Unregistered Salesman or Agent-§ 12.
5.6.1 § 33A4(1) CivilLiability. The purposes of salesman and
agent registration are essentially the same as those of dealer registration,
discussed in Part 5.5.1 above. Registration of salesmen and agents is re-
quired by the same § 12 that compels dealers to register. So the civil liabil-
ity of an unregistered salesman or agent is virtually the same as that of an
unregistered dealer. Thus the analysis of the latter in Part 5.5.1 is applica-
ble and need not be repeated. But there are some refinements and special
problems which are considered below.
commissions on § 5 transactions while intending that they be liable for the full amount of
the purchase price in a § 33A(l) suit.
295. See note 294 supra.
296. § 5C(l) is quoted in full in note 102, para. (B)(1) supra. § 5Q has an even more
extraneous provision tagged on the end (unitization or pooling agreement not deemed a
sale). However, the legislative intent is less clear in the syntax of §§ 5C(1) and 5Q than it is
in § 5N, note 294 supra.
297. This assumes that he is a dealer or person required to register by § 12. See Part
5.5.2 above.
298. MacKenzie v. Newton, 341 S.W.2d 498, 501 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1960,
writ refd n.r.e.) (defendant, sued for interest in royalty he acquired for partnership of him-
self and plaintiff, is "estopped to take advantage of his own failure to secure a dealer's
license if such was necessary"; he had represented to plaintiff that he did not need one).
299. 1934 Act § 15(a)(l). There is no federal requirement that salesmen register.
300. Eastside Church of Christ v. National Plan, Inc., 391 F.2d 357 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 913 (1968).
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Since a dealer sells through his salesman or agent, 30' and they are virtu-
ally his slaves in the contemplation of TSA, 30 2 the dealer--even though he
is registered-is liable by § 33A(1) for a sale made by his unregistered
salesman or agent.30 3
5.6.2 Significance of Salesman or Agent. Although § 12 cov-
ers dealers, salesmen, and agents, it phrases the registration requirement
much more clearly for the latter: "No salesman or agent shall . . . sell,
offer. . . unless registered as a salesman or agent." This contrasts with the
"person, firm, corporation or dealer" language employed for the dealer
registration requirement and discussed in Part 5.5.2 above. Thus, there
can be no doubt that a person must be a "salesman or agent" before being
subject to § 12 registration as such, and a plaintiff must prove him to be
such.
5.6.3 Meaning of Salesman or Agent. "Salesman" is carefully
defined by § 4D to include: "every person or company employed or ap-
pointed or authorized by a dealer to sell, offer . . . or deal in any other
manner, in securities within this state, whether by direct act or through
subagents. '' 3°4 "Agent," on the other hand, is utterly undefined.30 5 We
might cast about for definitions from other areas. But it seems tolerably
clear from the language just quoted and from the side-by-side use of
"salesman" and "agent" through most of TSA, 30 6 that the words mean the
same thing and are just one more example of the legislative predilection
301. §§ 4C, 4D, and 12 all recognize this reality.
302. See Part 5.6.4 below.
303. Semble § 14D: a dealer's registration may be revoked for using an unregistered
salesman.
The dealer's civil liability for an unregistered salesman can usually be reached by an
alternate route, § 33F(1).
304. Officers or Partners of Dealer. § 4D adds "provided, that the officers of a corpora-
tion or partners of a partnership shall not be deemed salesmen, where such corporation or
partnership is registered as a dealer hereunder." Officers and partners would seem to be
covered by the dealer's registration so there is no need for them to be registered again as
salesmen. See §§ 15, 17 (dealer registration certificate states the names of "principals, of-
ficers, directors or managing agents," and is to be changed when they change). In practice, a
distinction is drawn between (A) those officers and partners who are to be actively engaged
in business in Texas-who must supply additional information, take one or more examina-
tions and who are covered by the dealer registration, and (B) other officers and partners who
are not to be actively engaged in business in Texas--who supply less information, do not
take examinations and are not covered by the dealer registration. See Tex. State Sec. Board
Rules, Appendix Items VIII.B (questions 6-8), VIII.B.I (Forms LD3-A and LD-E-I). At
least one officer must be registered by a corporate dealer registration. Tex. State Sec. Board
Rule VII.A.4, Tex. Reg. No. 065.08.00.001 para. 4, reprinted in 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH)
46,608 para. A.4 (1977). Presumably the same applies to partners of a partnership dealer.
And presumably an officer or partner who is not registered by the dealer registration is--if
he sells in Texas-a salesman or agent who must be registered in that capacity to avoid
§ 33A (1) liability for himself and the firm.
305. Cf Stone v. Enstam, 541 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ), dis-
cussed in note 273 supra, where Dean was held not to be an agent, without an attempt to
define the term.
306. E.g., §§ 7A(l), 12, 13 (caption), 14, 18, 22B(l), 23B, 25, 29A. See § 4C, which de-
fines dealer to include one who sells "directly or through an agent," without mentioning
"salesmen" but using "agent" in precisely the same way that § 12 (requiring dealer registra-
tion) uses "directly or through agents or salesmen." "Agent" is used without "salesman" in
1978]
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for redundancy. 30 7 It follows that a salesman or agent must be connected
to a dealer in one of the ways described in § 4D.30 8 Moreover, he must be
selling or offering 309 securities himself or through subagents.
As a matter of policy, clerical personnel-who typically are not regis-
tered-should not be treated as salesmen or agents even though they have
incidental connection with sales: e.g., a salesman's secretary who mails a
prospectus to a customer at the salesman's direction, or receives and
records a customer's order after the salesman has made an offer; an order
clerk; a delivery clerk; etc. Despite statutory definitions of "salesman" and
"sell" that might be stretched to cover clerical personnel, such persons per-
form no significant selling tasks, and their registration would add nothing
to investor protection. Their supervision by registered salesmen and deal-
ers provides all that the regulatory system contemplates.
5.6.4 Meaning of Unregistered-The Moonlighting
Salesman. Salesman registration, like dealer registration, may be limited
to certain kinds of securities listed in Part 5.5.4 above. The consequence is
that a salesman selling outside his restricted area is unregistered.
A salesman registered in another state, or with a self-regulatory organi-
zation like the New York Stock Exchange or the National Association of
Securities Dealers, is not registered in Texas for purposes of §§ 12 and
33A(1). 310
A murkier question arises from the differences between salesman and
dealer registration. One effect of these differences is to make the salesman
something of an indentured servant to the dealer for whom he works.
31
'
Moreover, the definition quoted in Part 5.6.3 above suggests that he is a
salesman when-and only when-acting with authority from his dealer.
312
§§ 5C(l) and 5Q but in a different context (the principal is not a dealer). § 14D uses "sales-
man" without "agent."
307. See, e.g., note 250 supra. The Board has apparently reached the same conclusion.
Its rule refers only to dealers and salesman, and says nothing about agents. Tex. State Sec.
Board Rule VIII, Tex. Reg. No. 065.08.00.001-.005, reprinted in 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH)
46,608 (1977).
308. A person not so connected may be a dealer in his own right, and liable as such if
unregistered. See Part 5.1 above.
309. Or dealing, which we think is limited to selling. See note 30 supra and accompany-
ing text.
310. See note 240 supra.
311. By § 12 he must be "registered as a salesman or agent of a registered dealer." The
dealer applies for the salesman's registration; the certificate is issued to (and retained by) the
dealer, and states that the salesman is registered as agent for the dealer, § 18. The sales-
man's registration is cancelled on the dealer's application. Id A salesman moving from one
dealer to another may transfer his registration to the second dealer with the latter's approval;
otherwise, a salesman who leaves a dealer will have his registration surrendered by the latter
for cancellation. Tex. State Sec. Board Rules VIII.D.3 & .4, Tex. Reg. No. 065.08.00.004
paras. 3 and 4, reprinted in 3 BLUE SKY L. REP.(CCH) $ 46,608 paras. D.3 and 4 (1977). The
Application for License as a Securities Salesman contains an Agreement by Employer (1'e.,
the dealer) that he will notify the Commissioner of violations by the salesman and will be
responsible for all his securities transactions. Tex. State Sec. Board Rules, Appendix Item
VIII.C, at 4.
312. One of the questions on the Application for License as a Securities Salesman is: "Do
you understand that you are to sell only those securities authorized by your employing
dealer?" Tex. State Sec. Board Rules, Appendix Item VIII.C, para. 13.
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His registration may be coextensive with such authority. If so, he is unre-
gistered-and therefore potentially liable under § 33A(l)-when he
moonlights, i e., sells securities his employing dealer has not authorized
him to handle, typically of a private company in which he is interested.
Usually the transaction is not executed through the dealer's facilities and
does not appear on its records or customer statements; if compensation is
paid, it is to the salesman individually.3 13 Thus, he may not be sheltered
by his salesman registration if the transaction in question or other transac-
tions (e.g., prior moonlighting) make him a dealer.3 14 In this event he is
liable under § 33A(1) unless he can show an appropriate § 5 exemption,
e.g., § 5I (for small offerings). This may have happened to Brown in
Brown v. Cole,3 14A since he was held liable-under the 1941-1963
voidability provision (Appendix 3 below)-although he was a registered
salesman. While the decision seems to avoid the "dealer" issue and to be
based on "seller" and unregistered security questions,31 5 it shows that the
danger for the moonlighter is more than theoretical, and indicates that the
courts may be thinking that a registered salesman is as much an unregis-
tered dealer as any other person.
There are policy arguments against unregistered dealer liability for the
moonlighting salesman. The primary purposes of regulation and investor
protection have been fulfilled when a person is registered as a salesman.
He has filed considerable information about himself with the Commis-
sioner, has passed tests on securities and on securities law, has made him-
self known to the regulatory authorities, and is aware that his registration
is good only for the current year, after which it must be renewed 31 6 and
during which it may be revoked (under § 14) for violation of TSA. But
there are policy factors pointing in the opposite direction, suggesting that a
salesman's license should not bar liability for dealer activity. These in-
313. For some examples of moonlighting in other contexts, see Lewis v. Walston & Co.,
487 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1973) (moonlighting saleswoman and employer liable by SA § 12(1)
(similar to TSA § 33A(1)) for sale of unregistered securities; saleswoman was "seller" by
touting the securities, by arranging a meeting between the buyers and officers of the issuer at
which the first purchase took place, and notifying the buyers before each of their later
purchases that additional stock was available; the test is whether the party is the "proximate
cause" of the sale; employer liable because saleswoman was within the scope of employment
although she was not authorized to sell these securities, the sales were not executed through
the employer's facilities or recorded on its books, and the employer received no commission
on them); Jackson v. Bache & Co., 381 F. Supp. 71 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (moonlighting salesman
breached no duty to plaintiffs (some of whom were his customers) in supplying them some
information about a company in which they invested; he received 10% finder's fees; the
transactions did not appear on the employer's books; employer not liable).
As held in Lewis v. Walston & Co., 487 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1973), a salesman may have
apparent authority even when lacking actual authority. See also note 321 infra.
314. The definition of dealer is discussed in Part 5.5.3 above. Since "dealer" and "sales-
man" are mutually exclusive categories in §§ 4C, 4D, 12, and 29A, it is arguable that "sales-
man" activity does not make one a "dealer."
314A. 155 Tex. 624, 291 S.W.2d 704 (1956).
315. See discussion in text accompanying notes 38-39 supra.
316. See §§ 13D, 18, 19. The form of Application for License as a Securities Salesman is
reproduced in Texas State Securities Board, Rules Adopted by the State Securities Board,
Appendix Item VIII.C (looseleaf, orig. pub. 1976).
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clude somewhat more extensive disclosure required of a dealer, 317 detailed
record keeping requirements for dealers,318 and the indentured servant
quality of the salesman-dealer relation which presupposes that the dealer
will supervise and be financially responsible for the salesman's acts. The
latter appear to be the weightier arguments, so-insofar as policy is rele-
vant-a registered salesman, when moonlighting as a dealer, has the same
liability as anyone else for not possessing a dealer's registration.
However, there may not be any such thing as a moonlighting salesman
under Texas law. In the Agreement by Employer 319 signed by a dealer as
part of a salesman's registration application, the dealer agrees to be "re-
sponsible for all securities transactions performed by the applicant sales-
man," and agrees to "properly administer the duties and functions of the
applicant." If valid, 320 this language implies that a salesman is always
"employed or appointed or authorized" by the dealer within § 4D and is
therefore always a salesman-hence not a dealer-and is sufficiently regis-
tered as a salesman under § 12, even though the transaction in question
was a personal one not reflected on the dealer's records.
321
5.6.5 § 34 Commission Ban. The commission or compensa-
tion ban of § 34 seems to operate in the same way for salesmen as for
dealers, so the discussion in Part 5.5.5 above is valid for salesmen too.
5.6.6 Related and Implied Claims. See Part 5.5.6 above,
which applies to salesmen as well as dealers.
5.7 Stop-Advertlising Order Violations- § 23B.
5.7.1 § 33A4(1) Civil Liability. The Commissioner has au-
thority to order a stop of misleading advertising under § 23B:
No dealer, agent or salesman shall publish within this state or use in
connection with any sale or offer of sale any circular, advertisement,
317. The form of Application for License as an Individual General Securities Dealer or
Investment Adviser is reproduced in Texas State Securities Board, Rules Adopted by the
State Securities Board, 317, Appendix Item VIII.A (looseleaf, orig. pub. 1976), and includes
a detailed financial statement, a "statement of plan of business" and other information
which is not required in the salesman's form.
318. See note 225 supra.
319. Note 311 supra.
320. One can certainly question whether the Commissioner's authority in § 18 to pre-
scribe the "form" of the application extends to substantive agreements about responsibility
and supervision.
321. Another aspect of the Agreement by Employer is that it may be a third party benefi-
ciary contract that bars a dealer from claiming-e.g., in a suit by a salesman's moonlight
customer-that the salesman was acting outside the scope of his authority.
Apparent Authority. In any event, a securities salesman has extensive apparent authority
to sell securities. Christie v. Brewer, 374 S.W.2d 908, 913 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1964, writ
ref'd n.r.e.): "The evidence is conclusive, in our opinion, that Allen possessed apparent...
authority to solicit [plaintiffl for the purchase of stock. He was an employed salesman of
[the dealer firm]. A salesman without authority to solicit is of a very peculiar breed." Ac-
cordingly the trial court properly (1) rejected evidence that the dealer had instructed Allen
not to solicit sales of the stock plaintiff bought and (2) refused a jury issue on whether
Allen's sale to plaintiff was within the scope of employment. Evidence of offers and sales of
the same securities to other persons is admissible on the question of authority. Id at 917.
See also Lewis v. Walston & Co., 487 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1973), note 313 supra.
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prospectus, program or other matter in the nature thereof, after notice
in writing has been given him by the commissioner that, in the com-
missioner's opinion, the same contains any statement that is false or
misleading or otherwise likely to deceive a reader thereof.
A § 23B stop-advertising order, commonly titled a "Cease Publication No-
tice," 322 need not be preceded by notice or an opportunity for hearing. But
the order is not binding on a person until the Commissioner gives him
notice, typically by sending him a copy of the order.323 Appeals may be
made to the Commissioner under § 24 for a hearing, and then to the
Travis County district court (for trial de novo) under § 27.324 The stop-
advertising order is rarely issued,325 is (in my opinion) available only
against sale advertising,326 and is typically directed against out-of-state
persons advertising in Texas by mail or in local periodicals. The purpose
322. For an example, see Gary R. Paro, Tex. State Sec. Board Order No. CP-556 (July 6,
1977) (advertisement seeking investments in an advertising campaign, with "guaranteed"
returns ranging from $150 in 36 days on a $100 investment to $20,000 in 90 days on a
$10,000 investment). The order contains typical findings: the advertiser is not a registered
dealer in Texas, the securities are not registered in Texas, the advertisement is an offer of
securities, the advertisement has not been filed with the Commissioner in compliance with
§ 22, and the advertisement is misleading and likely to deceive. Only the last finding is
necessary for a § 23B order. The others relate to matters that might become the basis for a
§ 23A order, or lead to prosecution under §§ 29A (unregistered dealer), 29B (unregistered
security) or 29G (§ 22 advertising violation).
§ 23B does not explicitly empower the Commissioner to issue an order, only a notice. The
paper issued by the Commissioner, like the example just cited, is in form both an order and
a notice. Whatever distinction there may be in administrative law between an order and a
notice, there seems to be no practical difference so far as § 33A(l) liability for violation of
§ 23B is concerned.
A § 23B order is permanent unless later modified or revoked by the Commissioner. See
note 347 infra and accompanying text on the corresponding procedure for a § 23A order.
323. It may be that summary publication of the order in the State Securities Board
Monthly Bulletin will be notice to those who receive the Bulletin (typically all dealers regis-
tered in Texas). But the point is largely academic since, as noted in the text, stop-advertising
orders are used mostly against non-Texans not registered in the state.
324. See also the appeal procedure in the Administrative Procedure and Texas Register
Act, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a, § 19 (Vernon Supp. 1978), which may be
applicable.
325.
Fiscal Year Ending Aug. 31
Statistics on certain
enforcement orders: 1977 1976 1975 1974
Cease publication (§ 23B
stop-advertising) 1 2 3 6
Cease and desist (§ 23A
stop-sale) - - 6 2
Revocation of § 5.0 exemption 1 2 7 4
Source: Tex. State Sec. Board, Annual Report to the Governor 19 (1977); id at 19 (1975).
Id. at 17 (1977) explains the post-1975 disappearance of the § 23A stop-sale order. The
reason is that the Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 6252-13a, § 19(b)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1978), which took effect Jan. 1, 1976, makes
such an order considerably less durable by automatically vacating the order when judicial
review is requested under TSA § 27. Consequently, the Board's enforcement thrust shifted
from § 23A orders to § 32 injunctions.
326. See note 28 supra.
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of the stop-advertising order is obviously to halt the circulation of mislead-
ing offers before investors respond to them.
A stop-advertising order may not be issued if the security or transaction
is exempt.327
If a dealer is advertising securities issued by someone else, the order
may be directed to both the dealer and the issuer. If the advertising is
subsequently used, liability falls on either or both of them who can be
considered sellers.328 While § 33A(l) has apparently not been invoked for
§ 23B violations, its thrust is relatively plain. It imposes liability on a per-
son who sells 329 in violation of § 23B, i e., by using an ad that the Commis-
sioner has notified him is misleading.
The elements of a plaintiffs case are that he bought 330 and the defend-
ant sold3 3 ' to the plaintiff332 a security3 33 by publishing in Texas 334 or
using in connection with the sale335 a circular, advertisement, prospectus,
program, or other matter after notice in writing was given to the defendant
by the Commissioner stating that, in the Commissioner's opinion, the same
contained a statement that was false, misleading, or otherwise likely to
deceive a reader thereof.3
36
It seems clear that a plaintiff must prove he received or saw the adver-
tisement. But it is probably not essential that the defendant directed the
advertisement to the plaintiff if the defendant in some other way "used" it
"in connection with" the sale, e.g., by selling to the plaintiff after the plain-
tiff replied to the ad. Apart from this, it appears that the plaintiff need not
prove reliance on the ad, or that his purchase was caused by the ad.
Clearly the plaintiff does not have to prove that the ad was misleading,
only that the Commissioner notified the defendant that the Commissioner
thought it was. Nor does the plaintiff have to prove any scienter or other
state of mind of the defendant.
Anyone circulating an ad after a § 23B notice from the Commissioner
would probably revise the ad, if only to have a basis for claiming it was not
327. This is another of the horrible examples of the lack of coordination among the parts
of TSA. §§ 5 and 6 exempt "[e]xcept as hereinafter in this Act expressly provided." Other
provisions expressly override the exemptions, e.g., § 23A stop-sale orders, § 29C criminal
prosecutions for fraud, § 32 injunctions for fraud, and §§ 33A(2) and 33B civil liability for
fraud. But not § 23B stop-advertising orders. § 22E does not fill the gap; it only confirms
that the exemptions override § 22 unless the advertising violates § 23. But, as we have just
seen, exempt advertising is beyond the reach of § 23B, although within § 23A. Exempt se-
curities or transactions are dealt with administratively by the § 23A stop-sale order or the
§ 5.0 suspension (see Parts 5.8.1 and 5.8.2 below).
328. See Part 3 above.
329. An offer, e.g., by prohibited advertising, that does not lead to a sale is not actiona-
ble. See Part 5.1.2 above.
330. See Part 2.1 above.
331. See note 108 supra and cross reference there.
332. See note 109 supra.
333. See Part 4.2 above.
334. § 23B so specifies as to publication violation but not as to use violation. Presumably
the general territorial principles of note 108 supra apply to both.
335. See note 334 supra.
336. On proof of notice, see note 111 supra.
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the same one to which the notice pertained. Whether the ad is the same
one should be tested by something like "substantial similarity. '337 The
plaintiff apparently has the burden of proof on this point.
5.7.2 Related and Implied Claims. Federal law contains no
corresponding stop-advertising procedure and no corresponding civil lia-
bility. The closest thing in the Uniform Act is § 403, which authorizes the
Administrator to require the filing of advertising, and § 410(a)(1), which
creates civil liability for violation of § 403.
If the offending ad is in fact misleading, a buyer has fraud claims under
§ 33A(2) and related provisions.
Texas has a criminal provision, § 29G, for the publishing of any adver-
tising that does not comply with § 22. Most advertising subjected to a
§ 23B order will not comply with § 22, e.g., because the security or dealer
has not been registered. So § 29G will partially overlap § 23B. But it
seems unlikely that any implied civil liabilities will arise from § 29G.338
5.8 Stop-Sale Order Violations-§ 23A.
5.8.1 § 33A4(1) Civil Liability. The Commissioner has au-
thority in § 23A to stop the sale of any security for unfairness, fraud, or
noncompliance with TSA:
If it appears to the Commissioner at any time that the sale or pro-
posed sale or method of sale of any securities, whether exempt or not,
would not be in compliance with this Act or would tend to work a
fraud on any purchaser thereof or would not be fair, just or equitable
to any purchaser thereof, the Commissioner may, after notice to the
issuer, the registrant and the person on whose behalf such securities
are being or are to be offered, by personal service or the sending of a
confirmed telegraphic notice, and after opportunity for a hearing (at a
time fixed by the Commissioner) within 15 days after such notice by
personal service or the sending of such telegraphic notice, if the Com-
missioner shall determine at such hearing that such sale would not be
in compliance with the Act or would tend to work a fraud on any
purchaser thereof or would not be fair, just or equitable to any pur-
chaser thereof, issue a written cease and desist order, prohibiting or
suspending the sale of such securities or denying or revoking the regis-
tration of such securities. No dealer, agent or salesman shall thereaf-
ter knowingly sell or offer for sale any security named in such cease
and desist order.
A § 23A stop-order, commonly designated a "Cease and Desist Order, '339
337. This is the test the Commissioner suggests when his order, note 322 supra, gives
notice to cease publication of the specified advertisement "and any other advertising materi-
als substantially similar thereto." The test should logically focus on those parts of the adver-
tisement cited or quoted in the notice as misleading.
338. See notes 135-36 supra and accompanying text.
339. For an example, see Sale of Securities of Bethel Baptist Church of Midland, Texas,
Tex. State Sec. Board Order No. CD-604 (Jan. 11, 1978), finding that the church's bonds are
publicly held and in default as to interest and principal, the indenture is not being followed
as to sinking fund payments, the books do not show the precise amount of bonds, bond sale
proceeds have been used to retire maturing bonds, the bank paying agent for interest has
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requires notice and opportunity for hearing. There is some doubt about
just who is covered by a § 23A order. The first sentence suggests that it is
persons who receive notice of the hearing on the proposed order, although
it could also be read to include the whole world.340 The second sentence
seems to narrow the scope to dealers, agents, or salesmen 341 who know-
ingly sell. Section 33A(l) creates liability for violation of a § 23A "order,"
not for violation of § 23A itself. Thus, the first sentence of § 23A (which
authorizes the order) is the basis for § 33A(1) liability, not the second sen-
tence (which adds a prohibition). It follows that the persons potentially
liable by § 33A(l) for violation of a § 23A order are all those validly cov-
ered by the order, whether they are the ones who receive the advance no-
tice or those referred to in the order. Even if this reading is correct,
§ 33A(l) liability should be limited to persons who "knowingly" violate,
both because the Legislature probably so intended, although it may have
put the word in the wrong sentence, and because of due process considera-
tions. 342 "Knowingly" presumably refers to knowledge of the order.343
By § 24, a § 23A order may be appealed to the Commissioner- essen-
tially a rehearing in this context-by any person who "take[s] exception"
to the order. Then an appeal lies to the Travis County district court under§ 27 for a trial de novo.344
The stop-sale order is not very frequently used, 345 and a high proportion
of its use seems to be against securities sales of nonprofit organizations.
The obvious purpose of the stop-sale order is to halt sales the Commis-
sioner believes to be inequitable, fraudulent, or otherwise not in compli-
ance with TSA. It complements and expands his power in §§ 7C(2) and
resigned, the church revenues are insufficient to service the bonds and keep the church oper-
ational, and the church is not making significant payments toward bond retirement, and
concluding that "it would be inequitable for the issuer, any dealer or salesman or any other
person, including existing bond holders, to sell bonds issued by" the church. The formal
order is that "all sales of bonds of [the church] by the issuer and its officers, directors, pas-
tors, employees and agents and by dealers, salesmen and other persons, including existing
bond holders, CEASE AND DESIST" until default is cured, sinking funds are receiving
regular payments that will reasonably insure payment of bond interest and principal, and
the order has been lifted or modified. On lifting or modifying, see note 347 infra and accom-
panying text.
340. See note 339 supra for an order purporting to bind the issuer, its agents, dealers, and
other persons including existing holders.
341. Two of these are defined terms. See Parts 5.5.3 and 5.6.3 above.
342. The other provisions for administrative stop orders all specify that they are inappli-
cable to a person until he has received actual notice: § 51 (last sentence), § 5.0 (penultimate
para., last sentence), § 23A (quoted in Part 5.7.1 above). To eliminate possible doubts,
§ 33A(l) should be conformed by making it refer to a violation of § 23A rather than to a
violation of a § 23A order. Or § 23A could be clarified.
343. The order is communicated in summary form in the State Securities Board Monthly
Bulletin to all registered dealers, which probably gives them sufficient knowledge. And the
order is normally sent directly to the persons who were given notice of the hearing. More-
over, it may be publicized through press release, mailing to lists of security holders of the
security, or otherwise.
344. See also the appeal procedure in the Administrative Procedure and Texas Register
Act, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANNm. art. 6252-13a, § 19 (Vernon Supp. 1978), which may be
applicable.
345. See note 325 supra.
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10A to deny registration when he finds unfairness or fraud. A stop-sale
order may be issued whether or not the security or transaction is ex-
empt,346 whether or not the security has been registered, and whether or
not the seller is registered as a dealer or salesman. If the security is regis-
tered, the order may revoke the registration. In any case, the order may
temporarily suspend or entirely prohibit sales. Most orders are permanent
in form, although they may be modified or vacated by the Commission on
application of an interested party under § 24, if the circumstances leading
to the order have been corrected. 34 7
While § 33A(l) has apparently not been invoked for § 23A violations,
its thrust is reasonably plain. Section 33A(1) imposes liability on a person
who sells 348 in violation of § 23A, tie., by selling a security named in a
§ 23A order.
The elements of a plaintiffs case are that he bought349 and the defend-
ant knowingly35° sold35 1 to the plaintiIP 52 a security 35 3 named in a § 23A
stop-sale (or cease-desist) order. The principal defenses would appear to
be that the defendant did not know of the order, or that the order was not
valid, at least to him.
5.8.2 Related and Implied Claims. The SEC has power sum-
marily to suspend trading in a security for 10 days if "in its opinion the
public interest and the protection of investors so require. ' '354 There is no
express civil liability for violation, but one could easily be implied. The
SEC also has power, after notice and opportunity for hearing, to issue a
346. This was not always so. In 1935 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 99, §§ 23 and 3 (preamble), at
272 and 259, the stop-sale procedure was inapplicable to exempt transactions and its appli-
cability to exempt securities was obscure. In 1955 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 67, §§ 24, 3 (pream-
ble), and 4 (preamble), at 339, 324, and 327, the stop-sale procedure was inapplicable to
exempt transactions and to exempt securities. In 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 269, § 23A, at
595, the stop-sale procedure became applicable to exempt transactions and to exempt securi-
ties except to government and municipal securities exempt by § 6A. The present all-inclu-
sive form was reached only in 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 97, § 1, at 216 (amending § 23A).
347. For an example, see Sale of Securities of Power Oil Co., Tex. State Sec. Board
Order No. V-557 (Aug. 3, 1977), vacating id. No. CD-319 (Nov. 7, 1967) and No. 5.0-309
(July 31, 1967), after change in management, shareholders, auditors, and assets, and after
becoming a reporting company under the 1934 Act. For a more restricted example, see
Securities of Am. Guar. Life Ins. Co., Tex. State Sec. Board Order No. M-CD-558 (Sept. 15,
1977), modifying id No. CD-428 (Mar. 27, 1970), to permit two named holders to sell 9.5
shares at $5 each to the chief operating officer of the company so he can qualify as a director.
The 1970 order was later vacated, id No. V-612 (May 12, 1978), noting that the vacation
does not relieve the company from complying with the registration requirement in future
sales, or finding an applicable exemption.
348. An offer that does not lead to a sale is not actionable. See Part 5.1.2 above.
349. See Part 2.1 above.
350. See the discussion of knowingly, and whether it is an element of plaintiffs case,
earlier in this Part 5.8.1. On the evidence of notice of the order-which relates to "know-
ingly"-available from the Commissioner's records, see note 111 supra.
351. See note 108 supra and cross references there.
352. See note 109 supra.
353. See Part 4.2 above.
354. 1934 Act § 12(k) which in 1975 combined former §§ 15(c)(5) and 19(a)(4). The
SEC's longstanding practice of renewing suspensions for additional 10-day periods was held
invalid in SEC v. Sloan, 98 S. Ct. 1702, 56 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1978).
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stop order suspending the registration statement for a security, after which
a sale would be a violation leading to automatic civil liability.355 The lat-
ter provisions have approximate analogues in the Uniform Act: §§ 306,
301, and 410(a)(1).
Other provisions within TSA are comparable in some ways to § 23A.
Section 23B stop-advertising orders have already been considered in Part
5.7.1 above. The § 51(c) exemption (15 sales a year by issuers)356 may be
summarily suspended by the Commissioner if he has reasonable grounds
to believe the sale would be fraudulent. A sale by the issuer after notice of
the Commissioner's action would-unless some other exemption was
available-violate § 7 and be actionable under § 33A(l). More potently,
the § 5.0 exemption (which permits secondary trading by dealers in a se-
curity)357 may be summarily revoked or suspended by the Commissioner if
he has reasonable cause to believe the sale of the security would be fraudu-
lent. If the § 5.0 exemption is revoked or suspended, dealers may not
trade the security unless some other exemption (like § 5P, for unsolicited
purchase orders, or § 6F, for securities listed on certain stock exchanges) is
applicable.3 58
The § 5.0 revocation or suspension is favored by the Commissioner
over a § 23A stop-sale order, and is more frequently used 359 because the
former is a summary proceeding and does not require any hearing or ad-
vance notice. 360 This enables the Commissioner to act quickly when a
company files for bankruptcy or undergoes some other significant change
that may not be known to the investing public. 36 1 However, the revocation
or suspension is not applicable to a particular dealer "until he has received
actual notice from the Commissioner" of the revocation or suspension. 362
A revocation or suspension is permanent unless it states otherwise. But it
355. 1933 Act §§ 8(d), 5(c), 12(1).
356. See note 102, para. A(l) supra.
357. See id para. (B)(2).
358. Salesmen are undoubtedly affected in the same way as the dealers for whom they
work. Nondealers (who may not use § 5.0 anyway) are not legally affected, and may con-
tinue to use whatever exemptions, such as § 5C(l), are available to them. But nondealers
are practically affected in that their ability to sell to dealers is virtually destroyed since no
dealer is likely to buy a security he cannot resell.
359. See note 325 supra.
360. § 5.0, penultimate para. This provision has been held constitutiqnal against claims
that it does not provide for a stay. Holladay v. Intercontinental Indus., Inc., 476 S.W.2d 779
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1972, writ refd n.r.e.). The same decision read in a right of judicial
review, although one is not given expressly in the statute; the review is by trial de novo in the
district court.
361. See, e.g., Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., Tex. State Sec. Board Order No. 5.0-608
(Mar. 7, 1978), revoking any secondary trading exemption for that company which filed for
reorganization under the bankruptcy laws on March 2, 1978.
362. The statute specifies that notice by certified or registered mail (with return receipt)
be given to dealers believed to be selling the security. But this may not be mandatory since
the last clause, making the action inapplicable before receipt of "actual notice," does not
indicate that the actual notice must be by registered or certified mail. The difference is
important since all registered dealers are sent the State Securities Board Monthly Bulletin
which summarizes § 5.0 suspensions (and other orders). Thus, by the time the Bulletin is
circulated, all dealers probably have "actual notice" sufficient to bind them by the § 5.0
order. Indeed, the Commissioner's typical press release on a § 5.0 suspension, and the en-
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may be vacated by the Commissioner on application of an interested party
under § 24 if the conditions leading to the order have changed. 363
A person who offers or sells a security after notice of a § 23A stop-sale
order on the security is a felon and may be fined $1,000, imprisoned two
years, or both, under § 29D. It seems doubtful that there is an implied
civil liability based on the criminal provision, for the Legislature has indi-
cated otherwise by creating the express liability; see Part 5.1.4 above.
6. Defenses. The main statutory defenses to § 33A(l) actions are ex-
emptions from the securities or person registration requirements on which
most § 33A(l) liability is based. These have already been discussed in the
relevant portions of Part 5 above dealing with the different bases of liabil-
ity. There may be defenses of invalidity of administrative actions whose
violation is alleged as the basis of liability. These too have been discussed
in place.
The scope of nonstatutory defenses is not well defined, and we will not
attempt an exhaustive treatment here. The courts have accepted equitable
defenses, such as pari delicto, in appropriate instances.364 Ratification
suing coverage in the financial and business press, may amount to "actual notice" although
it is not directly from the Commissioner to the dealer.
363. See, e.g., Fidelity Mortgage Investors, Tex. State Sec. Board Order No. V 5.0-609
(Mar. 20, 1978), vacating id No. 5.0-534 (Feb. 4, 1975). The earlier order was issued when
the company filed for bankruptcy reorganization, the later one when a bankruptcy reorgani-
zation plan was confirmed by the court and the company reported positive earnings and net
worth.
364. See Ladd v. Knowles, 505 S.W.2d 662, 668 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, writ
refd n.r.e.). Plaintiffs actively sought to buy stock that was already outstanding from a
private offering and that they thought would be enhanced by a future public offering. De-
fendants had made no effort to sell the stock. Plaintiffs knew the stock was speculative.
They knew it was unregistered and subject to transfer restrictions that might never be re-
moved. They knew the stock was not even in the seller's name. Id at 670-71. In affirming
judgment for defendants based on a jury verdict, the court wrote:
[I]f the transactions were in fact illegal solely because the stock was not regis-
tered, plaintiffs, by knowingly joining with defendants in the illegal scheme,
were equally culpable with defendants and, therefore, in pari delicto. As such,
plaintiffs were precluded from an instructed verdict on the ground alleged by
the provisions of [old § 33D].
Id at 668. Old § 33D (the same as new § 33K) makes contracts in violation of TSA unen-
forceable. Prof. Hamilton has pointed out that § 33D is not relevant since plaintiffs were
trying to rescind the contract, not to enforce it. Hamilton, Corporations, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 146, 169-70 (1975). He also criticizes any application of pari delicto
to registration violations because of the broad public policy in favor of registration. Id I
have little trouble with this policy when applied to an issuer, which has the primary respon-
sibility for complying with the securities laws. Even then, there may be situations in which
the equities between the parties outweigh the registration policy and justify pari delicto. But
for private resales, on which the § 5C(l) exemption is notoriously fuzzy (see note 102, para.
(B)(1) supra), there is less to say for the registration policy and more to say for balancing the
equities between the parties. I find the Ladd facts quite appropriate for pari delicto.
A version of pari delicto appears as dictum in an earlier case. "Only by charging [plain-
tiff] with knowledge that the Ambrosia stock was unregistered and that this fact made it
illegal for Allen [a defendant salesman) to solicit its sale could the question of Allen's au-
thority [to bind his employer] arise under this record." Christie v. Brewer, 374 S.W.2d 906,
913 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
In Malamphy v. Real-Tex Enterprises, 527 F.2d 978 (4th Cir. 1975), a pari delicto defense
was properly submitted to the jury and applied against buyers who were also brokers selling
for defendants to other buyers. The suit appears to have been mainly a fraud case, although
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may also be a defense.365 Laches has been held not to be a defense to a
statutory right like § 33A when suit is filed within the period of limita-
tions.366
Because § 33A(l), read literally, is a no-fault provision leading to poten-
tially huge liabilities for defendants and windfalls for plaintiffs, there is
room for the courts to deny rescission, or to deny any relief at all, when a
good faith effort to comply with an exemption has failed in some minor
respect.367
7. Relief For § 33A(l) [like §§ 33A(2) and 33C] the prescribed relief
is rescission or (if the buyer no longer owns the security) damages. If the
buyer still has the security, he must sue for rescission. This is the pattern
of most express liability statutes covering privity transactions. 368 The de-
tails of rescission and damages, including interest, costs, and (if the court
finds equitable) attorneys' fees are specified by § 33D and will be discussed
under that section in a later installment.
Despite the narrow range of remedies in § 33D, there may be room for
courts to fashion other remedies in suitable circumstances. 369
Section 33A(l) claims, based as they are on automatic liability for rela-
tively discrete and objective violations that are the same as to all concur-
rent buyers, tend to be well suited for class actions under Texas Rule of
Civil Procedure 42 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. "Security,"
nonregistration (of security or person), escrow violation, excess marketing
expense, stop-advertising order, stop-sale order, and exemption raise typi-
cal claims and defenses and common questions of law or fact that
the court refers to a § 33A allegation without saying whether it was § 33A(l) or (2). In any
event, the state claims were not submitted to the jury so there is no holding on pari delicto as
to the state claims.
For more general discussion of pari delicto and estoppel, see SOWARDS & HIRSCH
§ 9.02[4]; Annot., Purchaser's right to set up invalidiy of contract because of violation of state
securities regulation as affected by doctrines of estoppel or par; delicto, 84 A.L.R.2d 479
(1962).
365. Ratification was found by the trial court in Stone v. Enstam, 541 S.W.2d 473, 481
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ), discussed in notes 49 and 273 supra and accompany-
ing text. But the relevant facts are not given since the decision was affirmed on other
grounds.
366. Riggs v. Riggs, 322 S.W.2d 571, 574 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas, 1959, no writ).
367. For a full discussion in connection with the corresponding federal provision, see
Schneider & Zall, Section 12(1) and the Imperfect Exempt Transaction: The Proposed I & I
[Innocent and Immateriall Defense, 28 Bus. LAW. 1011 (1973).
368. Eg., 1933 Act § 12; UNIFORM ACT § 410(a). Express liability provisions for non-
rivity transactions typically authorize damages, e.g., 1933 Act §§ I1(a), (e); 1934 Act
9(e), 18(a). But implied liability by SEC Rule lOb-5 may take the form of damages even
though the buyer still holds the security. Eg., Pfeffer v. Cressaty, 223 F. Supp. 756
(S.D.N.Y. 1963); 1 BROMBERO §§ 2.5(5) and 9.1, at 226.
369. Cf. Meadows v. Bierschwale, 516 S.W.2d 125, 129-30 (Tex. 1974), rev'g andremand-
ing sub no. Bierschwale v. Oakes, 497 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1973). The supreme court approved the imposition of a constructive trust on the proceeds
the seller of securities received from resale of the property transferred to him in payment for
the securities. Although the seller's liability was based in part on § 33A(!) in the intermedi-
ate court, the § 33A(1) element was expressly not ruled on by the supreme court, which
decided only on common law or equitable grounds.
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predominate over individual questions. 37 0 Thus, the principal issues in a
class determination will be whether the class is so numerous that joinder is
impractical, whether the plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the in-
terests of the class, and whether a class action is superior to other methods
of adjudication.
8. Limitations Period. Section 33A(l) suits may be brought within
three years after the sale, but the limitation period may be shortened by a
rescission offer. The details of limitations are prescribed by § 33H(l) and
discussed in the later installment of this Article covering § 33H. The
three-year period is long compared to the one year for comparable viola-
tions of federal law37 ' and the two years for comparable violations of the
typical state law. 372 This is a great advantage for Texas plaintiffs.
9. Conclusion. We consider here the use, actual and potential, of
§ 33A(l), and offer criticisms of the statute as it is written.
9.1 Use of§ 33.4(1). Section 33A(l) is an automatic liability or
strict liability provision, not based on any fault of the defendant toward
the plaintiff. Liability is based solely on the defendant's failure to comply
with registration or other specified regulatory requirements. (See Part 5
above.) It is an extremely potent provision, perhaps too potent, as we shall
see in Part 9.2 below. Nonetheless, to judge from the reported cases, plain-
tiffs have not taken advantage of its power. I find only a handful of
cases-five reported and one unreported373 -in which a buyer plaintiff has
obtained a final judgment in a nonregistration suit under § 33A(l) or its
predecessors. In six other cases § 33A(1) plaintiffs have failed to prove a
necessary element,374 and in three more, defendants have established ex-
370. A good example, although not discussing the class criteria, is Searsy v. Commercial
Trading Corp., 560 S.W.2d 637 (Tex. 1977), rev'g 559 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Texarkana 1977), and affirming a trial court judgment of $187,759 for an 84-plaintiff class
suit based on nonregistration of commodity options as securities.
The most likely nontypical claim under § 33A(l) will be under § 9C if prospectuses are
given to some buyers but not all. If the issue is a defective prospectus, it will be typical and
common for all buyers who received the same prosepctus about the same time.
Improper offers (Part 5.1.2 above) may also present nontypical and noncommon issues.
There may be different sellers of the same security in different situations. See Part 3
above.
371. 1933 Act §§ 13, 12(1).
372. UNIFORM ACT §§ 410(e), (a)(l). All the state limitations statutes for technical or
registration violations are summarized in Bromberg, Curing Securities Violations: Rescission
Offers and Other Techniques, I J. CORP. L. 1, 7 n.27 (1975), and, more recently, in SOWARDS
& HIRSCH § 9.02[5.].
373. Searsy v. Commercial Trading Corp., 560 S.W.2d 637 (Tex. 1977), rev'g 559 S.W.2d
663 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977); Bateman v. Petro Atlas, Inc., Civ. No. 75-H-445
(S.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 1977); Brown v. Cole, 155 Tex. 624, 291 S.W.2d 704 (1956); Prokop v.
Krenek, 374 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Smith v. Smith, 424
S.W.2d 244 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1968, no writ); Smith v. Fishback, 123 S.W.2d 771
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1958, writ ref'd), note 18 supra.
374. LeNoble v. Weber, Hall, Cobb & Caudle, Inc., 503 S.W.2d 321 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Tyler 1973, no writ), note 111, para. (A) supra (nonregistration); Riggs v. Riggs, 322 S.W.2d
571 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1959, no writ), note 227 supra (tender required by 1941-1963
voidability provision, Appendix 3 below); Stone v. Enstam, 541 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1976, no writ), note 273 supra (seller, dealer or salesman); Chesnut v. Coastal
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emptions 375 or equitable defenses.376 The remaining reported nonregistra-
tion cases were not final dispositions. And there have been no reported
§ 33A(l) recoveries-indeed no reported litigation-for violations of § 9
(escrow, expense limits, and prospectus) or § 23 (stop-sale and stop-adver-
tising orders).
By contrast, nonregistration was a successful defense (under § 34 and its
predecessors) in more than a dozen suits for commissions.377
There are various possible explanations of the paucity of litigation
under § 33A(l). One is that most securities litigation is brought under fed-
eral law, using federal claims. But that does not prevent pendent state
claims, and there are instances in which § 33A(1) gives considerably
broader rights than the corresponding 1933 Act § 12(1).378 A second possi-
ble explanation is that Texans are too sporting to take advantage of regula-
tory or technical provisions like § 33A(1) to recover investments that have
gone bad. But that does not square very well with the happy embracement
of the same regulatory violations as a § 34 defense.379 A third possible
explanation is that potential plaintiffs and their counsel often overlook
§ 33A(l). I suspect this is true in many instances. Yet another possible
explanation is that, in many situations, § 33A(l) liability is so clear that a
defendant pays on threat of suit, or does not appeal from a trial court
decision.
Whatever the reason for the sparseness of § 33A(l) cases, a review of
them (and § 34 cases) reveals other interesting information about the use
Oil & Land Corp., 543 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.),
note 31 supra (sale); McConathy v. Dal Mac Commercial Rest Real Estate, Inc., 545 S.W.2d
871 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, no writ), notes 72, 87 supra (security); Matrix Com-
puting, Inc. v. Davis, 554 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, no writ), note 93
supra (damage).
375. Anderson v. Eliot, 333 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1960, writ refd),
notes 104, 230 supra (§ 5C(l)); see Sibley v. Horn Advertising, Inc., 505 S.W.2d 417 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ refd n.r.e.), note 104 supra (buyer, sued on purchase contract,
defended by alleging nonregistration; seller-plaintiff established § 51(a) exemption).
376. Ladd v. Knowles, 505 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, writ ref'd
n.r.e.), notes 166, 364 supra (pari deicto).
377. See cases in note 284 supra.
378. Comparison of§ 33A(1) and 1933 Act § 12(1). § 33A(l) allows or may allow recov-
ery for various things not actionable under federal law; e.g., oral offers during waiting pe-
riod, Part 5.1.2(B) above; preliminary prospectuses without the Texas legend, Part 5.1.2(C)
above; escrow violation, Part 5.2 above; excessive marketing expense, Part 5.3 above; unre-
gistered dealer (although there is an implied federal claim), Part 5.5 above; unregistered
salesman, Part 5.6 above; violation of stop-advertising order, Part 5.7 above. The state claim
based on unregistered security appears to be broader than the federal in at least one impor-
tant respect because the state exemption for resale of outstanding securities, § 5C(1), may be
significantly narrower than the federal analogue, 1933 Act § 4(l). See note 102, para. (B)(1)
supra. The Texas three-year limitation period is substantially longer than the federal, Part 8
above. In addition, a § 33A(l) plaintiff may receive attorney's fees if the court finds it equi-
table to award them. § 33D(7). A 1933 Act § 12(1) plaintiff generally cannot win attorney's
fees except in a class action, although an award is theoretically possible in any case in which
the court "believes the ... defense to have been without merit." 1933 Act § 1 1(e).
379. There are readily apparent differences-both psychological and financial-between
not suing and not defending when sued, Ze., between not fighting and not fighting back. So
it is natural that regulatory violation issues would emerge with greater proportional fre-
quency in the latter situation.
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of the two statutes. With very few exceptions,380 they have been used only
for off-market transactions (privately or individually negotiated) in non-
market securities (closely held company stock or, in almost all the early
cases, oil and gas interests). This is no great surprise, since regulatory
compliance is a norm for securities and persons in the organized markets.
9.2 Critique. The State Bar Committee gave no real considera-
tion to making fundamental changes in § 33A(l). 38 1 The general feel-
ing-and my own at the time-was that § 33A(1) had not caused serious
problems in the past, that other sections had caused serious problems
which needed attention, and any effort to make significant change in
§ 33A(1) would meet with strong resistance from the Commissioner and
his staff, which might imperil the whole bill.
The research and analysis for this Article have persuaded me that there
are serious problems with § 33A(1). To start with a minor one, its content
and balance are curious by comparison to the criminal provisions which
cover roughly the same range of conduct.382 Much more importantly,
§ 33A(l) and similar absolute liability provisions are a welsher's paradise.
They allow the buyer of a security to speculate-at the defendant's ex-
pense-on the market performance of the security and the economic per-
formance of the issuer for the three-year limitation period (unless a
rescission offer is made earlier). This distorts the risk distribution func-
tions of the capital market and has strong elements of unfairness. There
can be little doubt that absolute liability for regulatory violations contrib-
utes to important enforcement and deterrent purposes. (It may well be the
single most effective deterrent for honest businesses.) But it does not sat-
isfy the other purpose of civil liability: to compensate victims. Rather, it
compensates those who have incurred investment losses, for whatever rea-
son.
383
Nothing in § 33A(l) requires plaintiffs to show that their losses were in
any way caused by the violation. The section does not compensate victims
so much as it fines violators for the benefit of supposed victims. Moreover,
in many instances, the economic burden of these windfall fines is borne at
least indirectly by other innocent investors (shareholders of corporate vio-
lators). Often the violators acted in good faith, thinking they were not
380. The only organized-market cases we have found are LeNoble v. Weber, Hall, Cobb
& Caudle, Inc., 503 S.W.2d 321 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973, no writ), note II1 supra; Flow-
ers v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., 472 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. 1971), re'g 465 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1971), note 35 supra; and perhaps Christie v. Brewer, 374 S.W.2d 908
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1964, writ ref d n.r.e.), note 42 supra.
381. Changes were made or considered in the measure of damages, liability of peripheral
defendants, statute of limitations, and rescission offers for § 33A(l) situations. See discus-
sions of §§ 33D, 33F, 33H, and 331 in a later installment of this Article.
382. See note 94 upra.
383. Losses typically stem from factors which have nothing to do with securities viola-
tions, i.e., macroeconomic developments (recession, inflation, interest rate changes, etc.),
market conditions, industry conditions, or the business misfortunes of the issuer of the secur-
ity. These are investment risks of the kind securities investors undertake voluntarily. To
transfer them to innocent perpetrators of technical violations requires very strong justifica-
tion.
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selling "securities" or that an exemption-which later turned out to be in-
applicable-made registration unnecessary.
All these problems are more acute in the Texas statute than in most
other securities laws because of the long limitation period in TSA. They
are compounded by the inadequacy or uncertainty of some of the exemp-
tions on which liability for nonregistration depends-such as § 5C(l) for
sales of outstanding securities by owners.
The other no-fault provision, § 34 (banning commission suits by unre-
gistered persons), is subject to two of the same criticisms: it encourages
welshing (to the extent of the commission or compensation) and does not
compensate for losses caused by the violation. Indeed, § 34 may be used
by an investor who has profited on his transaction.
The reported cases on § 33A(l) and related no-fault provisions get very
low marks for equity. The decisions have often relieved business persons
of obligations incurred in arm's length transactions, 384 and allowed them
to shift high risks they accepted with open eyes. 38 5 In other instances,
plaintiffs have complained of fraud and won without having to prove it;386
indeed they sometimes won from persons who clearly had no part in the
fraud.387
Some courts have frankly recognized the inequities of their holdings:
True enough to hold Brown liable to respondents is a harsh penalty
and a rather inequitable result. The respondents were not misled by
Brown who made no profit or commission and likewise sustained a
total loss of his investment. The respondents knew that it was a spec-
384. See, e.g., Kadane v. Clark, 135 Tex. 496, 143 S.W.2d 197 (1940), discussed in note
17 supra Semble, under § 34 barring commission or compensation suits by unregistered
persons in nonexempt transactions, Maddox v. Flato, 423 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1967, writ refd n.r.e.), Remley v. Street, 523 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1975, writ refd n.r.e.), Sibley v. Coffield, 193 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1946, writ refd n.r.e.), Thywissen v. FTI Corp., 518 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1975, writ refd n.r.e.), and Tumblewood Bowling Corp. v.
Matise, 388 S.W.2d 479 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1965, writ reed n.r.e.), note 284 supra;
Mecom v. Hamblen, 155 Tex. 494, 289 S.W.2d 553 (1956), note 287 supra.
385. See, e.g., Brown v. Cole, 155 Tex. 624, 291 S.W.2d 704 (1956), discussed in text
accompanying notes 38-39 supra; Smith v. Smith, 424 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1968, no writ), discussed in text accompanying note 40 supra.
386. See, e.g., Smith v. Fishback, 123 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1938, writ
refd), discussed in note 18 supra; Brown v. Cole, 155 Tex. 624, 391 S.W.2d 704 (1956),
discussed in text accompanying notes 38-39 supra. That this was at bottom a case of fraud
by nondefendants is acknowledged by the court: "Some months later, the parties hereto
[plaintiffs Gould and Cole and defendant Brown] ascertained that the affairs of these two
Mexican corporations had been misrepresented to them by Fields and Kane .... 291
S.W.2d at 707.
In Bierschwale v. Oakes, 497 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1973), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. Meadows v. Bierschwale, 516 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. 1974), notes 100,
227 supra, plaintiffs proved untruths and omissions but failed to bring themselves within old
(1963) § 33A(2). Nonetheless, they won under § 33A(l).
Cf. Christie v. Brewer, 374 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1964, writ refd n.r.e.),
discussed in text accompanying note 42 supra. This may well have been a fraud case at
bottom (one of the defendants was under felony indictment for the same transactions).
Plaintiff won the trial, but the case was reversed and remanded.
387. Brown v. Cole, 155 Tex. 624, 291 S.W.2d 704 (1956), notes 38-39 supra.
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ulation and presumably at the time considered that they stood to lose.
Naturally if the venture had turned out to be in their favor no doubt
they would gladly have accepted the profit. On the other hand, the
case is not one dealing with equitable principles, but with the applica-
tion of the Securities Act that was enacted to prevent the very thing
that happened here, namely, the sale of worthless stock. Despite our
natural sympathy for the petitioner under these circumstances we
must sustain respondent's cause of action .... 388
The courts could improve their marks by shading their interpretations-of
"security," 389 of §§ 33A(l) and 34,390 and of exemptions from them-to fit
the equities of the facts at bar.
A more equitable § 33A(1) could be drafted. It might be one, like
Ohio's, which creates civil liability for registration and related violation
"unless the court determines that the violation did not materially affect the
protection contemplated by the violated provision."' 39' It might, like ex-
isting and proposed federal provisions, allow a defense that plaintiffs loss
was not caused by the violation.392 Better yet would be a more general
mitigation standard. 393
A no-fault provision like § 33A(l) should have a short statute of limita-
tions since the windfall character becomes more pronounced the longer the
buyer of a security can speculate on the market or the success of the issuer
388. Brown v. Cole, 155 Tex. 624, 291 S.W.2d 704, 711 (1956), note 38 supra.
389. See further argument on this in Part 4.2 above.
390. E.g., of critical terms like "dealer" and "person who sells." See Parts 5.5.3 and 3
above.
391. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.43, amendment reprinted in 2 BLUE SKY L. REP.
(CCH) 38,143 (1978). Defendant has the burden of proving that the violation did not
affect the protection intended by the statute. Biernbaum v. Midwest Oil & Gas Co., 108
Ohio App. 560, 160 N.E.2d 410 (1959). Apparently he does not do so merely by showing
that plaintiffs loss was caused by factors such as the failure of the company. Miller v. Grif-
fith, 92 Ohio L. Ab. 488, 196 N.E.2d 154 (C.P. 1961). On the other hand, he should be able
to do so by showing that plaintiff received the same disclosure he would have had if the sale
had been registered instead of exempt.
392. 1933 Act § 11 (e): damages for untrue or omissive registration statement not recover-
able to extent defendant proves "that any portion ... of such damages represents other
than the depreciation in value of such security resulting from such [untrue or omissive] part
of the registration statement." For application, see Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip.
Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 586 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (loss of value proportional to general stock
market decline, measured by Standard & Poor's Daily Stock Price Index, not recoverable).
ALl FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1708(B)(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1978): for certain
frauds, the specified measure of damages "is reduced to the extent (which may be complete)
that the defendant proves that the violation did not cause the loss."
393. The maximum flexibility is given by ALl FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 2007 (Pro-
posed Official Draft 1978):
If a defendant in an action under section 1702 [sales without registration, etc.]
proves (a) that he acted honestly and reasonably, and (b) that any illegality on
his part was inadvertent and did not substantially threaten the purposes of this
Code, the court may deny or modify rescission or limit damages to the extent
justice requires.
For other methods of mitigating the strictures of absolute civil liability, see Schneider &
Zall, Section 12(1) and the Imperfect Exempt Transaction: The Proposed I & I Defense, 28
Bus. LAW. 1011 (1973); Bromberg, Curing Securities Violations Rescission Offers and Other
Techniques, 1 J. CORP. L. 1, 50 (1975).
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before he demands his money back with interest from the seller. Texas'
three-year period is far too long on the equities, and considerably longer
than the one year under federal law and the two years of most other
states.
394
Another essential of a fair system of absolute liability-and of a system
in which self-policing can work optimally-is a reasonable and clear set of
definitions and exemptions which determine whether registration is neces-
sary. TSA has major shortcomings in this respect, e.g, the overbroad § 4C
definition of dealer (Part 5.5.3 above), the overnarrow § 5C(l) exemption
for resales of outstanding securities by owners,395 and the uncertainty
whether use of an unregistered dealer or agent destroys a seller's § 5C(l)
or § 5Q exemption.3 96
Clarification is also badly needed for what is included in the 20% maxi-
mum on marketing expenses for § 9B, and when is a lower limit a "re-
quirement" of the Commissioner (Part 5.3.1 above). Given the dubious
effects of such limits, I have grave doubts whether they should be imposed
at all, and even graver doubts whether automatic liability-for the entire
consideration paid, not just the excess expense--should result from ex-
ceeding them. Other parts of § 33A(l) liability based on § 9 are fuzzy too.
Liability for § 9A violations should be limited to failure to escrow funds
and improper release of funds, and there is need for more specificity about
the measure of liability (Part 5.2.1 above). Liability for § 9C violations
should be limited to failure to deliver a prospectus (Part 5.4.1 above).
Liability based on § 23 violations needs better definition too, especially
as to who is covered by a § 23A stop-sale order (Part 5.8.1 above).
There are other acts which appear to, but should not, lead to absolute
liability under § 33A(1). I have already noted the bizarre results that
§ 33A(l) may produce when sales comply with TSA but are preceded by
offers which do not.397 I have considered there the means by which the
courts might avoid these results, and the ways in which TSA should be
amended to avoid them, e.g., by deleting "offers" from § 33A(l) so that it
is confined to "sales" in violation.
Section 33A(l) does not extend civil liability to all regulatory violations
that might injure investors. Thus, § 22 advertising rules are not covered by
§ 33A(l). There is no good reason why they should be covered. Other
sanctions are available to enforce them. Moreover, as noted in Parts
5.1.2(C) and (D) above, there is considerable overlap between § 22 and
other provisions, and what § 22 adds is not significant in terms of the kind
of investor protection for which automatic civil liability ought to be im-
posed.
Absolute liability serves important enforcement and deterrent functions.
So does capital punishment, but no one has suggested that it be decreed for
394. See Part 8 above.
395. Note 102, para. (B)(1) supra and accompanying text.
396. Notes 295-97 supra and accompanying text.
397. Parts 5.1.2, 5.1.2(A)-(D), 5.4.1 above.
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failure to register under the securities laws. Powerful sanctions require
very selective application in very clear-cut circumstances. Section 33A(l)
and the provisions it incorporates should not be scrapped, but should be
limited in some respects and clarified in many.
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APPENDIX 1
1977 Civil Liability Provision-TSA § 33398
Sec. 33. Civil Liabilities
A. Liability of Sellers.
(1) Registration and Related Violations. A person who offers or sells a
security in violation of Section 7, 9 (or a requirement of the Commissioner
thereunder), 12, 23B, or an order under 23A of this Act is liable to the
person buying the security from him, who may sue either at law or in eq-
uity for rescission or for damages if the buyer no longer owns the security.
(2) Untruth or Omission. A person who offers or sells a security
(whether or not the security or transaction is exempt under Section 5 or 6
of this Act) by means of an untrue statement of a material fact or an omis-
sion to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not
misleading, is liable to the person buying the security from him, who may
sue either at law or in equity for rescission, or for damages if the buyer no
longer owns the security. However, a person is not liable if he sustains the
burden of proof that either (a) the buyer knew of the untruth or omission
or (b) he (the offeror or seller) did not know, and in the exercise of reason-
able care could not have known, of the untruth or omission. The issuer of
the security (other than a government issuer identified in Section 6A) is not
entitled to the defense in clause (b) with respect to an untruth or omission
(i) in a prospectus required in connection with a registration statement
under Section 7A, 7B, or 7C, or (ii) in a writing prepared and delivered by
the issuer in the sale of a security.
B. Liability of Buyers. A person who offers to buy or buys a security
(whether or not the security or transaction is exempt under Section 5 or 6
of this Act) by means of an untrue statement of a material fact or an omis-
sion to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not
misleading, is liable to the person selling the security to him, who may sue
either at law or in equity for rescission or for damages if the buyer no
longer owns the secunty. However, a person is not liable if he sustains the
burden of proof that either (a) the seller knew of the untruth or omission,
or (b) he (the offeror or buyer) did not know, and in the exercise of reason-
able care could not have known, of the untruth or omission.
C. Liability of Nonselling Issuers Which Register.
(1) This Section 33C applies only to an issuer which registers under
Section 7A, 7B, or 7C of this Act, or under Section 6 of the U.S. Securities
Act of 1933, its outstanding securities for offer and sale by or for the owner
of the securities.
(2) If the prospectus required in connection with the registration con-
tains, as of its effective date, an untrue statement of a material fact or an
398. 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 170, § 1, at 344.
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omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not
misleading, the issuer is liable to a person buying the registered security,
who may sue either at law or in equity for rescission or for damages if the
buyer no longer owns the securities. However, an issuer is not liable if it
sustains the burden of proof that the buyer knew of the untruth or omis-
sion.
D. Rescission and Damages. For this Section 33:
(1) On rescission, a buyer shall recover (a) the consideration he paid
for the security plus interest thereon at the legal rate from the date o the
payment by him, less (b) the amount of any income he received on the
security, upon tender of the security (or a security of the same class and
series).
(2) On rescission, a seller shall recover the security (or a security of the
same class and series) upon tender of (a) the consideration he received for
the security plus interest thereon at the legal rate from the date of receipt
by him, less (b) the amount of any income the buyer received on the secur-
ity.
(3) In damages, a buyer shall recover (a) the consideration he paid for
the security plus interest thereon at the legal rate from the date of the pay-
ment by him, less (b) the value of the security at the time he disposed of it
plus the amount of any income he received on the security.
(4) In damages, a seller shall recover (a) the value of the security at the
time of sale plus the amount of any income the buyer received on the se-
curity, less (b) the consideration paid the seller for the security plus interest
thereon at the legal rate from the date of payment to the seller.
(5) For a buyer suing under Section 33C, the consideration he paid
shall be deemed the lesser of (a) the price he paid and (b) the price at
which the security was offered to the public.
(6) On rescission or as a part of damages, a buyer or a seller shall also
recover costs.
(7) On rescission or as a part of damages, a buyer or a seller may also
recover reasonable attorney's fees if the court finds that the recovery would
be equitable in the circumstances.
E.. Time of Tender. Any tender specified in Section 33D may be made
at any time before entry of judgment.
F. Liability of Control Persons and Aiders.
(1) A person who directly or indirectly controls a seller, buyer, or is-
suer of a security is liable under Section 33A, 33B, or 33C jointly and
severally with the seller, buyer, or issuer, and to the same extent as if he
were the seller, buyer, or issuer, unless the controlling person sustains the
burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable
care could not have known, of the existence of the facts by reason of which
the liability is alleged to exist.
(2) A person who directly or indirectly with intentio deceive or de-
fraud or with reckless disregard for the truth or the law materially aids a
seller, buyer, or issuer of a security is liable under Section 33A, 33B, or
33C jointly and severally with the seller, buyer, or issuer, and to the same
extent as if he were the seller, buyer, or issuer.
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(3) There is contribution as in cases of contract among the several per-
sons so liable.
G. Survivability ofActions. Every cause of action this Act survives
the death of any person who might have been a plaintiff or defendant.
H. Statute of Limitations.
(1) No person may sue under Section 33A(l) or 33F so far as it relates
to Section 33A(l):
(a) -more than three years after the sale; or
(b) if he received a rescission offer (meeting the requirements of Sec-
tion 331) before suit unless he (i) rejected the offer in writing within 30
days of its receipt and (ii) expressly reserved in the rejection his right to
sue; or
(c) more than one year after he so rejected a rescission offer meeting
the requirements of Section 331.
(2) No person may sue under Section 33A(2), 33C, or 33F so far as it
relates to 33A(2) or 33C:
(a) more than three years after discovery of the untruth or omission, or
after discovery should have been made by the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence; or
(b) more than five years after the sale; or
(c) if he received a rescission offer (meeting the requirements of Sec-
tion 331) before suit, unless he (i) rejected the offer in writing within 30
days of its receipt, and (ii) expressly reserved in the rejection his right to
sue; or
(d) more than one year after he so rejected a rescission offer meeting
the requirements of Section 331.
(3) No person may sue under Section 33B or 33F so far as it relates to
Section 33B:
(a) more than three years after discovery of the untruth or omission, or
after discovery should have been made by the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence; or
(b) more than five years after the purchase; or
(c) if he received a rescission offer (meeting the requirements of Sec-
tion 33J) before suit unless he (i) rejected the offer in writing within 30
days of its receipt, and (ii) expressly reserved in the rejection his right to
sue; or
(d) more than one year after he so rejected a rescission offer meeting
the requirements of Section 33J.
I. Requirements of a Rescission Offer to Buyers. A rescission offer
under Section 33H(l) or (2) shall meet the following requirements:
(1) The offer shall include financial and other information material to
the offeree's decision whether to accept the offer, and shall not contain an
untrue statement of a material fact or an omission to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they are made, not misleading.
(2) The offeror shall deposit funds in escrow in a state or national bank
doing business in Texas (or in another bank approved by the commis-
sioner) or receive an unqualified commitment from such a bank to furnish
funds sufficient to pay the amount offered.
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(3) The amount of the offer to a buyer who still owns the security shall
be the amount (excluding costs and attorney's fees) he would recover on
rescission under Section 33D(1).
(4) The amount of the offer to a buyer who no longer owns the security
shall be the amount (excluding costs and attorney's fees) he would recover
in damages under Section 33D(3).
(5) The offer shall state:
(a) the amount of the offer, as determined pursuant to Paragraph (3) or
(4) above, which shall be given (i) so far as practicable in terms of a speci-
fied number of dollars and a specified rate of interest for a period starting
at a specified date, and (ii) so far as necessary, in terms of specified ele-
ments (such as the value of the security when it was disposed of by the
offeree) known to the offeree but not to the offeror, which are subject to the
furnishing of reasonable evidence by the offeree.
(b) the name and address of the bank where the amount of the offer
will be paid.
(c) that the offeree will receive the amount of the offer within a speci-
fied number of days (not more than 30) after receipt by the bank, in form
reasonably acceptable to the offeror, and in compliance with the instruc-
tions in the offer, of:
(i) the security, if the offeree still owns it, or evidence of the fact and
date of disposition if he no longer owns it; and
(ii) evidence, if necessary, of elements referred to in Paragraph (a)(ii)
above.
(d) conspicuously that the offeree may not sue on his purchase under
Section 33 unless:
(i) he accepts the offer but does not receive the amount of the offer, in
which case he may sue within the time allowed by Section 33H(l)(a) or
33H(2)(a) or (b), as applicable; or
(ii) he rejects the offer in writing within 30 days of its receipt and ex-
pressly reserves in the rejection his right to sue, in which case he may sue
within one year after he so rejects.
(e) in reasonable detail, the nature of the violation of this Act that oc-
curred or may have occurred.
(f) any other information the offeror wants to include.
J. Requirements of a Rescission Offer to Sellers. A rescission offer
under Section 33H(3) shall meet the following requirements:
(1) The offer shall include financial and other information material to
the offeree's decision whether to accept the offer, and shall not contain an
untrue statement of a material fact or an omission to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they are made, not misleading.
(2) The offeror shall deposit the securities in escrow in a state or na-
tional bank doing business in Texas (or in another bank approved by the
commissioner).
(3) The terms of the offer shall be the same (excluding costs and attor-
ney's fees) as the seller would recover on rescission under Section 33D(2).
(4) The offer shall state:
(a) the terms of the offer, as determined pursuant to Paragraph (3)
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above, which shall be given (i) so far as practicable in terms of a specified
number and kind of securities and a specified rate of interest for a period
starting at a specified date, and (ii) so far as necessary, in terms of specified
elements known to the offeree but not the offeror, which are subject to the
furnishing of reasonable evidence by the offeree.
(b) the name and address of the bank where the terms of the offer will
be carried out.
(c) that the offeree will receive the securities within a specified number
of days (not more than 30) after receipt by the bank, in form reasonably
acceptable to the offeror, and in compliance with the instructions in the
offer, of:
(i) the amount required by the terms of the offer; and
(ii) evidence, if necessary, of elements referred to in Paragraph (a)(ii)
above.
(d) conspicuously that the offeree may not sue on his sale under Sec-
tion 33 unless:
(i) he accepts the offer but does not receive the securities, in which case
he may sue within the time allowed by Section 33H(3)(a) or (b), as applica-
ble; or
(ii) he rejects the offer in writing within 30 days of its receipt and ex-
pressly reserves in the rejection his right to sue, in which case he may sue
within one year after he so rejects.
(e) in reasonable detail, the nature of the violation of this Act that oc-
curred or may have occurred.
(f) any other information the offeror wants to include.
K. Unenforceability of Illegal Contracts. No person who has made or
engaged in the performance of any contract in violation of any provision
of this Act or any rule or order or requirement hereunder, or who has
acquired any purported right under any such contract with knowledge of
the facts by reason of which its making or performance was in violation,
may base any suit on the contract.
L. Waivers Void. A condition, stipulation, or provision binding a
buyer or seller of a security to waive compliance with a provision of this
Act or a rule or order or requirement hereunder is void.
M. Saving of Existing Remedies. The rights and remedies provided
by this Act are in addition to any other rights (including exemplary or
punitive damages) or remedies that may exist at law or in equity.
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TEXAS SECURITIES A CT-CIVIL LIABILITY
APPENDIX 2
1963-1977 Civil Liability Provision 399
Sec. 33. Civil Liabilities
A. Any person who
(1) Offers or sells a security in violation of Sections 7, 9 (or any re-
quirement of the Commissioner thereunder), 12, 23B or any order under
23A of this Act, or
(2) Offers or sells a security (whether or not the security or transaction
is exempt under Section 5 or 6 of this Act) by means of any untrue state-
ment of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made not misleading (when the person buy-
ing the security does not know of the untruth or omission, and who in the
exercise of reasonable care could not have known of the untruth or omis-
sion) is liable to the person buying the security from him, who may sue
either at law or in equity to recover the consideration paid for the security,
together with interest at six per cent (6%) per year from the date of pay-
ment, less the amount of any income received on the security upon the
tender of the security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security.
Damages are the amount that would be recoverable upon a tender less (a)
the value of the security when the buyer disposed of it and (b) interest at
six per cent (6%) per year on such value from the date of disposition.
Nothing herein shall prevent the award of punitive or exemplary damages
in an amount not to exceed twice the actual damages, as found by the jury,
when such false representation or omission is proven to be willfully made.
B. Every cause of action under this Act survives the death of any per-
son who might have been a plaintiff or defendant.
C. No person may sue under Subsection A(l) of this Section 33 more
than three (3) years after the contract of sale. No person may sue under
said Subsection A(1) if the buyer received a written offer accompanied by
reasonable financial information before suit and at a time when he owned
the security, to refund the consideration paid together with interest at six
per cent (6%) per year from the date of payment, less the amount of any
income received on the security, and he failed to accept the offer within
thirty (30) days of its receipt; or if the buyer received such an offer in the
amount specified above less the value of the security when the buyer dis-
posed of it, and less interest at six per cent (6%) per year on such value
from date of disposition, before suit and at a time when he did not own the
security, unless he rejected the offer in writing within thirty (30) days of its
receipt. In connection with any such offer, the seller shall deposit funds in
escrow in a state or national bank doing business in the State of Texas, or
receive an unqualified commitment from such bank to furnish funds, suffi-
cient to provide for the refund on all securities covered by the offer. The
notice accompanying such offer shall state (1) the name of such bank
399. 1963 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 170, § 12, at 478.
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where the refund may be obtained upon the surrender of the security, or if
the buyer has disposed of such security upon satisfactory proof of such
disposition and of the value received therefor, and (2) that buyer, upon
receipt of the refund, may not sue to recover the consideration paid plus
interest or for damages under Subsection A(1) of this Section 33, and (3)
that the buyer, in the event of failure to accept the offer within thirty (30)
days of its receipt, may not sue to recover the consideration paid plus inter-
est or for damages under. Subsection A(1) of this Section 33. No person
may sue under Subsection A(2) more than three (3) years after the contract
of sale or more than three (3) years after the buyer in the exercise of ordi-
nary care should have discovered that such sale was made in violation of
said Subsection A(2). Nothing in this Subsection C shall affect or restrict
the periods of limitation or other rights applicable to causes of action
based on fraud brought pursuant to Article 4004 of the Revised Civil Stat-
utes.
D. No person who has made or engaged in the performance of any
contract in violation of any provision of this Act or any rule or order or
requirement hereunder, or who has acquired any purported right under
any such contract with knowledge of the facts by reason of which its mak-
ing or performance was in violation, may base any suit on the contract.
E. Any condition, stipulation or provision binding any person acquir-
ing any security to waive compliance with any provision of this Act or any
rule or order or requirement hereunder is void.
F. The rights and remedies provided by this Act are in addition to any
other rights or remedies that may exist at law or in equity.
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TEXAS SECURITIES ACT-CIVIL LIABILITY
APPENDIX 3
1941-1963 Civil Liability Provision 400
Every sale or contract of sale of any security made in violation of any
provision of this Act shall be voidable at the election of the purchaser, who
shall be entitled to recover from the seller in an action at law, upon tender
to the seller of the security sold, in proper form for transfer, together with
the amount of all dividends, interest, and other income and distributions
received by the purchaser from or upon such security, the full amount paid
by such purchaser for such security, with interest from the date of
purchase; provided that any action by a purchaser to enforce any right or
liability based upon any sale made in violation of any provision of this Act
or any Acts predecessor thereto or amendatory thereof or upon any mis-
representation made in connection with such sale, shall be commenced
within two (2) years after the purchaser thereof has knowledge that such
sale was made in violation of any provision of this Act, or Acts predecessor
thereto or amendatory thereof, or upon a misrepresentation, or within two
(2) years after such purchaser, by the exercise of ordinary care, should
have discovered that such sale was made in violation of this Act or Acts
predecessor thereto or amendatory thereof, or upon a misrepresentation,
and not thereafter; and provided further, that no purchaser shall bring any
action under this Act against the seller unless: (1) at least fifteen (15) days
before filing suit, he shall have made a written demand on the seller for a
refund of the full amount paid by the purchaser for the security, with inter-
est from the date of purchase, less the amount of any income from such
security that may have been received by the purchaser, and he shall have
tendered to the seller the securities sold in proper form for transfer; and (2)
the seller shall not have made such refund and accepted such tender within
the said fifteen (15) days.
400. 1941 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 363, § 1, at 593, adding § 33a; 1955 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch.
67, § 34, at 344; 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 269, § 33, at 600-01. The advance demand re-
quirement (the clause beginning "and provided further") was not added until 1955.
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APPENDIX 4
1975 Commission Ban-TSA § 34401
34. Actions for Commission; Allegations and Proof of Compliance
No person or company shall bring or maintain any action in the courts
of this state for collection of a commission or compensation for services
rendered in the sale or purchase of securities, as that term is herein de-
fined, without alleging and proving that such person or company was duly
licensed under the provisions hereof and the securities so sold were duly
registered under the provisions hereof at the time the alleged cause of ac-
tion arose; provided, however, that this section or provision of this Act
shall not apply (1) to any transaction exempted by Section 5 of this Act,
nor (2) to the sale or purchase of any security exempted by Section 6 of this
Act.
401. 1941 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 363, § 2, at 593-94 (except that the proviso read: "this
Section or provision of this act shall not apply to the exempt transactions set forth in Section
3 of this Act or to the sale and purchase of securities listed in Section 23 of this Act, when
sold by a registered dealer"); 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 269, § 34, at 601 (except that the
proviso read: "this section or provision of this Act shall not apply to the exempt transactions
set forth in Section 5 of this Act nor to the sale and purchase of exempt securities listed in
Section 6 of this Act, when sold by a registered dealer '); 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 78, § 3, at
206, codified as TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-34 (Vernon Supp. 1978). The reason for
the 1975 change is discussed in note 288 supra.
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